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ill

PREFA.CE

Several years of association with the subjoct-matter of the thesis has
taught the author that he is presenting only a brief introduction to ICiarkegaardts Phi1080Ph;y
sis may

~pear

or

Religion.

In spite of this llrd.tation, however, the th

to the reader to be too 1en.gtb.y'. It was thought best, therefor

to omit an expanded treatment of Kierlcegaard's.llf'e and the background of the
times in which be l1yed.

The interested reader I'IIIA7 find this information in

the following works. E. L. Allen, Existentialism From Within, (London, 1953),
pp. 3-7; Walter Lowrie,

!. Short

~

£'!. K1erkegaard

1944), pp. 1-16J H. V. Martin, Kierkegaard,

(Princeton, New Jcosey,

!h!. Melanchol;r l?!!!!

(London, 1950),

!!!.2 Kicokegaard (London, 1941), pp. 1-40;
Philosophy .2! Religion (Princeton, New Jersey,

pp. 24-33. Denail Patrick, Pascal
Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard.'s
1948), pp. 3-1.

The word "Bellef" is used in the title to signify that the prima.ry occupatlon of the thesis is with the psychological and ontological character of
human belief', and not wi til Supernatural Fa! th.

Very special thanks are due to the ReY'erend Robert F. HarV'cu, S.J.,

ot

West Baden College and to the ReYermd Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., of 1o)"Ola
University for their ldn&Iness and helptulnes8, and to Mrs. C. P. Culhane, of
Detroit, Michigan. t«> undertaking the task ot typing the final copies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Sor~

Aabye Kierkegaard was bom in Copenhagen. Denmark. on May

5. 181.3.

the seventh and last child of Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard and Ana ~rensdatter
Lund Kurkegaard.

Ane was Michael Kierkegaard's second wite (his first wife

having died childless atter two years of married. life), and had been a maidservant in his home.

The father, Michael K1erkegaard, bad risen .from the sta-

tus of a hungry shepherd boT on the West Jutland heaths to a position of
wealth as a hoaier in the city of Copenhagen.

At the age of fortT, thirteen

years We1"ore the birth of ~ren, he decided that he had 'earned enough money to
live the rest

or

his lite in retirement.

He spent his time thereatter reading

and pondering religious and phUosophica.l questions. l
Michael Kierkegaard was a man of deep and brooding dLsposition,.. given to

cea8eles8 introspection.

As a boy, he had cursed God for allowing him, a poor

and hungry shepherd to suffer so much without coming to his aid.

ae looked

upon his later prosperi tT as God' 8 answer to his curse, signit)'ing that his
guilt was

80

great that it could never be atoI8d for in this life, but would

be punished onl,y in eternitT. When his youngest child was born, he decided

lJohannes Hohlen.berg, SEen Kierkegaard, trans. T. H. Croxa.ll (Nev
York. 19$6), p. 22.
1

2

the boy was to be the means of reconciliation between hiuelf and God as
kind of sacritice.

He resolved, therefore, to bring up hie lion to accept

rom God' II hand. his I113'sterioue fate.

2

The relationship between father and son became inti.Jllate and rather unusual.

tu,ture of their companionship was the
r in imagination.

M

in<k>or walks" which they took toge-

During these walks, as they paced back and forth across

room, the elder Kierkegaard would describe vividly and minutely everything
ey "saw" and eYer;yone they "met a on the wq.

When he was old enough to do

, the boy joined in the descriptions, and the two would construct a fantasy..

•

which the;r followed various rat tes through the city, met and conversed with

rieDds, a'ld "if they went elong well-known wqs, they watched each other sharp-

to see that nothing was overlooked.") The lather insisted that f!Nery detail
the walk be as sharply' reproduced and as true to life as possible.

It was during these imaginary walks that young S~ren l1ericegaud developed
e vivid and f<rceful imagination 1Ih1eh he displqs in all his ~t;lngs .. and

ch, because
OUB

or

its exactitude, conjures up tor the reader clear cd spontan-

pictures ot real life.

His father's insistence upon exactness also devel-

pad in the boy a remarkable precicion in spe ech and expression, which tills
II

lIOrks with the accents of 11fe.
In addition to joining his father on imaginary walks, spren was also per-

tted to be preaent at conversations on theological topics which his father

2

Ibid.,

2,.

)Ibid., 32. lierkegaard tells this storr in his own words in his
ournals, trans. Alexander Dru (Oxford, 1939), pp. loB-lll.

otten held

~d th

others.

At these tines, said Kierkegaard later, his father

"combined with his almibhty imagination an irresistible dialectic,.4 which

~

pressed the youth, and upon which he modelled his later writings.
The third, and most impor'tant, innua'1ce which :U.chael lUerkegaard axel'-

cised upon his youngest son was through training in Christianity.
give the child as earJ.,y as possible an

It

impression of Christ ••

He tried to

> From his fa-

ther's program. of training, K1erkegaard ,farmed two convictials: "First, he
felt that he was destined to suffer in this world., that he was a sacrifice who
could not expect to partake in what people usuall¥ understand as a happy liteJ

and, secordl.1, he felt offence at Christianity end in revolt against God, because He had nBce the world as it is, and put Sttch de!"tal1ds on men • • • • He

neTer wholly" succeeded in resolving this anom.a.ly.lI

6

From his father, then., Kierkegaard received a. vivid and meticulous imagination, a passion for dialectics, and a sense of dedication to sutfering.
In his own l<fords, he "went into life favoured in every way as :r:egands 1ntel-

lectual abilities and outward prosperity,"

7 but marred with the inli'eritance

of his iather's brooding and introspective spirit.

This broodiness was to

color his whole production as an author and to influence proioundly his whole
life.

8

4Kierkegaard,

!!:! JoUI'IUiU.s,

p. 109.

'Hohlenberg, p. 38.

6
Drld.,

174

7S,ren Kierkegaard, The Point of View For
Walter Lowrie (Oxford,

-

8Ibid •

1939),p.,-s:" -

!t Work As An Author,
--

t.rans.

4
He entered the U:niversity of Copenhagen in 18.30, but his study was desultory.

He finished the prescribed undergradua.te courses, and entered the

school of theology out of d.eference to the wishes of his father and the example
of his older brother.

He spent most of his time, however, i.n Ita. wide assort-

ment of aesthetic stuo.ies and read much fiction (especially the Gdrman Roman9
ticists),11 and his spare hours were occupied in visits to the Student Union,
the coffee shops and theatres.

dis whole cmduct was that of the typical rich

man • s son, for whom. study was a bore.
During his sta;y

ters died.

at the university, his mother, one brother, and two sis-

(One sister had died JI\8ZQ' years before.)

These deaths did not a1'-

feet the young Kierkegaard, but they affected his father proIoundl,Y'J and some
time between 1835 and 1837, in a drunken state, he revel!l.ed to his son Sp.el1

two secret sins which he had committed: first, that he bad cursed God in his
boyhood; second, that Spren t s mother had been pregnant at the time of her marriage to Je{ichael Kierkegaard, and that. the wedding had taken place only a tev
of

months a.fter the death of his first wife.

The shock of these revelations, to-

gether w.:I.th the sudden recollection that he himself had visited a brothel while
in an intoxicated state" awakened the young man to the necessity of a JIlOral re-

generation.

He turned s eriousl¥ to stud\r; but he studied aesthetics exclusive-

ly, and abandoned theology.

In 1838 the elder Kierkegaard died.

This event proved to be the occasion

tor a spiritual regeneration in S;ren's life.

9Hohlenberg, p.

16.

He returned to the study ot

!theology and passed his examinations on July 3, 1840.
~s

There i. no record of

being ordained for the ministry at this title, or later.
During the same year, 1840, he became engaged to Regine Olsen, who was se-

venteen years old at that time; but after the engagement, he found that he could.
not bring himself to go through with the marriage.

.His feeling of guilt for his

own sins, his supposed sharilg in his father's guilt, md his inherited broociing
disposition, all hindered him from wishing to share his life with her.
ly", he felt that he had a mission to perform in the wcrld,

10

Basical-

and that to ask her

to share the persecution which he was sure would accompany that mission would be
an injustice to ber.

He resolved to set her free tram a:n;r attachment to him

b7

acting boorishly and aoopt1ng a cynic&l snner toward her, so that she 'WOuld

to hate

bane

and

despise him.

In 1841 the engagement was broken, with mxch pain on both side., which
~en tor his part resolved not to show.
~ti1

Regine's attachment to him continued

her death, mare than sixty years later.

He remained faithful to
her,
f
o

~ough she

rarried ancther and mOlred to South America; an:l mal\Y r1 his writings

~ cr,rptic messages of explanation to her.U
Alter Kierkegaard' 8 broken engagement, there tollow-ed a £ruittul period
~f

writmg, largely concerned with anti-Hegelian tracts.

This period of Kler-

Fegaard,ts lite will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.
In 1840 there was founded in Copenhagen a witty &nd impudent newspaper

alled the Corsair.

10

Its editorial policy was to caricature, tnrough articles

-

--

r1erkegaard, The Point of View, p. 78.

U

See Hohlenberg, pp.

115-135.

6
and cartoons, the political figures of the
the displeasure of its editors.
~ember

~,

and aqrone else who incurred

In 1846, P. L. ~ller, a secret and powerful

of the Corsair's staff, began a bitter and derisive attack upon the

[books of Kierkegaard, writing in the pages of a periodical called Gaea, an aesIthetic "annual.

Kierkegaard answered through a newspaper called the Fatherland.

4Pller 1 s attack apread to the pages of the Corsair, which, under the editorShip
pf one Meyer Goldschmidt.. began a relentless campaign ot ridicule and persecu~ion against Kierkegurd.

By' 1848 the Corsair' a ruthless campaign of ridicule

~ been successful, largely because ICierkegaarc:i's personality, with his pecu~ar appearance, dress, habits, and speech, was an inexhaustible aource of de~ision.

The whole town ot Copenhagen turned against K1erkegaard) but M,Iller

~. discredited when Kierkegaard made public M/fller's secret connection with the

orsair and revealed 80me unsavory- facts about MPller's private life.

M;ller

ost his chance to be considered tor the post of Protessor ot Aesthetics at the
In1versity of Copenhagen.

Ooldscl:md.dt, stricken with remoree at his own part

n deriding a man whom he reall¥ admired, sold his paper, which '!oon. failed and
peased pUblication.
His conflict with the Corsair influenced Kierkegaard profoundly.

First,

tle began to realize and formulate more clearly the idea of his "Christian colli.
sion"; and the persecution which he suffered from the whole populace seemed to
him the proof that bis life was consistent with his doctrines.

Secondly', he

began to aee h1Iuelf aa "the extraordinary," one chosen for a special task
outside the fal.e "univeraal1tyH ot organized religion. 12

12
T. H. Croxall, Kierkesurd Commentarz (London, 19$6), p. xviii
See also Hohlenberg, pp. 18$-187

7
Atter a brief interlude, during which he studied intently the case of
A. P. Adler, a pastor who had been dismissed in 1816 from the State Church of
Denmark for claiming to have had a revelation from Christ Himself, Kierkegaard
meditated and wrote upon the subject of the teaching authority ot the established church, and reached the conclusions which were to guide his tb1nldng
for the rest ot his lifer "The recognition of theae three things, the difference between the ordinar,y individual and the extraord1nar.r, the dist1netion between the concepts genius and Apostle, and the antithesis between Christianity
and Christendom 1fU what nerkegaard gained trom occupying himaell' with the

Adler affair."l)
At this point, he gave up writing aesthetic works, except very occasionally, and became an open champion of what he termed "Christian!t1'" in contrut

with "Christendom."

ae set forth the claims of Christianity clearly, showing

that its appeal was a demand tor personal commitment on the part of the individual, in .-Si_clm;;;;;.;,e_s...
s

~

neath, and examined the contrast betw8e!n

t~

Chris-

tian1 ty and the meaningless Christendom organized by the state Chunfu of Denmark, in Training

!!! Christ1an1tl.

In 1854 Kierkegaard began his open attack against the established reli-

gion of Denmark, and in 1855 he began publishing a series of pamphlets under
the general title,

!h!

Instant, to carry his polemical opiniOllll.

I!!!

Instant

was published over a period of tout" months, and the last issue was printed on

l3uohlenberg, pp. 195-196.

8
September

24, 18SS,

On October 2,

about two months before his death.

18SS,

overworked and overwhelmed by this conflict, he fell

seriously sick, am was confined to bed in a Copenhagen hospital for a little
over a month before he died.

On his deathbed he refused to receive Holy Com-

~on unless administered to him

b.Y a layman; but he

p~ed to God

to be for.

given for his sins, and to be free from despair at the hour of death.

He ack-

nowledged his trust in God' s grace through Christ, and he died on November 11,

16,S.
At his funeral, his brother, Peter Christian Kierlcegaard, an ordained
minister, conducted the services and delivered the tuneral oration.

But at

the graveside, the ceremony of interment was interrupted by Kierkegaard' s
nephew, Henr1k Lund, who protested in the name of his uncle, and in his own
name, against this participation in the worship prescribed b.Y the of'ficial
church of Den1U.rk, against which Ki.erkegaard had so passionately fought.
Thus, S_ren Kierkegaard, the focal point of' conflict even .after his death,
~

passed. away.

He was an extraordin&l7 and profound thinker, a an g:Ltted with

the genius of a vivid and forceful imagination, and wi til outstanding powers
of speech and argument, a man of brooding and melancholy temperament.

He saw

himself as the extraordinary champion of individuality against the functionalization of man, as the spokesman for individual commitment to Christ against
Ithe organized Christendom of the Danish church.

He became, like Socrates, a

sign of contradiction to his contemporaries, and a permanent center of contraversy even to our own dq.
The llterature produced by Kierkegaard is extensive and varied but

lIlq'

be

9
conveniently divided into three categories .. which "follow naturally upon one
another, both chronologically and by reason of their contents."14 They are
the PSeudonymoUB, the polemical, and the devotional -writings.
The pseudonymous works mq be divided into three classes: first, the aesthetic works: Either/~ Repetition..
and Stages .2!! Life's!'!!l.

!!!! ~ Trembling,

the ConoeE ~ Dread,

These works trace the progress of the spirit (and

of Kierkegaard t s own spirit) from an irresponsible preoccupation with sensuous

pleasures to the realization of the necessity 9f religious conversion through
a personal act of choice.

The second group of pseudonymous writings includes

his strictly philosophical works, Philosophical FrafP11!Pts,15 which states his
theses on becoming, on historicity, and on belief, and the Concluding Unscien16
Postscripts ~ .:!!! PhilOSOphical Fragments,
which pre~ents, first, (:Lerke.
gurd's objections to 8ll1' attempt to systematize thought,

am

his thesis that

the relationahi.p of man to God is necessarily a subjective one J secondly, his
,
1:
philosoph1' of religion and. his anal7sis of the concepts of reall tr ·and truth.
The Postscri:et was originally intended to be the last of ltierkegaai!d's writing
but it actually occupies the central position in the collection of his works.

14nenzil G.M.Patrick.. faseal!2! Kierkegaard (London,1947), II, 178.

lSSee Patrick, II.. 221-230 for an admirable summar,y and explanation ot the
contents of this work. See also Croxall, CommentarY, 164-194.

16

See Patrick, II, 230-251, and Kurt P"einhardt .. The Erlstentialist Revolt
(Milwaukee, 1952), pp. 40-5.3 for excellent lIUJ!Iflaries of thiS York.
17David M. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (M1nneapolis,1948), p. 92.

10
After the attack upon him. b;y the Corsair, which followed the publication of the
Postscript, he decided to abandon pseudonymity, but to continue writing in his

own nane as a champion of true ClJrist1an1t;y against the emasculated Christian
religion as organized in Denmark.

A third group of pseudonytllOUlJ writings ap-

peared. later, however, in the .form o.f polemical. tracts.
ing

.!!l Christianity,

Sicknees

~

Death, and.

!!2.

These included Train-

Ethico-Religious Treatises.

The second. category' o.f his writings, the strictly poleMical werks, fol-

!!£ !!!!-Examination, Judge l2! Yourselves
1876), !!l Attack 2£2!! Christendom, !!!! Present

lowed. the CarseJr incident:

(which

was not published until

Age, and

-

the issues o.f The Instant ..
The third, and most interesting, eategoJ7, the d.8V'otional.

lI)

ms, inelude

the large number o.f Edi.t)'inJ Discourses and Christian Di.scoUl"ses, together with

three Diseourses .2!! Imagined Occaeions and

!!!!. Works 2!!e!!.

tierkegaard was

eare.f'ul. to usue these devotional d1aeourses in his own __ • When one of his
pseudonyJlOus works vas published, a little devotional work accompanfed. its publieation.

of

nerkegurd continued. this practice throughout the whole period

his authorehip, .from his .first v<rt, Either!2!:, until the publication o.f
Instant.

ot

I!!!

'fb.e reason .for this vas ltierkegaard's anxiet;y to show, when he .final-

ly revealed. hiJlsel.f' as the author of' the pseudoJ11D1Ous works, that he had

been,

tram. .first to last, a religious thinker and writer, eontlerned only with the
18

problem o.f becom:1.ng a Christian.

l8Kierkegaard,
Patrick, II, 159.

~ Point ~!!!!, pp. 13, 22, 42-43, 92, 149. Se. also

11
In an ad.cl1tionsl appendix to his Conelud:!.ng Unscientific Postscript, entitled itA First and Last Declaration," I1erkegaard formally acknowledged auth-

orship of aU his pseudonymous writings, and frr the benefit of those who wondered at this stranf:.,'8ly involved type of authorship, explained that his pseudo~ty

was essential to the production of his writings, which "poetically

req.lired regardlessness in the direction of good and e"fil, of contrition and
high spirits, of despair and presu.'!lption, of suffering and exultation, etc.,
which is bounded only ideal.lT by psychological .consistency, and which real actual persaul in the actual moral 11m1tatiClls

or

reality dare not permit them-

selves to ind1Jlge in, nor could wish to.,,19
The reuon, therefore, for the pseudoJl11&Ous character of nerkegurd's

earq writings lies in his own literarr plan: to present, viewpoints consistent
with the characters of imagined speakers taking metre_ poa:i.tions with regard

to the topics under discussion. These clul"acters, completeq determined but
imaginar,y, would present the aesthet1e and ethical viewpoints of 11fe unt11
I1erk8gaard vas prepared to produce

!! ~ ...Au",.:t...,ho..,r.....,

hiSOWIl

wom,

!!! Point

~!!!!

of

.2!!1Z ~

in which he rendered an account of the plan and cohesiveness of

his wark, but which was not published until 1859, four years atter his death,

although a abort 8UDJIII8l'1' of it was published Wring his lifetime under the

t1tle,

2!!!1Z ~ !! !a Author.

Perhaps a more profound Meaning of this involved an mysterious method of
writing 11es tirst of all in his basic point of view, which demanded that a:tf3

i11f&
9

19
S,aren K1erkegaard, Concludil;Jg Unscient1fic postscr~ to the PhUosoFragments, trans. Walter t~Tae and tiaVid §Venson (Pr eton;-1iew Jersey,
), "iF'Irst and Last Declaration."
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author present himself to his readers as actually existing 111 his own t..~ought,
20
and liv1ng out his ideals in his own life.
He complained of the divorce ot
life and thought in his OlIn da.T, sqing that. the phUosopher built a beautiful
palace of thought, and. ;ret lived in a kennel nearby.

Therefore, only the ideas

which he himselt tried to live out to the fullest extmt were to be written in

his own name) his reflections on the aesthetic and ethical life were embodied
by' suitable characters, aJ¥l he claimed no responsibility for them.

even to disassooiate himself as much as

possib~e

He tried

from. his work, and even when

he vas busiest he ahowd himself for a tew moments each evening at the theater,
2l
in order to perpetuate the impression that he was a mere idler.
A second reason tor the pseudoJ\YlllOUS authorship 1.,. in the tact that as a

modern Socrates, he was convinced. that the tntth of

~

doctrine, as a living

and personal reality, Ct>uld not be communicated directly as a doctrine, but

only indireotlT, "as an "l;ternative to be chosen, as a possibility to be real22
iled."
"Thus, the aesthetic V&'J' of life, presE'llted without epmpmmise or
confusing admixture by an author who himself assimilates it and lives it and.
exhibits its nature not only in thought but in teeling, is placed before the
The same thing is done tor the ethical attitude toward life, the

reader.

religious lite as universally conceived, and finally' the specifically religious
20

Hohlenberg, p. 180.

21

Ibid.

22

F.duard O. Geismar, Lectures on ~ Religious Thought or Spren Kierkegaard (Minneapolis, 1937), pp. ~5-2o.
-
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mode

or

existence.

The reader is thus confronted with a choice between altern-

atives, and compelled to tind. the answer to life's riddle for himself ...

23

After the brief exposition of the life of ICierkegaard and of his writings,
given in this introduct<ry chapter, there remains the task of presenting the
precise problem to be treated in the ranainder at thi s thesis.
The primary' object of this thesis is to present and explain Kierkegaard t •
definition of faith. "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriationprocess of the most paasionate inwarctness. n24

In order to explain this doctri

and its Significance, three chapters will be necessazy.

The following chapter

will present the sources at Kierkegaard's CDncept of bellet in the theological
teac~s

or Luther cd the Phllosophical teachings

of Kant.

Then Kierkegaard'

reaction to Hegelian Determinism. and to Romantic Aestheticism will be discuss
in order to provide the mer e proximate sources of his ideas regarding ballet'.
Hext, ltierkegaard's own positive solution to the problem of belief will be presented-a solution to be found in the .freedom. of belief, throug:q a study of
the nature of

lUll

as Kierkegaard conceived hint, and of the necessiti of the act

of fa! th as lierkegaard' s expression of man' 8 freedom and fulfilment.
The final chapter will contain a summary of the thesis, a criticism and
an evaluation of Kierlcegaard' s ideas.

23~., 2.
6
2'

~erkegaard, Postscript,p. 182.

CHAPrJiR II
THE SJffiCES OF KIERKEGAAP..DtS CONem OF FAITH

In the precedL'lg chapter, Kierkegaard and his wri tioga were brhflj intro-

duced, and the general plan of the thesis was outlined.

The task of the pre-

sent cha.pter is to present the sources of Kierkegardts concept :;i' belie!.
Si.'1ce KieI'kegaa.x'd· s doctrine of belief is not irJ accord uith Cat.'lolic teaching,

a !:>rief outline of the Catholic doctrine of Supernatural F'aith will be presented, after which Kierkegaard I s theological sources for his concept of belief
as they are found. in Luther will be discussed.

The

lat~er

part of this chap..

tar will be concerned with the philosophical sources of Kierkegaardts concept
of belief in Locke, ltume and Kant.

A presentation of the sources of Kierkegaardts ideas is especiA1l1 necesof

sary because tds doctrine seem to many renders to be completely foreign to tra-

ditional. modes of thought.
ology.

The d1!ficulty lies ehie.fl.y in his strange termin-

One should not, however, contuse novel terminology with outlandishness,

the <:be trines of Kiarkagaard become intelligible when viewed in the light of ..

common tradition.

Catholic teaching on the subject of SUpernatural Faith differs essentlalll'
from that of Kierkegaard in its insistence upon the role of the intellect in
the act of faith.

According to traditional ani universal Catholic teaching.

supernatural Faith is an act
ing

ot assent to dL v1neq

revealed Truth.

1

Accord-

to St. Thomas, this act of assent is essentiallT an act of the intellect,

performed under the influence ot the will. 2 The activity ot the will is required by the fact that the intellect, in positing an act ot faith, is not

moved directly by evidence Which is intrinsic to the object to which the assent is given. The object ot divine revelation (according t.o its very defini.tion) cannot be penetrated. by' human reason.

But though it cOlllPlete].y trans-

cends the understanding, revelation is not al tt!cether foreign to the understand.
ing, and. though the object of divine revelation bas not that colllPel.lin.g influ-

ence over the intellect which .t1rst principles, immediately sel.t-evident principles, and objects of immediate experience exercise oyer it, still the intellect can be scientifically directed to the establishment ot the tact of r ....81atioo. This tact is established by means of extrinsic evidence, chietq miraaele. which accompaxv the revelaUon aDd serYe as testimoniala to it.

Miracles

proTide motive. ot credibility sutticient to permit assent, but. insUfficient
to demmd it. ThUll, in perforllling an act ot faith, the intellect, \hough it hal
rational grounds for a ...nt, 18 not determined by the intellectual clarity of
the truth presented; it is rather

C01llUnded

treeq to act bT the vill, which is

~oceedings ot the Vatican CouncU, Sess.III, "Constitutio Dogu.tiea de
Fide Catholica,1I sec. 3, April 24,1870. Manai. L, 431-436. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, S. T., II-II, q. 2, a. 1, c., Parma ed., III, 10.
2

-

-

--

St. ThOJll&s Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q.

4,

a. 2, c., Parma ed., III, 20.
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a.ided by grace and innuenced by motives of credibility.
The act of faith induces in the subject a state of mind called "bellef."
In the scale.

ot the attitudes which the human

mind can adopt towards truth,

bellet stands between opinion and scientific cert! tude.

Beliet ditfers on the

one hand trom opinion (which 15 characterized by an act of assent which is accompanied by a tear that the opposite l'IU\Y be true) in the firnmess or certainty
of its adherence to its objectJ on the other hand, it differs from strict knowledge in so tar as a direct intellectual

Tisiv~

of the object is lacking.

Divine fa! th 1s more certain than either opinion or knowledge, however,
because "the tirst Truth which oauses the assent of divine faith 15 stronger
than the light ot reason which causes the assent of kncwledge. 1t3
This, in brief, is the teaching ot the Catholic Cbyrch regarding supernat-

ural :I1.th: It is an act

or assent to divinely revealed truth, essentially an

act of the intellect pertormed under the influence of the will, aided by divine
grace, an act accompanied by the highest cert! tude.

Although orthodox Catholic teachers, under tho innuenee ot St. A.ugustine,
had discussed, used, and valued subjective criteria tor faith, and had proposed
motives of credibilitY' based on the d;ynamism of the h'Wll8n spirit tor God, 4
nevertheless, they had emphasized the tact that faith itself is essentially a

3St• Thomas Aquinas,
228.

~

Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, ad

4
Jean Guitton, Actualite de Saint

7,

Parma ad., IX,

A~stin (Dijon, 1955), p. 138-139.
Fulbert Cqre, InUtalion.l LaPhUosopheI5a §aint AUgustin (Paris, 1941) J
pp. 284-281.
- -
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tional act.

But trom the earliest

dsI's

of Protelltantia, its teachers haTe,

n the contra..r), emphasised the inability of human reason to penetrate and unrstand the truths of faith.
We JIlU8t credit Martin Luther, an apostate Augustinian monk, with inaugu-

ting the fundamental error of Protestantism.

From the time of his entrance

to the monastery in 1505 he vas "troubled by fear of God' fl judgement, by
oomy thour,hts on predestination, and by the recollection of his own sins."

5

s early as 1515 he Pagan his campaign to prove that "justification is by fa1th

6
one."

.
This doctrine !.a.d its proximate origin in his reaction to OcCamiSlll

in his attraction to the l'IlJ"sticism of his Geman forebears; but a deeper

lanat10n lie. in his own tortured mind's search for assurance of salvation
in his eonv1etion ot men's radical. corruption.
The "Scholasticism" which Luther knew, and against which he reacted vioently, vas a debased torm of Scholasticism-in reality a superficial IiOminalia
ich Luther's contemporaries inherited from the philosophers of.tha.tourteenth
Ri fifteenth centurie..

Known to history

as Occa:mism., this movement was char-

terized at first by a critical attitude towards the basic principles of the
raditional metapby'sics.

By' Luther's time it had "degenerated into a form

heology show1ng great signa of decadence."

7

ot

From talse speculations concerning

nature of man, the school of Occam was led to an excessive est1m.ate of the

5Hartmann Grisar, S.J., Luther, trans. E.Jt.Leonard (Lomon,1915) .. 1,9. T
orJc, in six volUJll8s, is the authoritatiTe study of Luther in the English lane, and ¥ill be used in this thesis as the source of information concerning

uther's lite, ideas, and writings.
6
Ibid.. I, 94.
7Ibid., I, 120.

powers of nature and an undervaluing of grace.

8

In his search for

justificati~

Luther lost confidence in the Nominalistic theoloi:::r of Jcca.llism, and "in hit ex
aggeration, he went to the t;leo1ogicsl extrema contrar.r to Occarrism.,,9

Luther

complained, at first, of the rationalistic treatment of the truths of :f'aith in
Occamism.

10

Later, however, he became an extremist" bnd rejected. all use of

man's reason in matters of faith. ll
From the writings of' the mystic Tauler, Luther learned to love the inwa.rd12
ness of faithj
a.ncl. thourh he later gave up all atta:'llpts to l€ad a spiritua.l
life" he retGined the respect for interior religious experiences l-1hich he hEd
learned from the m;ystics.
Hore profoundly, the doctrine of luther that "Justification is by faith
In-

alone, It had its origin in }lis own search for an assuranee of salvation.

deed, his doctrine has been called merely a Itumversalization" of his own e.:xperieneea.

13

.

His early brooding on predestination and his consciousness of

personal. sin influenced his denial of man's free will and bro~t about his

theory of arbitrary imputation by God14 of the mrits of Christ Itwit'hout an;y
cooperation on man's part or any

bu.l'J1ar1

work of merit • .,lS

8
~.,

I, 132.

9~., I, 120.
10

Ibid., I, 136.

11-

Ibid." I, 158.

12

Ibid.,

13-

I, B8.

Jacques Maritain, Three Refornters (New York" n.d.) p.l".

14
lSGrisar, I,

383.

Ibid., IV,

433.

19
Furthermoret according to Luther, human nature has been essentiall;Y coriUpted by Original Sin,

16 and henceforth man can neither attain any knowledge

(f the divine nor perform any good act.
his is due to the

d~rect

Thus, 1£ man does perform a good act,

action of God;17 tor nothing in man's nature bears

fitness to Him.
The only hope for mankind in such a predicament, according to Luther, lay
n an appropriation of salvation through blind faith, and in a personal certainy of the assurance of divine favor as the result of such blind faith.

18

There-

ore, in the individual, the objective criterion of faith is the indwelling of
.he Holy' Spirit in the soul; the subjective criterion (the only one man can ver.

~) is an 1ntemal., M1'stical experience which that testimon;, begets

in us. 19

8ith itself became for Luther nothing lIlOre than "an art1f1cially st1mulated
ope that the mrits of Christ obliterated f!lf'ery sin.,,20
The legacy of Luther, then, was a skepticism, a fundamental m:1strust of
he intellect, from which subjective experiences alone could save man in his
.
latural ignorance of God. Luther's preoccupation with his own interior states
~

aused the absorptiCin of his whole theology in the doctrine of salvation,

21

md his dogmatic substitution of subjective certitude for objective certitude
dth regard to salvation transfers to the individual's subjective state of asuranee of salvation the certitude once claimed tor the intellect alone.

16~., I, 98, 140.
17Ibid.,
18Ibid.,
19ibid.,
20Ibid •
21-'

I, 207.
I, 374J II, )5.
IV, 4)8.
IV, 4)2.

Marttain, 17.

--20

Two dominant themes emerge trom this Lutheran anti-intellectualisM and

merge in the writings of Kierkegaarda voluntarism arnEmotionalism.
As a Lutheran divinity student, K1erkegaard could not help but be 1ntluenced by the strong voiluntari2$ic element in Lutheranism, which substitutes the
activity of the will tor the activity of the intellect in the perception of and
the assent· to the obj ect or faith.
But an even stronger element than voluntarism in Kiericegaard's writings

is his elllOtiona.llSJlt. This, too, was part of his heritage from Luther, as a
second substitute, atter voluntarism, tor intellectual activity in the realm ot
faith.

Evangeli_, or emotional religion, has been an important tactor in the

developing attitudes of ProtestantiSll, and represents "an aspect ot the spiritual histor,y

or

modem Europe whidl has received scant official recognition,

but in tact constitutes its most significant future."
the emotionalism of

~erkegaa:rd,

22'

It is bard to overlook

especially in new of his continual emphasis

upon "passion" in the detemination ot the true Christian through the act ot

•

faith.
'!'he following chapters will attempt to show more clearly the Lutheran
elements of voluntarism and ellDtionalia in Kierkegaard's writings, as theyexhibit his Lutheran preoccupation with the inwardness ot faith, justification
through faith a1. one, the universalization of personal experience as a rule for
faith, the appropriation ot suntion through blind taith, and a passionate
search tor certitude in spite ot a fundamental anti-intellectualism.

22

Patrick, II, xi.

21

Although Lutheran Protestantism, witll its overtones of voluntarism and
emotionalism, were important sources of KieIkegaard's thought, his philosophical sources were equally important, and contributed much to the formation

ot

his basic anti-intellectualism. A discussion of Kierkegaard's philosophical
heritage reg81'ding the notion of belief will t.he:ce.tore be pre8ented in the fo],.
lowing pages.

The rise of the natural sciences in Europe and the Empirical philosophies
which originated because of them did not af'fect in arq large measure the Scan-

dinavian countries until some time after the upheavals of 1848;23 but the influence of the Empirical philosophers, particularly through the writings of

~

1'l'l.anual KantJ reached Denmark: at an earlier date, and made a pro.tound impression

on the rrdnd of Kierkegaard.

It will be worth while, therefore, to sketch

briefly the non-theological opinions concerning belief current in Europe belon

1855.

Most non-scholastic philosophers of that period, under t~e iQ£luence

either of the rational skepticism of Locke, Hume, and Kant, or the dnti-intellectual1sm of Luther, tended to replace all judgements •• even all knowledge..
wi. th belief.

The non-scholastic explanations of belief n1a3 be traced from the school
of Empirical philosophers, since they, l'OOre than others, had need of justifying

inference and evidence not intrinsically verifiable.

John Locke, for example,

considered knowledge to be only "the perception of the agreement or dieagreemen
of two ideas,n 24

23

.

__..a

-.uu.

truth

a8

belonging only to

,

Hoh... EI1berg, 9.

24John

Locke, An Ess

Alexamer Cutpbell 11'i8.~s.~r~~~""""~ij"

IV. i. 2, ed.

22

proPOSitions.

25

True knowledge a.l1d certitude therefore, according to Lock.,

are found only in the cont(l1"platior. of our abstract ideas. 26

~Je

have, to be

sure, "knowledge of our own being by intuition;" and the lteaistencEl of a God
reason clearly makes known to us;"

21

but since, Locke claims, ideas do not

connote existence, lithe knowledge of the existence of aIV other thing we can
.
28
have only by sensation."
However, testil:l0IlY to the existence of anything
other than our own being extends only to the actual moment of sensation of an
29
JO
object.
For the knC'wledge of wl other thine~,
belief, or "faith" is nec1
essary. Faith, s'Vs Locke, "is nothing illt a firm. assent of the rrind. ,,3

25

~.,

~d.,

IV. v. 2, Fraser ad., II,

244.

26Ibid., IV. vi. 16, Fraser ed., II, 266. See also.. IV. Idi. 7, Frasor
It;3'46-341.

27Ibid ., IV. xi. 1, has.r ed., II, 32$. Locke offers two proofes tor the
in character. -:me is an "ontalo,_,ical" arguDescartes and St. Anselm. His proof di/rers
~ro~ the purely contological argument, however, in tt.at Locke nowhere deduces
~wledg. of realit ies of any 1d.nd from abstract ideas, but proceeds trom the
selt-intuition of a contingent intellectual being to the conclusion 'bt the
!Mcessity of the existence 0'1 God as f1rst cause. The second proot which Locke
a.ttempts is that ,,*,-ich is called the proof "from contingency." In this he is
iless successful because his knowledge of the contingent world is onJ.7 a udiu
!E2- Locke's arguments are given in the Fraser edition, II. 306-324.
~xistenee of God, both renective
~nt, airdlar to that employed by

28

-

Ibid.

29 Ibid., IV. xi. 9, Fraser ed., II, .33.3-.334-

ed.,

Ii,""12' •

See also IV_xi. 1, Fraser

.3O Ibid .,p. 324. Here Fraser commente. "It is curious that Locke holds
the existence at God to be 'Wi. thin the sphere at our unconditionally certain
knowledge, and that he excludes from that sphere the phenomena and laws 01 Dature, and that ltant an the contrar,y vindicates a pure a priori P~SiC8, aDd
~en1es that the existence af God can be known by pure reason.*

31Ibid ., IV. xvU. 2), Fraser ed., II, 413.

_.'/
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ruth and reason although they cannot contradict one another, according

to Locke, haTe di.tinct province..

DReason is the discover.r ot the eerta1nt7

or probabillty ot sueh propositions or truths which the mind arrive. at b.r d...
duction made from • • • ideas which it has bl' the use of its natural facultie.J
32
viz., by sensation and ranectlan."
In other words, reason is concerned 801el.y with the truth or talsitl of propoaitions.

Faith, "on the other side, ia

the assent to 81:fT proposition not thus made out b7 the deduction of reuon, but
tupon the credit of the proponr."

33

The ground of probabilit7 for our as.ent

to &rI3 proposit.i.on is det.er:m1ned by the agreement of the testiJDon¥ of others

fwith

our own experience, general testimoDT, and revelation • .34
In Locke'. estimation, then, certitude is found only in our knowledge of

abstract ideas) we muat believe in the existence of all other things. Locke's
asaertion that reason clearll malees known to us the existence of God cannot be

[upheld, given Locke's preaupposit101l8.

His reluctant skepticism with regard to

our knowledge of real existing objects vas t ranaDdtted through

~

-.d laat to

Kierkegaard, who, it will be shown, continued the _pirical error of" 8ubstitutin
~eliet

for knowledge in dealing with ex1atence.

Darld'Hwae'8 consideration of belief, an import_t outgrowth of his Jhmcia..

mental preoccupation with causality, parallels Locke's d:l.scusa1on.

HuM's dia-

32~., Ir. :x:rli. 23, Fraser ed., II, 413.
33Ibid., This "faith," however, refers only to the miracu.loue interventiOA
of God iii tile universe, which is called Revelation.

34IbidfA IV. XY •. 4, Fraser ed., II, 36S-)66. Thus the notions "belief" and
"falthft In e writings of Locke haYe separate functions. Faith is reserved for
our acceptance of truths revealed b.r God, belief, "the firm assent of the mind"
is our attitude towards fact. in the realm of senee experience.

--Unction between knowledge of "matters of fact" (existential objects) and knowledge through "relations of ideas" (affirmations which are "intuitively and demonstrably certainlt)

3, i. wall known.

He reached thia distinction in his attempt

to work out two basic, but mntrad1ctcry, principlesl The firat, "that all our
distinct perceptions are distinct ex1stences,,,36 or, in other werde, that what
we can distinguish in perception is distinct also in reality, is a subjective

principle which l'IIIke s the dis tinetions in real things depend upon the distinctions of the m1al.
real connection

assumption.

The Hcrod principle, "that. the mini never perceives &'lfI'

DOng

distinct existences,"

37

~

is based on tt. opposite, objecti1'

Hi. whole account of causaliV depends upon the latter pr1neiple,

ani he af't1ma that causality is not a relaticn between the mind. t 8 own ideas 1Zl

such a

11.,- that

real causality.

subjective cOservation or reflection will jueti.f)' the notion ot
HUIIle admitted that he could mt reconcile these two principles,

but that be could not renounce either. 36
In deaJ.1ng with our knowledge through "relat.i.one of idea8,~ therefore, HU1II

encountered no problMl.

He applied his .fl.rst principle, and calcluded with

Locke that our judgments are only additions cd subtractions ot concepts accord-

to the law8 ot association, md are concerned only 14th °Qlantit7 and nuaber. o39 He further concluded tn. nothing except 8the science. of quantity aDd

ing

3,David H1.1JIM, An

~ coneenUS'! Human Understanding. iv .1, Library of Liberal Arts ad. (lew rork~~195~), p. 4 •
36navid Huae, A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix. Everyman ed. (New York

1949)1 II, 319.

-

--

J7Ibid •

-

38Ibid •

-

39uume, Ea8!l, xii. 3, Liberal Arts ed., p. 171.

number. • • UT safely. • • be pronounced the only' proper object of knowledge
and denxmstration.1t

40

In dealing with our knowledge of "matters

tered a serious problem.

knowledge of "matters

or

or

fact,· however, Hume encoun-

He applied his second principle, and insistecl that

tact," or real existmg things, implies

S01lll

reference

beyond the mind, and is onl¥ interred from "cause and ettect observed emp1rically." 41 Furthermore, in treating of cause and effect, be asserted that lIall
our reasonings ccneernillg Callse. ar¥i effects are derived from nothing but cus-

tom.; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitiTe, than the cognitive part ot our nature....

42

Two thoughts are cmtained in thi. statemnt. The tirst, that we are de-

termined bT custom to inter a necessary connection between two impressions Uld
to call the second one an effect, introdllces the second thought, that belief i.

43

nothing more than a teeling which accoupanies our idea of any existing thing.
This cbctrim ~ belief" i. based on Hume's notion that the validity' ot
knowledge is tb und only in the viv1dneaa of our impressions.

OUl'

Beliet., he insist,

i. notbi~ but a more vivid, lively', tcrcib1e, firm, steadT conception of an
object than what the imagination is eYer able to attain.

Lh

Since the viTdnes.

of ou" impressions is the onl¥ true criterion far reality, and since it i. the
1,1
,1

40Ibid •

-

~Ibid., xii. 3, Liberal Arts ed., p. 171.
HUIle, T_tise, I. iv. 1, :t..'veryJll8l

43 Ibid.,

ed.,

I, p. 179.

Appendix, Everyman ed., II, 313-314.

44~ I,

iii. 7, Everyman ed., I, p. 99.

I'
T
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only thing which separates fact from fiction, belie! must be the attitude of
the mind tCMards all "matters of fact," or realq existing t.hings.

Hume, like Locke, credited only mathematical propos! tions with providing
real certitude.

He substituted belief for our knowledge of existing things,

and reduced belief' itself to a feeling.
to our knoWledge

or

Hume'. reluctant skepticism with regarc

existential objects was transmitted. through Kant to narka-

gaard, who...as will be shown-continued the error of' the Empiricists in substi-

tuting bellat tor knowledge in dealing with

~tence.

Immanuel Kant contributed much to the erroneous substition of belie! for
true knCllledge

or

existential things; but his concept of belief was more volun-

taristic, ald based less on feeling than was that of HUIle.
Kant must be regarded as a thoroughgoing empiricist., just as Locke or
Hume, in spite of the importance he placed upon intellectual categories;

tor

no more tha1 Loeke or Hume could he deal intellect.ua1lT with an,-thing except
objects of direct. perception-phenomena, subjectivel1' modified b;.y the categaries ot space and time. True judgments, tal! Kant, as for th e othdr empiricists, can deal with noth:1.ng rut ooncepts J tor not even the synthetic, experiential character ot sense perception can ;yield knowledge ot real, or "noumenalexistence.
Kant's treatment of judgment in the speculative order allOunted to a repudiation of reaaoa in t..'le speculative order; but his rejection of reason in t.he
fields of morality and religion was equa.lly' strong.

His avowed. purpose was to

liberate religion from the rat1cnalistic influence ot Woltf'.

4S

To accomplish

10IDaanuel Kant, Religion Within t.he Limits or Reason Alone, trans.
Theodore M. Greene and HO,.tT. HUdson TCliicago, 1934), p. XiiiX.

this~

he divorced religion ent:irely from the innuence of speculative reason,

giving the religious spirit free scope in the realm of Jraotical reason only'.
Practical reason m.d the will were to supply for the failure of the speculativ
re8.8m to attain anything beyond the objects of immediate experience.
Kant's fundanental moral principle, uooonditional and ! priori, det.r.mining the will absolutely, waSI ifAct so thst the maxim.

or

thy" will can always at

the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."

46

This law

is simply "given· J "it is not an empirical fact, but the sole i'act of the pure
reason, which thereby announces itself as originallY legislative. n47
Between this ftmdamerta,l law of practical reason and the postulates of th
existence of God, of t l'8 immortality of t he soul, and of th e life to cane,
is a necessary conneetion, since the fulfilment of the moral. law is possible
only if sum postulates are given.

46'

These postulates, it must be noted, are not truths which are known; they
are rather practical assumptions.

In Kant's own words: "F1rst•. in ieligion,

aprr ebension am

as regards the theoretical

avowal of belief no ass'rt1onal.

knowledge is required (even of God' s existence) • • • J rather it is merel;r a

problematical aSSUlllPt10n (hypothesis) regarding the highest cause of things
that is presupposed speculativel;r yet with an eye to the object toward which
our morally legislative reascn bids us strive-an assertOl'ial faith, practical and therefore tree, and giving promise of this its ultiMate

aim.-49

46Imma.nuel Kant, Critit!e of Practical Reason, I. 1. 7, trans. Thoma.
Kingsmill Abbott, 6th ed. (

ndOii, 1948),

p.

119.

47 Ib1d.

48Ibid.,
49-

II. i1.

5-6,

Abbott.,

ed.,

p.

241.

Kant, Reli on IV. 1. 1, Greene-Hudson eel.

•

l42.

These postulates, then, are found in human nature, but only- as postulates,
invested with reality through tm activity of the will or the "morally legislative reasoo. tt

They are belipved, with a faith that is merely "8ssertorial."

It is in this way that fBi th--bellef withOllt objective evidence, 1mether intri.nsic or extrinsic-fills the void lett when Teoason abOicates.
The righteous man, says Kant, when faced with t.he postulates of practical

r-r:r existence in this world
existence outside the chain of physical causes, and in a pure world

reason, "nay say: 'I will that there be a God, that
be also

al

of the underotcmd.ing, a..."1d, lastly, that my cruraM.on be errl1ess; I firmly abide
hI this, and will not let this fait h be taken from me. t "

50

The righteous man

rrw;r make this "assertorial" 8.Ct of faith because the pure moral law binds him
an a command, and not as a mere rule of prudence; and he is thereby justified
in assuming ! priori in nature all the conditions necessar,y for its fUlfilment.
Clesrly, "Kant's philosophy is voluntaristic.,,51
The act of the will Wt1ich

co~stitutes mants

faith in God,

~

th,

i~norta1-

ity of the soul a'ld in the after lite, induces in him a state of mind called
belief, which Kant distinguishes !ron 6pinion and from knowledge.
he states, "is a consciously insuffieient judgment, subjectively as
~bjeetively.

~

~ell

as

Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as objective-

insufficient.

50

"Opinion,"

K...1'1owledge is roth subjectively-

Kant" Gritil}Ue

2!.. Practical

R,eason, II ii.

am
8,

objectivelY' sufficient."

Abbott Ed., p.

$2

241.

SlHugo Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung. trans. JOM E. Smith, (Chicago, 1956)
p.

6.
S2 IDnan.lle1

K~t, cri~e ~ Pure
19" p. 4&>:'

Everyman ed. (New i~k,

Reason" "Transcendental Method," 1. 3"
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Here he explail.'E that
,resence of phenomena.

too objective sufficiency of knowledge arises from

the

In the case of belief, this objective suf'fieiency is ab-

sent.

In other words, we believe whatever we cannot perceive through the eats-

~ories

of' t

re inteUect. The subjective sufticiency, on the other hand, of both
In t.he case of pra.gmatic beliefs, the

fmowledge and belief arises in two wqs.
~ubjective

suf' ficiency is determined by a feeling of corrriction, Which

false, but is
~alie!s,

~lot

opposed bY' any known objective facts.

which can in no

wa;J'

be justified

object~vcly,

mew

be

In the case of r.oral

the subjective sufticienc

is deternuned by the l:loral s611t:Lm.ents. 53

The truth of the !'lind, then, for Kant, lies onl7 i..."l the know-ability of concepts; real. existence lies outside the mind t s reach.
as they exist in reality, Kant substitutes an act of
w-ithout the antecedent ministration of the intellect.

For knowledge ot things
bel~ef

elicite<:. by the vil

Kierkegaard studied Kant

seriously, S4 ani imbibed Kant t S empirical.. anti-rationalism, as he had studied
Luther ani learned from him the unknowability of God and the need. tor an appropriation of salvation th:rough the certitudes or blind faith.

Spurre~ on by his

irJler1ted introspective spirit, Kierkegaard, will, like Luther, un1versalile
his own inward experiences in his reaction to ratioaalisInJ 11I:e Kant, he will
apply a Lutheran theological concept

or

faith to the philosophical realm.

53For Kant's treatment ot the I-toral Sentiments, see Preface to the Meta@lsical Elenents 2!. Ethicsl xi. A, in Abbott· s translation ot theCillique.2!
Practical Reason, p. 310.
54

See, tor example, his Journals, pp. 3, 96, 330, 358, 364.
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The following e.hapter will t1rst describe Kierkegaard I s reaction to Hegel.-

!ian

DeterminiSM. following the example

lKan t IS

reaction to Woltl.

or Luther's reaction

to Occamism and

SecondlyI his reaction to Roman tic Aestheticism will

!be studied, and in this collision with Determinism and Aestheticism will be
farmed his own positive ideas of faith.

CHAPrm In

KIERKEGllRD'S ATTACK lJP')N DETERMnlISM AND M~ICISM

In the precedir:e chapt.er, the:. re,:oots sources of Kierkegaard' s docr,rine o:f'

Paith were presented..

It is the purpose of the present cnapter to ir.dicate the

positive philosophical ele;nents of his notion of: .faith which arose in his conPlict with Det.ermirdsm and with Romar.lticl$m.

Jean Wahl, in his btudes Kierkegaardiennes, writ.es paradoxically, "Ki.erke~aard

triumphed over Idealism with the aid oJ: Romanticism., and over Romanticis.

~ th the aid of Ideali~ j
~e

1

and ttlis statement mIi¥ well serve as a general out-

for the present ch'Pter.

Kierk&gaard's aim in his double triumph was to

.Lndicate that there are two W'a¥S of beeOIIlini; a C,hristian, both of which are necessar,y.

The .first wa;y to

becan.e a Christian is to abandon the Hegel1an glor1of

fiution of tlJe intellect in matters of fal. the

This methexi vas wOl'ked out in

ICiarlre gaard t sattack upon Hegel' s Deternlillism, an at Lack made with the weapons

pfferecl by the aesthetic wq of life.

The second wq to become

C!.

Christian is

~o

transcend aesthetic iMmediacy in existence. This rl9thod was made possible

by

ICierkegaarci's attack upon Romanticism, in which he employed. a modified form

of the dialectic of absolute Idealism, leading the individual through the stacea

JJean

wahl,

Etudes K1erkegaardiennes, 2nd, ed. (Paris, 1949), p. 13.
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of exist&nce fro1';l the aesthetic, thrnugh the ethical, to the ral:t(inus stare.
Kierkegatl.t"dls attack upon Hegelianism will be C'A'lsidersd first, together with

be outlIned together with an account of the JdstentiAl dialectie.

ll~!..re a U:l.5CU881on of

50!~

ltlerkeg&are t s attack upon Hegelianism is undertaken

f'Jfmtion of M.s knowledge of and his rel.ati:m to Hegel should be n\ade.l and

his int,ellectual lnd reli{:iftGs

!~;{itives

fez oPPoSl.tion to fIegel shQ"ld be luen-

tione(:, tor.ether with the reamn 9 f-r his lnte:fest in individual existence, and
the

so~rces

(Jt his

B~mantic

outlook.

r,uring Kim"kee:;urd t s lifet:tJr.tE!" the ruling philosophy of
than of Ge:rma.I\Y·,w.s that of Ceorg

~;1.1.helm

ne~;

«en more

Friedrich Hegel. who died in. tbe

year 1831, the year after Y.1erke~a.ard entered the University of Copenhagen.

It

f

is kncwn thQt Kicrltegaarc, even during his 6.rly jears a.t the tuiivereit;r; vu
of

\;011 &Cqtudnted ~rith the Hegelian l:U'ld. anti-.Hegolian writings

t.hat he !at Br read the vcr ks

or

Hegel carefully.

2

or the 18"'8,

and

w'f.iether or not he misun-

derstood or rrJ.s.:L.'lterpreted the theories of Hegel 1s not relevant Lere, sinee
h~ ~f't9l1$

broad

ttl h,.,re been

int~llectual

L~terested

&11\ social

.: 2:.ramelJ Coll.1ns, The .Mind
'Ibid., lOS.

in Her,el only as the "~

3
1I'1OV'ement," against which he

.2! ~f:jrkeE!!!!!

!! ori(;O

of a

waged a hi. tter one-

(Chicago" 19S3), pp. 104-10$.
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K1erkegaa.rd seldom discussed the subtler refinements

ot Hegelian1sm in

hi.

writings, he concentrated his attack rather upon 1ta .tunda1Ilental presuppositlons-or upon what; he thought were its fundaaental pr8fJUpposit1oos. A stud;y
of the cauUc ant1-HegelJ.an oo_.s 1n bis work suggests that he cona1de1"e4

HegelJ.an1Iil an objective phenoaenol.ogioal soience, in 1Ih1ch all being and all
knowledge are reduced

to abatracUon

and abstract, general categorin.

a q.tem, he believed, realit,. becomes notb1ng

~re

In such

than a fI18tem. of abstract

essences, laD.ledge and being an ld.entitied, be1nt a'Id. beeond.ng are

~1ated

into a unitT through an abstract, i_nent d1alect1c&1. process which 81T1thes1-

ze. all contradictions. and the 1nd1Y1dual exist.EDt, as a _re IIlOMftt 1n tbe un..
folding ot an abstract idea, 1. . . both indi'V'1dual1t,.

tI1~ ••It-de~t1on.

JUIR.OO'ARDt S MOT !VIS

K1erkegaard' s prot..t againllt the 1IIposmg intellectual. structure ot Hegelian

tho~t.

was based upon intellectual _

religious DDt1Ye..

lntel.lac-

tuall¥, he found the pret8laioDs ot pure thought ridiculous, and hiJ wr1tings,
part1cu1arlT the Conol.!41nI tJnac1entitlc Poetscri2t, U"e tull of jibes at
"The Syetea, III aa he called Hegel.1aD1aa, tor ita failure to account

diY1dua1 exieting person.

t . the

in-

As a rel1g1a.:ta writer, his react.ion to Hegel1an1S1l

has been called by 0118011 -the auperated proteat of a re11g1Cll8 coneeience

agaiDBt the centur1es-old. auppreaaicm ot existence by abstract tb1n1d.ng ... 4
Hegel1arda WQ11d bave been ot little interest to him bad it not seemed to be

"
£!

the cause of the lack of rel1g1w.s teJ:fOr and ethical reaponei't>1lit7 to wb1ch

let 0 w~",~

,~

V

LOYOL.A,

. }

Etienne Gl1son, Being.!e! ~ Ph1l.osophers ( .~onto~~~IPV 1$3/
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his age was prey through its

atte:~ipt

to r,:,conoile

Jfe~.;01iallism

with t.he teach-

ings of Ch.rist4n:lt,..'
His early interect .Ln tile individual. hu:.mm soul and ita athical respon-

hia <wn destin,y instea.d of

bein~{

determined by some inoxorabl1 ISvolvi..'lg idea.

For in 00.1" age it is not ;~l3r(;1;r au l."l\:U.vidual scholar or
tb1n1ter here and there who concerns l1J.meell with uaivarsal
hiator;n thu wiwle age 1oucU.1 dewuwds it. laevertheles8,
Etb.1c. an:! tt. eth1e81., as Calatltut1.ng t.he eS881'1t1&1 anchQrat':.e for all. individual exiGtence, have an indefeasible
cla1a upon e'fIf!f'T existing 1nd1v1dualJ 80 1ndet...ible •
claim, that whatever a man r.uq. accantpUtah in the wcrld,
eft1l to tbt 1IlOet aatonlah1ng ot ach14R .....tB~ it 1" none
the less quite dubious in its significance, unless the
1nd1v1~al bas been ethicell.y clear 1Ih_ he made his ohoiee,
has et.bic.a.lly clarilio<i !lU eh¢~.lce to l:I.imselt. 'rho ethical
q1a11tT ls jealous tor ita own integrity, ~ 1s quite un1JIi>res5ed by the W'At utwnding quant1t,v..
.•

Secondly, KierkegurC' s early-a1ll&kened 1nterc:st in individual experiene4t
and in personal reaponsibUity was

a~rpened

b;y the great social levelling

I

process, to be different is unpatriotic.

The herd JKmta11ty cieve.loP5, &nd

the iruJi vidual will i8 absorbed in't.o the macinea. o£ tohe crowd; the individual

Spatr1ck, II, )2.
,j

6

Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. ll9-120.

1..,868 hi. Hnse of indiviC1ual rtJeponsibillt.Y, and nis fear of personal. judi-

7
_nt.

Accordillg to IUerkegaard, in modern h\t'llan herds, "that et.ernal respont.lle individual before Goel is ie9'
to • .,- t.b.at lithe erotui is untrutn," , and this

s10111t.,y ....1d the rliiiJ.,i.c;io\JS U.l.Ilf;li..ng out

lNl~wo.,tt

a and

us wen/';

il,'1"9uponaib1e,
to

Ii

iractJ.ou.

60

far u

at leadt.
10'
1f
01'

be wil.l.ing to take the

weakell8

f:.r at

or

lns senae of ruponaibility by red:ucing it

stepa toward a rebuilding of persoll4l integrity

t.hrolCb Christian f>Aroiam; far "Chr1at1an heroism (and perh4's it is rarely to
be seen) 18

to venture wholl¥ to be o!1enl.f,

1n1te ind1daual.
~

1lWl,

alone be.f'ore the face

tUII

oj'

an indiv.idual man, th1e del-

God,

alC8l8

in t.his t.remendous

MlJd this t.rel1randous respo.naibility; but it is not Chri:ttiNl hero!_

to be hUl'Gbugged b.r t.ae pure iaea o£ lnuvm1ty
11
at warl£.l hiatc:lr7. lf
'l'hua, 1napired

<Jr

to pliv the g. .e of· ..,.elliDg
~

b7 hia all-conaUlUing interest

in the individual, wi t.h in.-

tellectual ani religious r:rotivation,. K1..ke~ beg.an his lifelong war aga1nat
) 7~)~ren Klerkegaarcl, !!!! iliclc:noss ~ I-tn, trans. Walter Lowrie (Jxford,
19U), p. 201.
ti
S;reD .u..kegurd, The P1'e8en\!.a- trans. Alexander' IJru aDd Walter Lowrie (''lXtoro" 191.0), p.
9
K1empard.. !!!! Point .2! View. p. ill.

)0-:-

---'-, ~ ,fOrbid.,
......... l.l.4.
"'~_/

U
Kieri:egurd,

I!! Sickness ~ neath,

p.

h.

Il.ertecaard·. bettlewith HegelianS . . 1n
was tought with the weapons

or Rounticu..

Romanticism which so intl\leDCed the a1nd

career, we lcaow,

_8

ot Novalia, Tieek,
those

or

apent 1n

~

What, t.beD, vere \be atUtudes of

or w.a

writer!

The..,.l¥ part of h18

aeatbet.1e studte., and he read the worice

lIoftzaan.. Vakenroder and the hrot.here Sablegel, .a vell as

tbe older Romanticists

and SehU.l.er.

bia mature Tears, as not.ed .boYe,

areat

Be had •

ot

the StlD"Jll!!!!

Pre«

peri.04, Goethe, He1ae,

respect for the prtt-l"OIIaDtic pbUo8ophera, Baa_

cd Jacobi, and expres.ed hi. adIIdratlon tor

tb_.

12

He rNd . . . utter of

])eau.rIc'. area'''' modern poet, aDd v.rote
boob of another ~ h18 aorltempo:rv1eS, Bane CturlniaD

ealne the work. of Oebl.euebl.aaer,
a review
Andereen.

or

one of the

1)

AU \he.. _i'er8 bad 1n ClOJIIIllOD the tact that tbeT broil.

ot~

ftJaUou 1d. tI

ratJ.onal.1_ and. dwelt in \be 8P1rit at aub..1eeU91tT and 1nd1v1duaU._. Their
rol8l'ltlc1a ftfDPOIaed 1tselt in delicious oon\ellplation or .,sUe rapture "
influence

or

tJ:a

the int1n1te and non-raUonal, the . .st.erloua and. inexplicable, th4

dark am 1ID08ftn7 tm-e..

or

the

WQl"ld.ft~ r:t.,y

objected. to the iDsut£1c1eac1u

of the apeculatl...e intell.ec', am. ••pound ·creat.i... e iMginat10n or tree iMpir-

.•~. Ullertcepardll P08'"1'12t. p. 224, tC1r example
".>

i

;':.,

nark.gurd, From!!,!! p e ; of .2!! StJ.U ~. This 10 rt, the
Iter.pard·. pubfi'8hed Vd~, 1,!.~~ Udlibr.1n English.

:US"'_

tirst

of

~atr1Ckf

•

II, 1,3.

'C:,. '. " .. ,..:,,~~i:;-1W;<:;..~."''''!'i''~'! .~'.,..~~ •. ~, ......... ~.c,,_ •. , ._,"

ation, teeling, or pusion, :reverie or irony, pure intuiticm or ingenuous epontaneity"

is''in tla1r _')proaeh

to reallV.

fCierkegaard trom. his earliest ,.ears

was under the s1»11 of ta1e subject.ive emotittlalI_J he rov'.!'"

~~oll7

escaped

t~.

it, although he la.ter trmscended Jar. Romantici_ in 111$ existent1al d1alect1e

It was this Rrmant1tJ attitude of 1I1nd, however, lII. ttl its tPphasia upon indirlchal experience and 1Ii th its nm-ratimal approach to experience, when coupled
with r1e!kegaard t s adherance to primitive Lutheran intellectual. skept,1cil11l, tba

proY1ded a plattorm trom which to attack the pretenalona of Absolute Ideal1811.
I1~RD'S
~1erkegaard.

,16

theses.

AN'l'I-HmJ!l.IlN THESES

. . . b1s mature critieism

Heg&Un Detem1D1_ upon three

Firet, Hegel's vcrld-histor.1.cal p:rocus as the necessary evolutiQn ot

the Absolute Idea is d. .tructive

ot tt. ethical lite or

individual becaua8 1t l"e<heea tbe ethical

principles.
dome

or

DIl8tl

lWl

as a responsible

to a _re speetatQ1' of ethical

fierkegaarti oppoH. Hegel'. position on the grOOMS

or huIia tree-

a~

81Gb camot be

Seomd, Hegel,doe. not realize that the existential. act

includ.ed. within a 8,..te or tinite tbouftlt, no matter how all-1nclul1ve and s1's
tenatic.

nerkegurdts objeeUon to Hegel on thie scere is _de tr<D the stand

point ot ex1etence.

'rtdl'd, HeBel cannot deal with the basic notions of being

l 6.rbeH three these. were suggested b7 Janes C:ol.ll.na in his boo Ie The
'Mind of K1erlceM' 1'1'. U9-l2O. They are to be round in substance i.ll"tbe
tntrodietion i~rlcegaard.'.
of Dread. trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeto~
New JerseY', 1944) J the actual, aelScl reason::i.ng is to be found in Kiericefaard'S ujor phUo8ophic.al WOKS, the PbUoeophical Frapents and the
Concluding Unaelenut1c Poatacr12t.
i

concm

being and becOll1ng, 'Mb1ch are non-eeptual.

llerkegaard' s objection to Hegel. in

this thuis l1ea in his existential catfpgorr

or

conttneenq.

These three the-

ses of !{ierkegurd w1U be treated in turn, together with an exposition of lier..

kegaard's positlve philosophical doctrine with regard to his own notioDS of
treed.ODl, existence, and contlngeDC7.

rierkeaaard.·. first theai. aga1nat Hegel
individual tree40mJ t'or he eon tends tbat Hegel

Weal to tbe

~eal

lite

or man u a

emel'ge. from his emphasis upon

t.

theory of world b.1st.ory is in-

responeib1e.. free, individual, aDd that

Begel reduo.. eth1e_ to abatract eont.8I1plation.

....-ld-historieal view as ·objectivizatlon," and

K1erlcegaard..,...u ot the
~I

The objective tendttnc;r, vb1eh proposes to l'I\ake ft'C'J'one an
oMernr, ad in lta max1aua to traDlt..1'Il hill ·into 80 ooj"ti" 8A
obaen'er that he become8 almost a giloet., aca.l"Cel;y to be distinguished tro. the t."meadows epait. of ttl. historical put-t.h1.
tendenea naturallT retua.s to lcnaI or Uat.en to aqything excePt
what etaDd.s in relation to itself. • • • For lt is relarded as a
.at.ti.e! thing that the objective te.ndetlq in (Ur ec.tton at ;,inte!lecrtual. contMplaUoa. 18, in the newer lin,1l1st.1c uRge" the
etb1cal answer to t.he cp ••Uon of what I ethicall.1 bave ta do,
and \.be t.uk usigned. to thlt contemporar,r nineteenth eentv,y is
war-ld hist0J'7. The objective tendency- 18 the wq and the truth;
th. etJd.cal is, becollling an obaC'!1"4'er. That the 1nd1v1d:ual auat
become an obsener 18 the etbical answer to the problem of lite-.
at" elM ooe i. coarpe1lecl to &88W18 tbat, t.heNl.,8 no et.bical <lUes1;100 at all, and in 80 far no ethical aQ.S'WCW. l"

What nel"ke,urd 18 aqing here, in his indlrect VIII, 1. that the man who
espo\l8e.. "The 87st..- become8 a spectator at tbe eth1cal lite,

knowledge beeanes virtue.

am 101" him

Kierkegaard object.s to this view, uinta11'ling that

He 1ne1atSI

is''I1e ethies tnWIt thereby p&rish.

It 1& tor this reason that ettt:1.es looks upon all world-historical
knowledge v:tt. h a degree of 8U.8p1d.OD, because ;1t mq so eaail¥
b8COJ'!le a snare, a demoralizing .esthetic diversion tor the
knowing aubjoct, in

80

tQ%'

68

tb. diat..iJlCtioo between what Qoes

or does not have tlistorical 8ign1tl.canee obe)"s a quantit.ative
d1al~tic. AIs a wusequence of tids tact, the abwlute ethical.
d1st1nction between good and evU tends tor the b1storl.cal wr.... to be MUt.ralJ.aad in the .eathet1c-_tapi:v's1cal c:1eterm1naUon of thl great am 81gn1t1eant, 18 lIbi.ch eategorr the bad
hu equal ad.I11ttanca with tbe good..
"
tili __ s that. an

&tt~

to lead t.he ethical life

er of w\a'ld histo178 18 immoral.

l'lot. lood ao.d ~vU, but the "&ignUieUlt" 18

Par the h:\.atar'1cal. . . . . . .r the aha of aWdcs.
~

bT beeomiD& "an oheer-

The Obs,."er grove incapable

d1at.1nguiahlna et.h1ce.l good and _11 hom the deeire of hiatar~ atature

,

tD:i the magnttudft oC h1a con t.ribut.1on 1:.0 the course ol hia tl'Jrl".

In place fJl Heg,.l

f.

THi XOTL':Jn

0'

Fr~M

wrld-b1ator1cal ethics. lieritep.ard ohutpiona the

rreedom of man I s relationship w1 th God, ad

tlat.l¥ cleclue. that t.he

tical. lit. 1s a matter uf 1nd1v1dual reapona1b1l1t.Y, whereas a
illUde col\p1et~ invalidates the .aaent,1al individuality
~all1t••

19

t.ruiT e~

~1d.-llistor1cal

am treeciom. 'fof

the

20

nerkegurd t s great ambition to aave et.b108 va_ therefore promplied b¥ bia
conviction tbat. a free indi"idual baa a decisive role to plq in .naping h1a

. ··,16

, . Ibid.,

-

120.

-

:•. 19Ibid., l2O-l2).

: 2OIbU•• 131-139

cwn destil:v'. his relationship to God is a "poss1b1l1ty-relat1onahip.1f wh1ch
IlUSt

be actuallzed l'q '"

tree act of the rill. The neD chapter will cluJ. with

he tree po$itln, of this :relationsh1p by the individual in the

ac~

ot faith.

THE SmlND THESlS

Uerkepardls seconti thea1s aga1Jl8t Hegel cont.itVi8 that iiegel cannot in-

1ude the exin.ent.ial act as 8uch within a qat •• ot tin1te thOUtiJ1t, and thereare must content hiuelt with .. purel¥ conceptual, abstract 818tem.

To pJ'OYe

ibis usert.ion, Kierkegaara proposes the dual tact \hat Ifa logical sT8t_ 1.
ossibleJ an existel'lt1al 81'810_ is imposa1ble. lI

.nterred,

is one that 18 complete and tin1ehect.

21';"·"·~
.

A 1o{2'1eal "8ta.it It'I.I'3'be

So K1erkegaard s... to regard

t wheu he sq. jeating171

I sball be u 1fil.l.1ng a8 the 11m man to tall down in wrah1p
b.ron the Sy'atem i t only I ec -.nl:lge to 88t .,.•• on 1t.
Hitherto I have luld no 8uCceU, • •• One. or 'twice I have
been on the Terge of beDding tbe knee. But at the last moaent,
wheR I alread1' had. rq hancUcerch1et spread on the 1J'O\lnd, to
avoid Bolling q troUMr8. and I !"tade a trusting ap~:'Ieal to one
of tne 1n1t1a:ted w.ho st.ood by. 'Tell m8 nov aincerel¥, 18 if.
ut1rely f1.n18b.ed; tor it so I v1l1 knMl down before it, .,..n
at the risk: ot ruining a pair ot tl"Ouse" .... '-I alwa;ya
received the same anawert 'No, it is not yet ql,lite fi"iahed. t
And GO thei! vu amther postponement-ot the Sy'atem, and ot
fft¥ homage.

·2.

A 10&1081 system, it

ma:r

also be noted, ia one in which real existence,

f1,th its unpred1etable, contingent luIppenings, 18 suppressed in favor ot an

a",id..,

99.
22
-Ibid., 97-96.

ideal and abstract existence bearing the s tamp

or

necessity.

Kierkegaard warns

ttl.tl.t ffi,n the mnstruction of a loricsl system, it is neoessary first and tore-

f'lost to take care not to inell~de In it anything whlet. :is s\lbject to an e xi.ten.
2
tlal d1alectic,n ) that is, anythinf, which has real existence. CO!:18equentl¥..
Ii.

lorical system, tor vhIJt it 1s worth .. ilS, in Kierke.gaard' s opinion, possible.

It 18 possible to
L~

Mall utaoture

pt:re l.y abstraet tc.r;as.

a completely- articulated, tullY' dfi'eloped system

But an abstract

Wtl:' Id,

a world manufactured of con-

eepta, is by no means the real world, the world in which responsible individuals work out their salvat1m in tear

:no.

to rcm'Jling.

A s7St_

or purel¥ ag.

strut thought, therefor'e" which pretendz to explain reality is comical; and
this is "The S,ystem" Which K1crkegaard unceasingly ridicules.
On the

othf'.t" hand .. the i!!tpossib111ty of an existential 8.1stem, that 1s, a

completely developed and tull3 determined

s;rst~l

of r . .-:al existence, 1s indi-

cated by iUerker;aard when, tirst. he challenges "The System" to make the immediate beginninr whi<'il it Clai:fUS; and Ncnndl;y, when he
eeed. w1thorrt, pre:mppoaitiona.

challe~e.

Jot to pro-

In other vorda, Kierkegaal"d r1II.inwns'fi;.bat i t

one takes into account the condit1ons of N"al exiutence, it is impossible to
ca.rry out the abstl'ttct speculations of "1.'he &)rste1l'l," sinee real existence cannot be known in an abstraet, co:rx:eptual

bu., let

\1S

was-.

not tty to deceive one another.

He

I,

W~1rns:

Johanl'.lAUi

"Let us then proceed,

Climacus, .. a lauman

being, neithaJ" more mr le•• ) and I aaaume that. an;yonB ! mq have the honor to

with tl1,·!t; tor in tbat eaM be instantly vanishes from "!Q' sight, and fro. the
2)Ibid.

99.

aaw..e sight ot overy IfDrtal.~
The

t1r6t proof. tneraforc, of the impossibility of an existential system

found ill the l.nIpo61S1billt.y of ahat K4"l'kagaard thcu.,;ht lias tl'l.a ,. i!.I'ln€o:i.ate

.i.~

t.g1nn1.ngft of Hagel-the !tPure

Be.i.nt~tf

2
describoo in Hegel's logic. $· K1e:rileQ-;

ee. i.r.. th.& .f''W'c 3ei~ oI: ilegel rAther the term of an entire process of abst.rac"
d
tion and re11.fiilctive anal,tsi$, 8ld not em 1r41aadiat.e beg1tmirlf; at all.
'l'he procua of aqstractJ.on which
k egurd t IS ~-t
v.e'W"

..

.. .l.6T

tenn1ru:;.ta~

an i-~J..U.I..I... ite

i.."l the Aboolute Idea is necessarily, in

,"

.~, .cannot ,I_e
__1_ a

0;£1 ..lone. ~:iebU

nukegaard's second proof of the impaaaibil1t,y
concerned with t.be possibilit;y'

01' p:t'Ogr66sin&

l-.._-"' •.

"

VVii).ull'}.l.r:.&:.

2-1. ..:

or an existential Sf.tam 18

philosophieal.ly without prasuppoa

itiolW, th.t is" of neglecting "he iJruwrl presupposition oJ: real existence.

less

~~o.Ph¥

bwa always EU'1ded-tro» lIeg\:ll to Hussarl-in tJle disappearance
-,

the 8trtp1r:1coiiil

Q!.'

.{.l.Wl'lWl

ael..f.' .,,28~'

-"!

~t

was precisely on ti.tis ground ti1at Kierke-

gaard obJected to lie6el' 8 preaupposi tionleas philosopb;y.

It was ,lis t:oncern to

And. how are the individual partioipants related to tne joint.
eftort J wbat are the categories wb1eh mediate 'between the

~'2iIbid.

-

)

99.

2SGeora: W1lbelm rre1drich Hegel" The Sc1C1DCe
wUl iaaa wa,ll&ee, 2nd. ad. (London, 19.3Ih p. 158.
: "?6Kierkegu.rd, Poatscript" pp. 101-102.
I

"

27.
Ibid.,

-

2B

~

lO~.

Coll1ns .. Mind, p. 127.

9! !.:s1c.

",11. 86,

trane.

h)
individual IDd the world..proeeu, and •
18 it aaa1n who
strings th_ all together on the qataatic thread? Is he a
human being, or is he apecul&tive philosopb,y in tb. abswact'
But it be is a human b e1ng, then be 18 alsO' an emUng individual. Two wqa, in general, are op_ tO'r an exilti.ng .inI1v1d.ual. Either he can cb hi. u~t to torget that be is an
ex1ating IiiaIv1dual, D7 1fh1cb. he beeo• • a cClllic tipn • • •
Or he can concentrate bis entire -ru upon the tact that. he
Ii an ex:1et.'lrlg 1nd1. v1dual. It is troa w.. a1de, 1n the tir.t
instance, that objection 1W8t be made to I!'I.OQem phllosopb,yJ
.' •• not \hat. it haa a ldataken prqu,ppoa1t1on • • • blt that
it has & comical presupposition, occasioned by its having tort:otten • • •
it me.. that. ,)'Ou and I and be are humaIt

beings,

..to

one tor

each

hiueli. ZY '"'

The torego.ing • ..- be 8\lJIIIVIrl.zed by aq1ng t.hat the attack of nerkelUl"d.
~ga1n.t

Hegel'. NYOea'UoD of ex1steneewu _sed O'n the tbes1a tbat an .xis-

~ent1al

erst. 18 iItponible beoaue a1atence car.tnOt be :included w1th1n a tul.

am tll1l3

~

complete

pI

JQ'L')
Gocl~' . A logtoal

fthat he

articulated

synEll1 or huDan thought,

.,..tem 18 poaaible

a8

bot only in the lIin<I

long as the ..,.1t._at1... 1s

18 dealing mlT v:l.th ccn.c.ta aDd not with reallV.

regaJ'ded Me qeta aa aD .expen-nt in thought, then "he
)l,-~~~

""hllrer who baa 11••• ;

tir in

tlplte

or

aVAN

It ol'll7 ~el bact

~

be the at.roapat

K1erkepa1"d~a adlldrat.1oit

tOr

Hegel"

of

~erd.u,

he aaw that Hegel' a &'y8t-, 1JIpoa1.ng ... it wae, l1&d to !"e"1'!Ain a qatea

ot concept..

It

COttlc.i

not explain the real world) tor the real world 1. an

existential world, and as such cannot be .Y8tematised.
THE NOTION

or

WSTltWCl

It is the notion ot real ex1ateDoe, therefore, tlhicn Kierltegaard propose.
in order

to desVoY the pretena10na of Hegel's coneeptual world. What, then,

do_ IU.erk8gaard mean by the term "existence"?

A fUll treatMent ot the special meaning of t.hilll no tJ.on of ex.1atence will
be reaerYed tor \he next Ohap\er, where UeJ'kegaard' f'
all

~ncept

ot the nature ot

will be diSCU8sed, but 1t wUl be profitable \0 note here tbat es18tence,

tor X1erkegaard, doe. not mean a _" actuality, ••tand~-outsicie-ot-caU8esJ
for "not tor • •~.le . . .t 1& 1t torgotten that tne &\lbject 1&1 aD a1eting
1nd1ytdual, aDd that exletence 18. proces. of beoolllin«.tt .'~,
'\'That ax1atellce 1a

pr1ur1lT • proce•• ot beoomiDg 18 indicated by the atat. .nt tbat
not

th~,

be creates, God doe. 1'I>t

ex1eta.;;33)··~

i. hDutable. lMt\

<lualitati.... wa,y, 1. a
and Ood,

col18taD\~

ext.t, be

SIl,

18

"God do. .

eternal. Man thinks And

8.. dU'termt tl"OIl

chang1ng creature.

('.«}

1n.811

~1n1te,

Tbt d1.tferenee ofbetwHD _

aa expreeHd b.r I1erkelaard, must not. be 1magiDed.e a complete

"othemeaa,. tor, when apeaJdng ot the true aqateat1c thinker," 1t1erk.,aard.
aa.ya that

·it.

18 he who 18 outside

in hi. eternit7

or ex1etence

and. 7et in existence, 'Who 18

tONY" conplete, an:i ".t. :Lncludu all ex1s\eUce wit.bi.n hiJue

.l/.I:, .~.~

~jl-",,.,,

--1t 18 God....

rnm

1ih18 stateant" it aq be interred that, in apite of

narkegurd •s repeated warning to reatember that God 18 completely "other" \ban
, -.nts ex1st.ence IVq' stID be viewed as a ldnd of pU"tic1pation in etemitT,

specially when lierkeCurd maintains 'tbat "existence is the child that is born

t the infinite

and the

~ '\.~ real

tinite, the eternal and. the terporal • • • •

tterence between fin:Lte beings and the Win1te

Oa.i

18 that f1n1te be1n€a

The a:>tion "coming to be" 18 an 1I1portmt one han, tor " • .una to be" is
naid.red a proc...-a proc... of connet

atrJ:~1ng.~1Jneric:eparcl

expre....

ell moet cl....l¥ .eD be ...,.8, 11Th. prine1ple that the .ld.eUIlI eubjecti....

h1nker ia conatantlT occupied in atr1Ying, cbe. not aean that he bu, in the
Wte

8ense, a goal toward wtdch be atri...., and tilat he would be 11n1ahed when

had reached this goal.

becoa1ng • • • • Th1.a

!! em!!!
RJM!H !! ~ !l!!!! th1nlc:er's !!! a1etelle•• ·~~
. , be .t.n.".. inArl1tel.T, 18

Th. edateDc. ot the tinite 1ndt:t1.dual, than, is a

~onatant17

Pl'OC." ot beooIl1ngJ

aAd

om1ng-to-be 18 a process of conatat at.r1Y1ng. Since all beoolldng t8Jc:.8 place
til

tree4Gm,,,36 ~t. lIneond1UonallT

excludes the l:iepUaD d.1al.ect.ie

Hl7 ft'olutlon of the ab801ute ictea.

o~

the nee-

nerkegaard t • conainl-to-ba eon.tit-ut.••

discont1nuity in nat11ft, a gap in exi.tenoe which cannot be bridged to" a pro...
••s of mecti.aUon, bu.t only' by the leap involved in .. tne dee1a1on.

pard'.

<x>ctriae at b8COftlirJg will be

, ''!bid.,

J&~ren

:seen

X1erlce.

more tUlly in tbe next aecUorl of

84.
Kierke,aard, PbUoaoehical lraf!!!!ta. trans. David JI'. Sveneoft

(Oxford, 19)6), p. 61.

46
th1e chapter. the means by which the individual

become. will be

discU8Hcl

in

the following chapter.
THE THDID THESIS

'fhe third o£ Kierkegurd's objections against Hegel is expreased 1n the tba '"

sis that in tl» metaph¥sical order, He«el CanDOt 4eal vi t.h the baa1c mUons

ttl.

or

being and becoming, since he cannot diatinguiah between \be.e concepts, pr-4 __

17

in their status as ooncepts, and the reality which

gaard objected that Hegel ignared completely the. tact. that.

,

represent.
JIIUl

iC1erke-

18 continpAt.

and, moreover, JUde being and beco1ll1ng eternal aDd neoeuar.r l'Nl.it.1es.

Uerkegaard apeaks sllghtingl¥ ot the "tnnUt, with wb1ch qat.eu.t.1.ta

concede that

He~

baa perhapa net been successful 1n :lnt.roducing 1IO'I8Il8Dt. .,,-

€'.rywbere in logic, tt~ ~c the who18
ae1.t-eY01'ri.ng principle.

.,.stem 111 Suppold ,. be a C01'llP1etel,y

It the trana1t1on tl'Cft one ata"e to anotber in tlle

system. i. inexplicable in one case, it 18

entirel.7 :1nn:pl.1cable. neri:eguH

mainta.1na fu.rther that "Hegel'. unparalleled di8eOftl7, the subject til. 80 - r -

alleled an adJ4rat1on, nanal,y,

t;he 1ntroduc~on of

sheer contusion of the logloal acieneeh'"

of

l'ID"ement into logie, 18 a

hOi

ltierke8aard complains that Hegel'.

theor;y ot Jad1ation, *ere1>7 two contradiCtory e1--=a can be 8,1Dth. .iaed into

a new and (litterent ale. .t, cannot explain real iIIOr_nt or chang•• aID our
t1mu no explanation is torthCOlling as to how Mediation como about., wbether
- it reaulte flo. . the 1IOYeuut of the two tactcre and in what aeue 1t alread7

1s conta1Dad 1n

ttl_.

or vbetber it

u

_thing . . 1Ihich

,"nerkecaard, PoatacrJ,2t, p. 99, n.

-

hOIb1d., 99.

~.,

u.d. i t

47
so, hov."

41

It the neW' element. is already present. in the synthesizing ele-

ments, there cannot be any real change, an.r actualization ot 8Ol'IlG\hing not 1n
existence before-tor be change Xierkegaardmeans "the

~e

involved in be-

ct'JYIing ••• a tren3ition tram mt bfrl.ng to being, of f'rol'1 possibillty to
aetual1t.1."

hi

'

If the transition

~

posaibilitT to actualiv is effected b,-

s(J!tething rot present in the two previous elements, then Hegel cannot name the

causi:t1f, element,

II.~

hi. poSiting o£

~O'V'e.ment

is irrational: "the 'NQN

trans-

ition 18 a mere ch.1ara in tbe sphere Qf lor;ie and 1+,. true plaee is in thEt

words, negel's dialectical moven1ellt 1s the mnceptual untolding ot a plan; it

is rot, am oanmt be, a real
Berel cannot claim,

s~

*"'elW'lt.
Kierkegeard, that neee.sit! i8 a qnthes18 of

poes1biU;ty aM actualitYJ tor "nothing e"t"er co• • into be1ns; with necessity;

wtmt i8 necetl8&l7 neve" comes into bait'llJ nothing becomes necellS«%7 by coll!1.na
into being.-

Lb-'
'In

these three stattmenta can be totmd [lerkegaa,rd ca

0W1!l

phil.

oeopbieal doe trtne ot change.
THE lOTION 0F Brer'lMING

First, "nothing eYer comt. into being with nee.a8itT."

This statement

!las a pa.rtl.y' negative, partly positive, value in Uerkegaardts d.oetrine.

Ne-

gatively.. it 1. directed against the HegeUan di.al.ectic of the neee8s&rT
' / . 1il''''
; S;ren Kierkegaard. It!f!t1t1Oll, trans. Walter Lowrie (Prineeton, Nw
Jere.,.. 19L1), pp. 33-34.
·
:'/.1 b;2
.
K1e2"kagaard, Philoso@cal l1':!I!!!n1is, p. 60.
• . ' It)aoren lCierkeflard, Tbe C01'1C!ft of Dread, t.rana. 'Walter Lowrie (Prineeton~,~ Jereey, 191Jh), p.'"'"7J.
'\,' .. lierkelurd, PhUoaopbical ha-~·~. 'D. 61.
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evolution of the Idea; for flnothuJg t.hat comtiS intI) being d.?es so by virtue
:l

loeic.u ground, but only throllth the opera.tion ot a

is Kierkepard's introduction to 11:1$ tl1eaiu that
h6\/F

!reedOO1."

that is, the ultiEte cause of

ual1t,y is t¥)t an im!'!liUlent evol'.ltionary

t~

If

ot

e&u.se."~\:~iu.,el,y.

it

all becom1..ng talces place with

ciJal1ie trom possibillty to act-

pri.ncipl~

but

If.

tree cau.lie.

Kierkegaard denies ile€ells absurd principle t..rua.t neoessity can Oe a 8,JIlt.hea1a

1t1

of possibility am aetuallty.

Th!rdlT, llnoth.ir.lf, becomes necessary bY' coming into being."

ize contingent beings, that is, thoee which have
employed the term "h1stor1cal lt ,

48

OOtfte

To character-

into being, fUerkegaarc1

~':'~~~

and 1naisted t.bat "historical beooJrU.ng comes

into being by the operation of a relatively' tree c ..'Wu~, ,.lIil1ch in turn points
ul t:tt:lateq to •

abaolut813' .tre1J cause."

jJ,(:

- !!!!!

. That so_thing happened, t.beret'ore.

is certain, and in a sen.. nacea8at"'TJ that it

The

Tho~1st

to happen is s1mp1.r not tnte.

would S8Y that historl is necessary only with "OOrlsequel1.t neeeaof

si t:n" and Kiarkegaartl, in agreeinc wit.h this terndnology, would still ina1at

that "the pa8t did not become neoess1U7 by coming into being, but on the con~,,~.

trary proved by eoll\ini; in to being tha t i t was not neces84X'l'. 8"""'Lt 6fpeakill8
this wq, Kierkegaard is

entphas~

t.lle Coo.tJl1ienc.Y of tile went iii.elt, &nO

irus1atirlg that. cur knowledge
;,.

ot t.he

49

past does not conteI' nec ••a1t.y vpon

~,

·ill "1'n.. certainty ot ex1atence
a historical _8rlt.

and the contingene.r ot co. .

ir" 1nto e:x1atence _ t theretol"8 be d1stingu1ahed. tram one mot-her.

Th1e C\1J'iou :intdstence upor. the contingency of "tJ.storicaltl facts ••8IU

diapropol'tionate, until one r ..:U.ze. that Kierkecaard·. iAsUtenc. bas an ulterior

-1:vee

hi. notion

Hie

d) .trine

of OOl'ltillg..,-

ot phil.oaoph1eal beUt. Which

mun

he ill

b. ual...tood in the l1ght of

.":me to

jllst1.t7.

.In the per-

son at Johann•• CliMcwI, K1erfrepard wr1tu,
The h1nor1ca1 O&lD)t be riven 1aedlatelT to t.t. ....s, since
t,he elusiveness of 'becoming 11 :Involved in it. 1',be 1'lIned1ate

iIIpNa.:1on

ot a . .tural. t*enOPleftOft or ot aa

ii"!pre881on of the h1stoncal... for tb,e

_alt 18 not the

b~

1!.volved cannot

be ••nud 1med1ateq, but onl3 the pJ'ennce of _ . content.
But ttle presence ot the td.atl.)1·lcal include. the fact of ita
_ _:Lng, or el•• it 1. not \be :pJ'eBfl'lCe of the historieal u such.

IlIfIlediate sensation and ~. <:ogn1t.,ton o,annot (leedy••
Thi. 1& by it.eU enough 1;0 ahow tm the ilU torica! eaumot be

tn. object :)f eit.her.. because t.be lli$toric<liJ. ll.U thiili alusivfiMS.
Vb1eh 18 1tapl1c1t in all becoming. As compared \d.t.b ~ 1mm.eelusiv~s~ boY Wb.icll
~bUul.
.!."

&&t., becoliU.ng has an

ble tact i8 rend.end

even

t.~:te

iaQat c.penda.

'to u:pJ.a11'1 the 81gn1.t"1cance ot h15 atateJrlatt, KJaokegaard UNa

*he fJXaJ\\ple

of our ..e1ng ...t.ar. That we . . . . star, aDd that the .tar l"Nlll' ex1sta, 18
certain) but . . e-.t kl10w tnm this that it baa come into being. lor our
kmwledp of betIom1ng. we neacl

.c:ae t ..m ef krovledge wb18h is both eerta1n ad

uneerta1.ft Uke ble'tol7' J.tHlt. ,be

~V

of beeoId.ng,

GIl"

ot the hiater-

:leal, :1a tw1'ol.b "the mtb1ngneu of the antecedent llOA-being 1. OM .ide ot

it, 1Iblle the .uJlhUa:t.1on ot tt. pou1ble i . mother, the f",lattv
be1ng at tae
.

. . . tim. the arm1b1lat1on of flYf117 other

-

poN1b111t7.1t~~'In

otJt.er 1ftII"cla, •

So
certain, it waG only 9 poeaiblHty.

In the liaru:d..hilation of tne possible," the

thmg became a reality} and in so beeortin(, "annihilated" fNfIr1' other poaalb.U-

ity which could hwe been actualized.

1:"or Klerkegaard, then" to come into ex-

istence is to emerge-not from a cootlnu.:UflJ..y- deVeloping necessity, au hegsl
\'s,')<.::ld have It--but !"'roM possibility.

But Itthe possibility from wb.ich that whit"J':

became actual once M\erged still clin{;:stc it and rEMains with it
after the lapae of
there is a

eenturleSJIf~~

f\i,nda..~ntal

uncertainty, as Kierkegaard chooses to na.'2.e it.

$$ ( ,

ing 1.8 belief, or taitllJ ''tor
~t

CO'Ilf:

-

doubt

taJ. th believes what it doe,. not 8ee.

in beccxnc'

56-I

talt.b.

into heine:. 11 ~7'
; .~

Kierkegaard iru!lifSts
t,htit

:in"olv~

believe that the star 1s there, for that. it sees, but it beliavd thai

t.he star has

kr£lw

past, evea

therefore, within flYfIrY existing t:billg

The only tact:>.lty which can abolish all t.he uncertainty

"dee e

a~

\lpol1

the certainty of our belief" al t.hOurJi ..fa CanllOt.

the tact vh ich we belier". actuallY' came 111'00 ex1.8tence.

OYf.Tcome?

Through, resolution of .alll

.,

How 18 our

When faith resolves to bti.ieve

that SCA1'!S fnt'lt 1s the effect of a tree Cltuse (and the fa.ct must be such it it
1s trnly h1storical), ttin, that very insta..'I'\t the indifference of doubt h&& been

,1
diltpel~ed ~ it.s equiBb rinm cv~rth!'l"\fn, ret by kncndedge, lrllt by will. uSB

belW for knowledge.

,

M.b the !"lI'\piric:ists" K1~rkeeaa:l'd ofters no other det.er-

minant fer belief' but the will; the nrrertaint:r of th;.:;
when taced with the j..nco"M,t)rehensib11itv of

t..r,.~

~Mlect

is

to., strong

rule

The 8800nd conclwdon pertillent here is that JClcrk'egau-d does not reall.Y
abolish the

'11M

of' the intellect 1.."l dMl:in;" with rell.Uty. he merely 't.reats our

intellectual. knowledge of reali. as unimportant.

-

We kf¥:)w that this or tJUi.t

thing exiats, our b.eUf!l is directed only to the tact tl141t lt .has

ing.

co~

into be-

The ~1r1cists, especially ~, pl..!'l;coo belief in the sarle pt)'ltion.

HurIIe t IS ttleatment of causality is much like r.ierlcegaard· s in t~t ~ fails to

ft'ind a true cause either in immedia.te cognition or in :lr.tere~e.
gul"d's problem at this point is
gaard is, In. the Philosop¥cal
~·ich

8O~at

Frag~ts,

dir:rerent from that of rru.1l.e.

the CZ2pt.ent

"lo..r
/,>6.i.u.Ld...

-

69.

.lhld.,

66.

$9

-

or our religion,

Kierke-

constructing '"' philosophy of belief

ilEt will later appl¥ to the religious realm.

~.wnte..'1d,

But lierl~e

In reli€iousbeliet, he will

U.s doctrines Md creeds, !IUV' be t.aken tor

te-nc&; tllirdl7~ that £legel t s dialectic cannot ju.st!.t'.r the prcduction of l"<!al

int'::'\vidt;.Ql, s'JbjecUve
u;:a;:'l!K1 his battJ.e

mq:.e:r1a.'1Ce~

:4t~l'ijnst

e5;'JE'.cl.all.1 :In ita !'::{l1-r.t.tionttl phas'1's--hs

Deten115.d.Stn

~m

the

~ound!;

0:' htll!!L"l existence,

!:Jt

Idealiem, pr1ma'ily, ';~e r.wJtboriolo"'ical dialectic.

K1erk:or;nt:rd,,, in attaekinn

r~ortJant..ieiern a5 it

destroy the HOIIIIDtlc viewpoint in
thing botter, to g1ve

ma'l.

tom and P1!"poso

re-yaltmtJ.on ot the ...tbet1.c wtq of

vlq of lite dtcJ not intend to

Hil object was rather to make it
to the aesti'let1c aspects

ute vas to

00_

SOJ'IMt-

at We. Tbia

about tbrwgh \he ex1$-

tenUal dialectJ.c of 'he three etae'e. of ._.oe, a d1aleetic Which 1.

'I

'I

r
53
plalltaUTel7 cW'teret trom all other••
DIAL&!TIC 8

n. OUfi'JUL

All d.1al.eeUo aprings tram contradiction. O.UB"allJr speaking, 1 t i8 a
..thad of _king pxvgrea. tbro\tgb opposit.1on.
~alog ..

Etqmologtoalll' it originates 1.n

that 18, in usen10n and contradiction. Dial.tic, theretore, 'begina

!n eonveraaUon,
riewpointa,

am tbrough co:nrenation

beco._ .eaD. o£
a

knc¥ledge.

aM dlsouaion, b7 COutpllrlQ8 opposite

When kr»wledge aDd thought adequate-

lY Jd.rrol' realit.,., dialectic , ...... apparent in thing. th8tl8e1.. . ., 111 the
bieral'Ch1cal ordel'ina f4 nality. Tbe real source ot d1alectiC8 is the human

tpe:rson, 1It1o ach'anua in Ta.rioua

1I'qa

~'S

'tv

opposi.~

DIAL.6CTlt

l!e1"kepard viewed Hegel'. philoaopq as a
UpoIl •

or aaa.i..--tdlating contradiction.

~

logical rqat_ hued

d1alectic of buaanent deYe1.op"" vt.reby the apparent contradieti#,)tls

Oil

one leTel ot beillf; are areroome in a ayntbeais upon a higher leYel, until the

new

1C1erkegaard'. correa•
t10n of liegel'. d1alect1c vas b&aed upon the postulate that actual existence

npreme he1ght of a world

of reality- _" l'eaeb.ed.

camot be trXPlained in a logical .7St... "Lor, ie, "

sa:rs one comfil8ntator, "deals

only with tho. . . and mt with ex1atence, an:! all thought 13 of the
1;,y of being.

qualJ.-

But where we are ooncerned wi th an absolute differeace L'l quality

as we are in cle..U.llg 'td th thOUf,ht and beingJ and

ltat1ve dialectic i8 teulble."

-

8_

60

nth

man and C"Od. ~ a qual-

If, then, the dialectic or

ut.

is trul.y

existant1al, that is. it .it really produce. qualitatively different beings,
there is clearly

DO

place in the lite ot

m.al

tor a. logical dia.lectic 1n vil1eb

all being i. cpultativelJr identical in an ideal order ot concepts.
kegaard aaw that Hepel was right in insisting that

SO!!»

But ner-

kind at dialectic 1.

essential. Therotor4l, nerkegaard cons true 'ted his d1alect1c with a careful eye
on the basic faults of the Hegelian dialectic.

Ja.ERlOiXlAIJm t S DIAL.&.iTIC
Thus, though Kiericegurd opposed the

:I.rml1ed~c1

ot the Romantic

way

ot 11£

he still clung to ill. original aesthetic poaition that individual existE'.nce 18
to be safeguarded at all costs. Consequentl.r his dialect1c is constructed to
lead the existing indiYidual

relig i oua,"

tt~

the aesthetic th:ropah the ethical,

6ltn such a WIt'" that the

n

"le~el1an

!2 the

identifica:t-ion ot thought with

bei,O£, and Hegelianism's cmsequent inability to juatity dialectical movement,
is corrected.

62

Kierkegaard's dial4ct1c 1s

s;{stans after a dialectic

or

or

a ditfeent Bort trom all others'; Other
of

thought; r..1erkegaard offers to the individual a

dialect1c ot lite. Other &y'8tems em.ploT a IIl8thodolog1eal d1aleot1e at.lI8d at
the inc"a:;e ot knowledge; the existential dalect1c 1a a spiritual l40remct
in the eli recticn of decisive choice and religious comm1tatent.

The existential

~

th1nker 18 laced, mt with a closed ayatall of thought, bI.lt with open poaa1bU-

lt1es f\r good cd evil.

6l.nav.s.d
gurti,

SWClaoft,

SoNt.b1ntfi: ,ben t

!!!. Point .2! fiew,

p. ~6.

KieriteGaard, p. 111.

See &1eo

62Dav.1d SWnlOn, Somethi.1)t About Kierlegaard, pp. 118-119.

lUerlce-

!
I

I'

!,

SS

I

'I'

I,

Aga1nat. ROIUIllt1c aut.b.et1clam, with its emphasis upon bnediate experience
spontaneous teeling, 11erkecaard proposed a dialectic which would lead. the
1'1dual througb the yarious level. ot existence to the peak of re11g10118 com-

t!lClt.

Hi~

cbcmne, like Lll'triler's before hill, ....s a universalization ot b1.e

life's ape r.lenc...

the tJr at stage mirrors his

OlCl

you thtul phase

or

qn-

. cal and unco_1tted oba.....ation of 11£., the second staf,:'8 r ....eals the ooUvaon 1ft his moral regeneration in

1836,

the third stage maJ'ks his own spiritual

nvel"Sion in 16)8.

The thre. s'Waf-os ot existence-the aestbetic, the etJ'lk al, and the religOUB-are viewed by K1erlcegaard as baing each the c alcnte embodiment at a total

at ute,

md at. the same time as aUg •• on the road of purposeful. living.

stage bas its

mID

particular outlook, each has ita natural culmination,

ita mo_ltt of dec1aion.

Tl:lq are not me re meant s in an evolutionar,y proc••

l.irlked 1lcgethel" i.'1 a weU-arUculated. totalitT.

Kierkegaard conceive, the

tages asetClusive and Clcloaed wcrlclaJ each is an independent area of lite,
lated 1.1'). i t$ a1u cd it.s activities.

«1"

l'be stages are dlsoontinuoua in th.

tb& one does not develop tram anctt8r.

q are completely independent and

t ooe Clot her} otherwise there

e&1l

be lived in thttr anUret,y independentlJr

wwld be no

t must be kept in m1ncl that the three

l'!EiatlS

s~es

at trane1t1on be"ween thea.

ecnstitute m .xistenU!Il dialec-

, ona which progre8ses tbl"ough a aerie. ot coltrad1ct.1ol'l8. Each higher atage
COl'18Ututed mt tbrolgh the abrogat1cll of the lCller, but through the auboration or the lcMer.

fbi nli€i0ll8

lUll

1s aUll po....nd. by ....th.tie

S6
passion and ethical r.1gbt8CW!JMS8, bta his whole ex:1neneo is reconstituted, or

repeated, on a higher level. Where liegel, through a process ot Mediation, would
synthesize the aesthetic stage Cd its opposite ethical. .t.age into the higher

unity by a Illloath trans! tiro of thflle:ht, K1erkegaard attenpts to -.braee all
contrad1ct1.oIll in Olle sp1ritual "leap."
This Q:)ctr1.n:e of the three staees serves as a tram9WOrk 1'Or a d1scU8slon

c4 Kier.icegaard's doctr1ra or beliet, vh.ioh mIII1 be coosidered as the cratn and

cul.m1.n&t1on ot the whole existential dtaleette

e~.t1tnting

the stages.

THE AESTHETIC STAGE
The first of the •• three stages 1s that ot aesthetio enjo)"!!lel1t. of I1fe.

p:t

las tlree levels. that ot ,..msual. imed1acy, exer.rplified by the character ot

pon Juan, that of skepttcal doubt, extnpl1f1en by' the cl'llr,acter ot Faust, ar.td

t.hat at true d.spair, as t01nd

1,"1

the cwacter of Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jw.

"hose thl"ee levels c€ aesthetic existence exempl1ty' tbe .-..1ar sensib111t1ee ot
~e aesthetic 'tWIY of I1to.

It vwId 8eem th& Ki&rkegaard thought th. almoet
'f

lndispensable as starting point.s tar the existential dialectic, tor he writell,
The three great ideu (Don Juan, P'8ll8t, and the Wandering Jew) repreHnt, 80
:.0

Sl»alc, the thl"ge.fold tendfl'lCT at lite outside religion, and onl7 as these

~eas
~1l8

come alive in ttw indivici1al hwIIan heine

s the

riO r

elation to

al mel the rell,1cu8 J

~ theolot~cal

80

position.-

II'l db eceme

Mediat a, onla' then

my vi ew o£ the S8 thr". 1d. ea. stands in

6';

In the .ti1'8t. level of aesthetic exi8t.ence, thI1t of sensual t.ed1ac1', nar~gaard' 8

anall'a1a renal. t.tat t be per8m what e .018 interest 111 sunk 1n the

enaual Uv1Jw-tor-the-moDBnt vh1ch characterizes the lowest torm. of ..atbeti-

$7
cultivate. 1agination and pl"actical knowledge at the upeue ot reuon

ism.

voUt1on.
ich

CUll

fbi. stag. t1 ae.thette ex1etence 1& characterised by boredom,

oIll,y be arerccme by' the "rotation _thod ," in whicb, to avoid dleap..

intmen.t, the aesthete IltUSt tute the enjoymem or Stlccess1ve moment.., but re-

uncomitted to aqy human rel.&\10118h1pa.
DortKt))." 800n give••IV to the a"mel level of aesthetic existenee, vh1ch
• ch.. actGriaed by a state

ot cbubt.

The hwun 8pint eanmt be aatiat1ed

reJ.;r in tlB tlQr ot 1IIned1& e pleutre.

The

~Yidual

in thie situation

K1eric.gaarc1 arn.a tha.t 1 t 1. iflPOrtant. to not.

b t. J he cb •• II)t yet d.apa:1r.

I:,

I

'III

the atart that deapa1r 18 not to be contused w1. t.h doubt..

It can be add,

'I

,I

I

t 1.

tru., that chubt 18 tbe d.eapair oE tbought. But deapa1r in thi. ca•• i.

nly partial. _

relat1.,.._

It doea mt attain the depth -.4 bl"8adth ot a do-

1r 'Wh:1ch 18 the expreaaian ot a • ..,le. personalJ..tr' and rela\e. to the
bsoluta.

I'

64

the stat. ot 'W'B"el1eved c.tupa:1r. The aesthetie personality

ate vben. the 1IIIpouJ.b11ity of "repetition" beeoIas apparent.
K1erkepard's book Repet1t1on,

me l1erkegaard h1lllSelt,

of

CCIII8S

The

to thi.

JOW'lg

man

aale.. a JOIlrl'1e1' to

rlin, tries to rapeat exactly fJ'IIery experience he had trmre, and deapa1ra ot
ing able to recapture the onginal leeUng. he had.

an aesthetic repetitiDn.

What the young an ae.a

He know ne1 ther the nature nor the neo.as1 ty

or

petition, although he know it. m.uat t.ake place to insure his happinesa; but
18 powerl... to eftect. it I and thus he despairs.

SPrerl lark.pard, ttr.~2IS A

.ton, New Jeratq, 19

,

t1erlregaard. does not

.."l1t
2! Lite, trana. Walter Lclfrie
•

,17tr.:

I.

$8
1

explain repet.1.t1on

jn

the aesthetic sphere of ute, fer it i.e essentiall7 a

'I
'I

Ii

1

religious category, and aI'1T explanat10n of it 18 reserved until the religious

II

stage is reached..

j,

THE TRANSITICHW, LEAP
The individual who finda h1maelt unsatiatied in the aesthetic .tap, .8

vas IUel'kegaard b1mselt in 18)6, 1e raced with the problem or how to transfer
h1e !IIOd e

at exietence to a higher stage, the stage of the atl'd.cal. The probla

is present because of the complete d1Icontinu1t,r between the epberes ot ex1stence wh.1ct1 precludes a

SMOOth

tnnaition fran one to mother.

The passage

from one stage of ewtence to another is .rfected onl¥ bT a Rleap •• 6S lierkegaard calls it a ",uallt.ative leaptl.

66

tor it is a tranaltl.on trom pouibU-

67

itT to actual1tJ', a true change, a coming...1nto-being.

More 1v&portant, the

68'
leap is the category ot deeaion and choice. The leap which. bridges the ,aps

betwen un's statee of ex1at1ng 11, theretore, a choice....... tree act bJ"'vhich
a man chooeee to become, that is, to exist on a new ani higher

P~

Choice

as aueh is not present on the ....\betic levelJ tor there choice 1s 4ther lIbol-

13' 1IIned1ate

a1Xl unreneeU...., or :tund.uIentallT indec1ei.....

69

One cannot even

choose to remain on the aesthetic levelJ tor INch a decisive choice would btpl;y

6SnerkegUrd, Postscript, p. 231.
66
Ibid.,

,I,

lho.

67 Ibid., )06.

68 Ibid ., 91.
69nerkegaard, Either/9.!:, II, 111.

59
full refiection, and to choose retlectiTel¥ 111 to enter the aphere of the

ethi.cal.
OhOOH

nerkegaard therefore aciviae. 'Ii.ll& Cleepa1riog aesthete, "So then

despairs tor even deapa1r 18 a choice. for one can doubt without choos-

ing to, but one cannot daspa.1r without choosing e

cboo... aga1n--and Wbat 18 it he chao•••?

H~

And

lilen a man deepairs he

choo••• biuelt, not in his imm..

diacr, mt as th1a tortu1toWi indivi.dual, but .he choos•• hi1Uell in his eternal
validity.1I

70

To "choose one••un in this connection is
adage, "know thyHlt.1t

~1.ailar

to the ancient Greek

"It 81gn1!1ev that the etb1eal ind.ivid.ual is w know

biJIl8elt mt in tbe MDS. of mere contGiDplation but in the senae of coming to

hilll8elt .a an inward. action oJ: the personal1V."

71

Cbooei.r.li

OIlesel.t in one'a

etemal Yal1ci1tvr IIl_ cOIling to tNe aeU'-consciouane.s, and. accept.1ng Ol'l8sel.t
72 .
as lIa task with manitold elell8llta. tf
It _ana that the man lilO has mad. the
leap to the e'tihical plane baD

treel¥

undertaken re.pona1b1l1t,y

hiuelt upon a _v and ethical pattem.
which ••parates

w..

Dr his

tar re-Mk1na

leap he has bridged

~e

lap

'f

hCBl tItOl"al liviD&, and 'by hi. act of choice be beglna to

ex1at anev.

?OIb1de, 177.

~1dar Tbomte,

sq, 1948), p.L9.

11erltegaard t s

See lt1erkeparci,

Ph1lo:r~ ot Re1~1on (Princeton,
@!¥!: ~""'!I, 2 •

72JC1erkegaard, E1ther/,2!. II, 216.

Ifa Jer-

1':
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THE m.'HICAL STAGE

The et.b1cal ..n baa thus choSEIl good and evil, and nov has morality as tb.
chief principle ot his CQlduct and the ult.tmat. end of his acUvity.
to dut7 beoo.. the aiIt

or the ethical

un, tor Uerkegaard s ethical man is a
t

The ethical law is both. immanent and universal.

ICantian.

Obedience

It is inmtanent in th

sense that it is an autonom.oue ethic, in which the individual. tollows the absolute will in all ca..., aDd refers to no QOm outside ot lliIIselt, it is uni-

veraal b1 the a . .e that it appUes to 111m in tbB

.aM •• that

it applies to

everyone e1. .e, azr:l b1. tuk 18 to real. he the universal law. Sin is the contra
venU(;fi of this UDiYeru.l law. 73
But the ethical lite, too, bas its limitations, and soon becomes uusatia-

It founders wiwn ccntl'm:ted witb the tact of s1n, and with the et.hic-

f'actor,y.

al impos.ib1llV of tJ.ruti.ng fer giVene8S tor sin.

Sin, on the one luuld, deprive

I, I
,

the ethical lite ot its univerSality, and places the simer outside the universal nom} the impossibility of torgiveness tor a1n, on the other- hanll, 18 ap'f

parent J for the categorical iJIlptrat1ve makes no provilion :tat'

any'

breach of fen

eral laws.
In -7 case, to remain in the ethical ateee would. be 1Dapoa.ible, ..en tor
the just

man, tor there are situaticos in which the ethical 1& inadequate,

8it-

uations in Vdch the ethical, or gmeral, rule. tor conduct cannot appl¥. This

wae the ca.. with Abrahara, when b14den by God to sacritice his
Abrahut to do

Cod'.

8al,

leaac. For

blddblg vould be to sin ap.1nat tb.e uniTeraal lawa of the

Ii
I'

ethie,al lite, to rewa obedience to God lIDuld be a a1D d1rect11' against God.

i
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~h1s

or

situation poses the three problems

Kierkegaard's book

~ ~ Trembl~

In this book, the story o! Abraharn and its significance, is, unfortunately,

....

somewhat cryptic) but lU,eric:egaard,
epeakine as Johannes De SUentio, intended
.
.

it to be

80.

In his PhUosoep.cal P'rapents and in hie Concludi;S Unscientific

Postecript,-&nd particularly the latter, wr.1ch he called "the turning point ot
my work

&6

.

an author"

74

--he explaine4 m.ore tul:Q' the meaning of his c17Ptie

doctrines. The cr;yptic story ot A'braham .ust be reYiewed. here, in orde to present the tinal philosophical elements of

.Kierk.g~' f!I

doctrine or belie!.

TRA.tlSITION T,,) THE RELIClaUS STACE

!!!£ e. Tftmblini

deacribes the transition between the ethical stage and

the stage o£ absolute religious faith) and in writing the book, Kierkegaard tollowed his uual st,.le ot presentation.

E!

Speaking

pseu&)1l1~uslT,

as Johannes

SUentio, he describes the rel1gious faith not abstractly or logically, but

ps¥cholog1cally, studying Abraham in the throes ot an ethieo-rel1g1ot18 dilemma.

Two ob8erva1'J.oDS pertinent. to t bis thes18 may be drawn from the qtudj ot Abrabanl.

First, in Abraham's action, there was what iC1erkegaard. calls a -teleological 8Ilspenaion of the ethical."

fh. ethical as such i8 universal, it i8 duty

eoncei....d u universa.ll7 obliging tor .eU-deteJ'lll1ning beings.

It do•• Dot

rater to ind1vidual particular case., to chance, or to exPed1enc7.
law 14 revealed. to man in the Categorical. I1nperative.

1... revelation of purpose.

MarltS

The eWcal

This revelation of ethic.

actions fl\ust tel'll toward the good of the com-

munity. The JUl.n who follows this dictate ot the etbical law ia called the

"trad.c he!'O," but not a "1tn1ght of '811;h." Aga.melllJ'lOn, when he 8aeritieecl
74K1erkev.&.arel. The Point ot View.. p. 41.
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lphegerda for the good. of the whole Creek race, is to be coosidered a J1tragic

hero. It

nut Abnha!ll 1s the 1Jlnigbt of Faith"; for his action was that of an in-

dividual acting ir.d.ividually'.

Now, Abraham's et..uc&.l duty was to loye and. protect IsaacJ but the higher
goal of faith comrnarxled the sacrifice of Isaac.

Abraham abandcned the univeraal

commandment; a.nd there.f'ore he began to exist u an individual-a "Knight. of
F'aitb"--in opposition to the universal.

75

He placed h1.mselt, tbrolJ€h faith, "in

an

absolute relation to the absolute";

~e

reduced ettt1cs 1n ids own life to a rel.a.t.i:,e position.

and. lIhen he bowed to the 'lIfi11 of God,

!ethical universality, he

ent&~c.Q

lab&ndoninp: all mediation

at church or society.

R,1s1ng above mere

into a particular, direct relati(;nah1p with CJod

Second:q-, the ;r.eana by which Abraham altered into

th~a

relationship with.

r:'<'ld are the means by which IiIl.'f3' individual existing ethica1l¥ must relate h1m.se1t
to God.

In K1al'kegaard. t s teminoloQ', Abraham made an "infinite double

ment" of faith.

lllOVe-

'l'r.e "tint movement" ot faith was Abraham'fI infinite'resigna-

pi' Isaac, that 18, l::ds <bnation of Isaac to the infinite Ood.

of

'I'he "second naove-

Plant" of .f&1th took place lllen Abrabarn belleved. "by virtu. ot t.m absurd" that
10ci would again restore Isaac to h1.1l.

It is to be mted bere that Uel'kegaard oppose. faith to reason.

belleves on3.T in the tace
to the act

(:£

or

an "absurdity .. "

Abraball

His intellect contribute. notb1.ng

faith but the realizat.ion that kuo1fl.edge is pit1.tullT inadequate

'When we are dealing with Cod.
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SU'!HAR.Y

It m.ll be the task of the following chapter to explain more fully the act

Df belief here presented as the means by which an individual leaves the ethical
~tage,

with its dependence upon reason, to exist in the religious star-e in the

!Pace of intellectu.al absurdity.

In this chapter, generally speakinf;, Kierkegaard's attacks upon Hegelianism
~1'1d

upon Aestheticism have been reviewed.

It was stated that Kierkegaard fought

~egelianiSI'l with the weapons of Romanticism, an:l. Romanticism with the weapons

pf Hegelianism.
~ality

The weapons he chose were a passionate i..'1terest in the individ-

and responsibility of

l'lan, al1d

the methodological dialectic of existence.

More partieularIy, this chapter has dealt first with Kier.kegaard's attack
~pon

Hegelianism in three theses: First, Kierkegaard

asse~ed,

Hegel's world-

rustor1cal process is inimical to man's ethical life as a responsible individuaJ,
~his

idea of world-historicity Kierkegaard opposed on the grounds of human free-

~om, positing the necessity of man's free relationship to God.

S~cortdl.y, Kier-

.,

egaard showed that Hegel's system cannot inelude real existence; for the System
s merely eonceptu.al.

Kierkegaard counters Hegelian conceptualism with his own

~octrine of existeme, explaining existenee as a process of becoming, a contin-

:u1l striving to exist.

Thirdly. Kierkegaard pointed out that Hegel cannot ex-

'lain becoming; for the conceptual dialectic cannot justify movement.
~ition
~nd

In oppo-

to this, Kierkegaard proposed his own philosophical dbctrine of becoming,

its correlative, belief.
The second part of this chapter has dealt with Kierkegaardts existential

~1alecticJ tracing the progress of the individual through two of the three
~tages

of existence: the aesthetic, and the ethical.

Finally, the cryptic story

of Abraham was discussed.. in preparation for e. fuller cd.z:;cuaaion of tile re-

ligious
lit~,0..

st~;a

ofax1stance and the act l1fAich ctXlst.itutes tne .i.i.divio.uU ill. t.hat

wJ:>.ich will be discusaed in the next chapter.

I

CHAPTER IV
KIERKEGAARD'S OOLUTION: THE lRl!EDOM OF BELIEF

The preceding

ch~ ter

dealt with Kiencegaard' s attack upon Hegelian Deter-

minism, and· the philosophical notions of existence, of freedom, and of contingency, together with belief, the correlative of contingenc)", which he developed
in the course of that attack.

Kiel"kegaardts dialectic was also discussed, as

it led the individual, by means of the "leap of choice," through the aesthetic
and ethical stages of existence to the peak of the etbical stage, the point at
which the "leap of faith" placed Abraham in the higher religious stage.
'l'hJ:ooughout this Whole dialectic, Kierkegaardts
is apparent.

preoc~upation

with existence

For Kierkegurd, it was explained, finite existenee, or "the his-

torical, n is a process of coming-to-be, a process which is effected through
free choice on the part of the existing ind1 vidual, a process by" .whiCh the inof

dividual, as it were, "makes himself anew" as he passes through the stages on

life' sway.

It was alao noted that Kierkegaard' s doctrine replaced knowledge

of finite existing beings, if that knowledge was to be significant,

wi~h

belie!'.

Some care was taken in the preceding chapter to separate K1erkegaard t s
philosophical from. his strictly religious doctrines) but tho!'! philosophical

notions which were outJ.ined previously m.ust, in the present chapter, be investee
with religious sign1.t.1cance because the whole dialectic of existence, as Kier-

kegaard presented it" is the m.ovemant of the human spirit towards a vital

6S

[I

'I
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i

intereOJllllunication nth God in a religious mode of existence.
It is, therefore, the purpose of the present chapter to outline Kierkegurdts doctrine of the religious stage

or

existence, together with the act of

choice, or .faith, by which the individual, in bringing the existential dialectic into his own life, bridges the gap which separates him, as an ethical man,
from the religious state.

More particularly, therefore, Kierkegaard'. basic

problem, "becoming a Christ.1an" will be discussed, together with his denial

ot

1J1:lT "objective" relationship of man to Christianity, and his insistence upon

"subjectivity" as the mode of the individual's appropriation of the relationship.

Under the heading of subjectivity will be discussed, first, the nature

of the subjective thinker as an existing individual who IIlUst fUrther become
subjective to a pre-eminent degree tJu:ough the freedom of. 1'aith.

Next, the

need for man t s subject.1ve relationship with God will be discussed, together witl
both the object of the relationship as a historical fact meriting belief, and
the means of effecting the rel&tioMhip, through the categolY of l'elig'iousness.

The diff:lculV

Etbe

of

"absurditytt or "pa:r.a.doX") ir:l'9'olved in positing this tree

relationship will be eJ;>lained, and the occasion upon lbieh the difficulty
presents itsalt :rl.11 00 brlefl¥ stated.

Finally, the act of faith by which the

individual freely posits the relationship, and t18 nature of the religious

state which is the immediate result of the act of faith, will be analyBed.
THE PROBLEM. BEOOMING A CmISTIA.N IN CHRISTENroM

Kierkegaard's whole effort as a writer--frol'll his tirst book to his lastwas d1rected, as he himself insists over and OV'er again, to the task of becominl

II

. I

I:

I

II
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a Christian.

1

Why is becoming a Christian a problem?

The problem, in narka-

gaarcif s opinion, arises, first, from the tact that people presume that theT are
Christians as a matter ot cout'se, and, secondly, that they think mewing Christianity' is the same as being a Christian.
Whenpeopla presume that they are Christians as a matter ot course, he
contends, ChristianiV has no meaning in their lives.

He explains his own view

best, when he contrasts true Christianity with the Christendom he knew, and labels the latter "a prodigious Ulusion" I
EV'ery one with some capacity for observation, who seriously- considers
what i. called Ch.r1stemom, or the ronditions in a so-called Christian eount17, l1lU8t surely be assailed b;r profound m1sg!\e"ings.. What
does it mean that all these thousands and thousands call the_elve.
Christians as a matter ot COIlrse? These many., many men ot whOlll the
greater part, 80 tar as one can judge, live in categories quite toreign to Christianity I People who perhaps never. once enter a church,
neT.r think about God, never mention His name eXcept in oathsl
People upon. wan it has never dawned that they might have aD¥ obligation to God, people who either regard it as a max1m1.Ull to be guiltless ot transgressing the criminal law, or c:b not count even this
quite necessar.rl Yet all tbese people, even those who assert that
no God exists, are allot 1hem Christians, call themsebres ehristians, are recognized as Christians by the State, are buriejl as
Christians by the Church, are certified as Cbr1st~s tor ail eternity! 2

Kierkegaard's canplaint against Christendom, theretore, is trund in the
tact that Christian tervar _s at a low ebb in the Der.uurk of his time, and
this by reascn ot the tact that. becoming a Christian vas made too easy.

It

was Christian baptism that constituted those thousands cd thousands as Chris-

tians; but baptism., although K1erkegaard admits that it "may tor all that be

lFor example, Kiericegaard,
2 Ibid., 22-23.

-

!!!!. Point. £.! View.

pp. 13, 22, 42. 92, 149.
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both justifiable and praisewor1lby, partly as an expression of the well-meaning
interest of the ehurch, partJ.y as a defense against fanaticism, and partly as
expressing the beautiful oare and forethought of devout parents, ,,3 should not
be looked upon as one's passport into the cOBlnunity" of believers.

It is merely'

a matter of conv anienee, "in view of the existing pol1ce regulations, .. 4 to have
a baptismal oertificate to present when one wishes to enter the university or
I

to get married.

In Kierkegaard's doctrine, one <bes not. beco. a Christian mere

ly by being baptizedJ the actions of nominal. Christians, as Kierkegaard obserYed
them., proved that.
~nsibUity

Rather, i1a agreement wi1h Luther, he insists that the res-

rests with tl:e individual to beccme a Christian by means of a per-

sonal approPriattoo,,5 that is, by a tree and. passionate comitment of one's
whole being to that transcendent tact which is the heart

of Christ1an1ty--1ihe

Incarnation of Christ.
The seccnd difficulty in becoming a Christian, according to Kierkegaard,
raises trom the misunderstanclillg

ot spewla.t1ve philosophy,

and particular:Q', of
of

pourse, the Hegelian ph1losop!v', that religion is a thing to be know, and not
Il

thing to be lived.

He canplained that the Hegelianprine1ple of ftobjectiviza-

Uon" was taking cmtrol of religion, and that speculatiVe knOlfledge was usurpLng the place reserved fao faith.

His condemnation of the objective approach to the truths of faith was a

3Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 325.

hIbid ., 328.
5

-

-Ibid., 32,$" 327.
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sweeping denial of all abstrollCt tbinJd.ng in religious matters, including the

extremes ot objectivity as found in the Idealistic thrught of the Hegelian

"System" on the one hand" and the more realistic conceptions of the Empirical
6
schools on the other.
His rejection of both extremes is based. on his cansis-

tent <bc trine that all. coo. ceptual knowing
real existence.

excludes the notion at

Object1ve knowledge, therefore, is of it s very nature onlY' an

"approximation" or a "hypothesis. 1t

knower, who must

necessar~

It is an

lip proximation beca1.l~e

the existing

into contact with truth according to bis own mode of ex7
1etence, cannot come to know 8'lything of another subject axisting as !3uch.
COllIe

It is bn>othetical because it does not refer necasserily to any existing subjec1,
but only

to some imagina.t7 subject-in-general, who need not exist at all.

While Kierkegaard obj ected violently to the abstrac~ions ot Hegel'" though ~

he saw nevertheless SQIle value in abstract th1nldngJ for the value of abstract
8
.
thought is that it presents a "possibility of actuali1U''' which Hegelian Idealism can never attain.

"Abstract thOl1ght," Kierkegaard admits, It.em.bN.ces the

possible. • • • pure thought is a phantom_ The real subject is not \he cognitive subject, since in knCM'1ng he mOV'es in the sphere of the possible, the real
subject i8 the ethically existing subject_ u9 Here, Iierkegaard indicates that
abstract thought presents to the ethiQall.y existing individual a possibility
which he, through his subjectivity, can bring to actuality_

-

6Ibid., 169-170

7Ibid.,

25" 26, 31, 278.
-Ibid., 515.

8

-

9

Md., 281.

He also indicates,

--10
J

OW'ever, that abstract thought of itself 18 disinterested, and that contemplaion roes not lead to action 'Nlthoot sane higher motivation.

For the mating

[ndividual, however, the motivation for existential progress is found in his own
~stenceJ whieh is his highest interestJ

peculation fails him.

10

and in this sphere disinterested

To lar:lw the doctrines of Christianity J to know God as an

bject of thcne-ht, is, fer K1ericegaard, insignificant.

His problem arises when

subject-a "subjective thinker"-attempts to know God subjectively as a Sub-

ect.

He best expresses hiw own rejection of all .speculative knCMledge in be-

aming a Christian and his own adoption of subjectivity when he remarks, tlSpe_

clative philosophy, as abstrE\ct am objecti.ve, entirely ignores the fact of
x1stence and inwardness, and inasmuch as Christianity accentuates this fact pardoxical1y, speculation is the greatest possible
ty."

m1sunders~ding

or

Christian-

11
To summarize the foregoing, it ffiI:\V be said that f<r Kierkegaard to know a

:bing objectively is to know it abstractly; to know a thing abstractlJ' is to

resc:ind from existence; but to prescind from existence is

~

!§nore

of

!2!.!!2! ~

IXistErlCe entirely. Since, in Kierkegaard's opinion, eonctpta ro not even con~ote

real existence.

bj act of thcugbt.
~t

Thus, abstractim amounts to the annihilation of the :real
Therefore, the existing subject must con e to know the Truth

Christianity-Jesus Christ-as an

exist1~

subject.

To explain how this

krnwledge" can come abrut thrrueh subjectivity is the {resent task.

10

11

Ibid., 278.

-

Ibid., 507.
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SUBJECTIVITY AS THE TRUTH

LogicallT, one would imagine, 1f Christianity cannot be known objectively,
then it must be known subjectively.

This is Kierkegaard'& contention men he

maintains that Christianity does not lend itself to objective observation pre-

cisely because it proposes to "intens1f.r

subject1vi~ to the

utmost." 12

What,

then, doe s· he :mean by subj ectivit,r?
,I

The conrnon neaning of subjeotivity, as given by Reidar ThOl'lte, a thorough
student of Kierkegaard. "refers to that tendency which seeks the organ or the
criteria of religious truth :in the intimat1C1ls of the individual's inner eonsciousness rather than in histor:r and objective reve1ation ... 13 This, sqs
Thomte, is the meaning which Schliermaciler and Ritsch1 attribute to the term.
BasicaJ.ly. it is also Kierlcegaardts doctrineJ but he develops the notion in his

own wtI3', beglnning wi th an anal;rsis of truth.
In his great philosophical wrk, the CmclucUng Unscientific PostscriEt,

he propounds the thew that "truth is subjectivity .,,14

In his .anal3'sis of

truth, he finds that truth is commonly defined either empirically, .. the correspomence of thought with being, ar it is defined idealisit1cally as the correspon1ence of being with thcnght.,

He rejects both def1n1 tions, insisting that

as an abstraction, "being" correspends onl¥ with itaeU, and either of the definitions of truth given is only tautological.

He insists that for "the exist.-

ing spirit who 18 mw conceived as raising the

qU.~~,t~Cln

12

-

!bid., 55.
13
Thomte, pp. 11.3-114.

l~ierkegaard,

PostSCriEt, pp. 169...170.

of truth, presumably in

I

"

i,
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1, botb the tJ'Ilpirical 8l'Ii the idealistic doctrine
order that he lUI" exist in it,"
ot

truth are devoid

at signiticance tor Ute, tor such doctrines are tota.llT ab-

stract and have sign1ticance "only tor the abstraction into which an existing
spirit is transtor_d wen he abstracts troM himself .2 existing individual.,.l6

Hu own positi'!'e <betrine ot truth culminates in the view, e:xpressed
his w:>rk, Trainir:!£

!!l Christiani!i:,

ill

that truth has nothing whatever to do with

thought; tor truth, "in its very being is not the duplication of being in terms

ot thought • • • • No, truth in its very being

is the recb.plication in )¥le, in

thee, in him, so that '1113', that thy', that his life, approximately, in the striving to attain it, is the verr being of tlUth, is a

Christ, tor He was the truth."l?

~ ~fe,

as the truth was in

Subject.iv1ty- is the truth, therefore, in the

seMe that there i8 no truth tor the individual except in so tar as he creates
it in his own lite. Truth is an ethical.

am

religious appropriation of the

ideal, an active practice and realization rather than lD¥ndedge.

cess ot appropriaticm. ft

It is· a "pro-

18

There is a secom sense in which trutl}. is stlbjectivit7 in the dbctrine of
Kierkegaard..

In dealing with "essential knowledge," that is, knowledge which

ha.a an essential relationship to existence, he

8.,.S

that such knowledge has a

relationship to the knower as an existing individual, snd that this relationshiJ

1,Ibid., 170.

-

16Ibid •
17
5th-en Kiericegaard, Training
ford, 1941), p. 201.

-

18

!!! Christianity,

Kiarkegaard, Postscript, p. 182.

trans. Walter Lowrie (Ox-
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as a vital intercommunication in existence between man and God, is preciael¥
the truth. 19 Kierkegaarci's teminology is rovel; it must alwa,ys be kept in
mind, therefore, that when Kierkegaard speaks of the "subjective thinker," he

does not intend to treat of "thought" in the usuall.T accepted sense of thEt term
but in the sense of one's active appropriation of, or personal commitment to,
Eternal Truth.

"Knowledge," for Kierkegaard, is not 1:m:;wledge as we usuaJ.l¥

reter to it; but rather it is the active rea1.ization in one's own lite ot the
Christian Ideal.

It is tor this reason that in Kierkegaard's writings, attention is drawn
rather to the nature ot man's living relationship with God than to his knowledg~
20
of God.
The question tor him is not whether the individual. is related to
something which is objectively' true, but whether the relationship of the ind121
·
vidual ia a true re1 at ion ahip •

Tru.th, therefo!\!), is subjectiviVJ and the converse is alao trtler"Sub22
jectivity is the truth;"
tor "at its ma.ximtlm, this inward. '~,' $bat is,
the truth ot man' 8 relationship with God is the passion of the 1nt1.Aite, and
the passion of the infinite is the truth.

But the passion of the infinite is

precisely subjectivity" and thus subjectivity becomes the truth •• 23

18
Uerkegaard, Postscript, p. 182.
19Ibid •

-

20Ibide, 177-118. ,/

-

21Ibid ., 178.

-

22 Ibid ., 181.

23 Ibid •

-

74
The significance of the notion that subjectivity is the truth becomes
clear when I1erkegaard equates "truth" with "taith."

Existential truth 1s the

personal, passionate appropriation at man's relationship to Christianity; and
Kierkegaard's definition of truth, "an objective uncertainty held fast in an

appropriation-process of the IlDst passionate inwardness,"

.

his definition of faith.

2,

24

is identical with

Thus, the truth-relationship is identical with th.

faith-relationship for the existing individual, and what is said of truth is
said about faith.
The act by which the individual seeker for truth, in his striving to attain eternal happiness, relates himself in his existence to God is a complex

act, comprising a number at essential elements.

Although these elements all

cOl'lV'erge siJllultaneously upon that "instant" in time when, the individual gathers
together all his powers to commit himself to God in an act of faith, they cannot, unfortunately, be explained simultaneously.

The renainder

ot this chapter

will therefore treat in turn the essential elaents of the "approprfation-proof

cess" which is Kierkegaard's act of faith! the subject of faith, the need for
taith, the object of faith, the means by which faith may enter the lite of the
individual .. the difficulties involved in the act of faith, the occasion of
faith, and the act of faith itself, together with the result of that act.

THE SUBJECT OF FAITH-THE INDIVIDUAL
Kierkegaard pre.ents a portrait of the subjective thinker, "his task, his
form, his style," in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 26 The subjective

24Ibid ., 182.
2'Ibid.
26-

Ibid •• 312-322.

1$
thinker is "an existing individual," and a "dialectician dealing with the
existential."

His equlpmant incluoes "imagination and feeling" dialectics in

existential inwardness, together with passion.

But passion first and. last."

The task of the subjective thinker is that of "un:ierstanding himself in his
existence, tI a. project Which has noth ing to cb with thoo.ehtJ for understanding ,
in Kierkegaard's interpretation, is rather ftexistinglt in the fullest sense.
The subjective thinker must "transfotm himself into an i.''lstrument that clearly
and defini tel;r oxpresses whatever is essent1allr human."

The scene of his ac-

tivity is "inwardness as a human being, tl and his method is that of sujective
renection.
First at all, then, the subjective thinker is an existing individual.
m.eans that his existence is a process of becoming,

8. con~tant

'l'hil

striVing, by means

of his free choices, to be something better than he is I to remake himself in a
higher realm. of existence.
be infinitely and
dest1ny".

The individual who thus has himself as his task will

genuine~

interested in himBelf and in the realization of hiB

Such infinite interest is called "the passion of human freofedom."

21

Passion, therefore .. plays a vital role in the development of man and in
his exercise of freedom; for the subjective thinker, says Kierkegaard, needs
"passion first and last."

In his axplanation of the exact natura of human per-

fection, be nates that the natural man 1s made up of feeling and passion, and
that passion is therefore an essential elerrtent of human na.ture.

28

It is pas ...

27Reinhardt, 42.
26

It1erkegaard,

190.

!!!!

Journala I pp. 102..103;

!!!£ !!!! Trembling,

pp. 184-

If

IIIII

sian" therefore, which makes a man what he is.

Now, when humanity is defined

according to sensibility rather than reason, hu.'1IS.n perfection Must eulminate
in the mast energetic exercise of .te.eling.

Passion is accordingly considered

by lC1erkegaare! as the apex of sUbjectiv1ty;29 and it is therefore characterized
by inward activity d1rected toward selt-integration through the existential

dialectic.
aion."

30

It is for this reason t.nat Itfeeli.."'lg'! is distinguished .from "pas-

Feeling is mere emotion; passion, or irw ardness, is true religious

feeling.

EXISTENTIAL PATIDS .
Existential passion, or "pathos," as Kiarkegaare! terms it, manifests itself' on three dU'f'erent levelss The Initial Expression, The Essential Expressian, and The Decisive Expression.

31

The initial exPression of existential pathos is "the absolute dlrection
toward the absolute telos e::cpressed :in action through the transformation ot the
indivicbal's existence,"

.32

.

that is, the necessary development of the individual
~

spirit in the direeticn of a relationship with God through his passage" by
of

means ot free choice, through the
various levels .,of existence.
.:-

It is passion

which provides the motivating terce tor action, in Kierkegaardfs doctrine;
knowledge has

29

ID

part to play in tile exf..stential dialectic. 33

Kierkegaard, Postscript. p. 177.

JOSee Thomte, p. 86.
31

This matter is treated at. length in K1erkegaard t s Postscriet, pp • .347-

493.

32

33

Ibid.,

1347.

See Kierkeiard, ~ ~ TreJll~, p.

59"

n.
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The essential apreaaion ot exiatential pathos is sutferin g, whether aesthetic or ethical.

Sutfering is characteristic of infinite resignation, the

first movement of the infinite double movement of faith, which narked the dialect1.ealleap ot Abraham into the realm at taith.3 4
The decisive apreasion of ex1atential pathos is guilt.
here that for Kier1cegaard "guilt" is rot the

aame

as

NsiD.j.ft

It Jluat De not ed

"Gullt" in its

tullest sense 1s a term which is usuallY' reserved to describe man'.. state of

3,

"untruth"--the state ot Original. Sin, the state ot alienation from God.
This
6
concept ot guilt 18 Ul'Iierstood in its fullest Lutheran .en".3 "Sin," on the
other hand, is not viewed

88

the opposite ot "virtue," bt:.t rather as the oPPO-

s1te of "f&1.th." This is also basiealJ¥ a Lutheran conceptJ for Luther claimed
that salvation eane. through faith alme. 37 Tn. reader do •• not find in the
writ ings of lCierlcegaard -7 dis cuss:l.on ot good and evil &eta in the sphere ot
religion, but only in the sphere of ethics, with reprd to the moral law.
11erkegaard, the Lutheran, ctnsider. the onl.y meritorious act,

~he

which our eternal salvation 1s dnemined to be the act of fa1th.
purely "moral" act can have significance ter eternitY'.

?nl1' act by

tilt

other

Kierkegaard sometimes

marks a sharp dist1nctiCll between the concepts "gullt" and "aiD"; sometime. he
uses the terms interchangeabl.. But 18 &l.,.s _

or

alienation from God or a

34See

aboTe, Ch.

0(11 aequent

aI'l8

e1ther man I s natural stat41

state d unbeliel.

3, p. 60.

3'Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 185-186.
)6
See above, Ca. 2, p. 18.
37
Ibid., Soe also K:1.erkegaard, !!!! Sickness

~

Death, p. 132.
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It is this decisive ellPl"esaion of existential pathos--a state in which :man
finds himself estranged trom God by the mere tact of his existence-which is of
significance for the rel1g1w8 stage of existence.

Man's mnsciousnes8 of to-

tal guilt, or otherness from God, in the primitive Lutheran sense, forces him

-

to think of this otherness <r separation from the Eternal in CX)meetion with hi

38

Guilt, sqa lier
kegaard, in attenpting to explain this strange ambivalence, Mis
aprea.ion
essential· relationship to the Eternal as his ultimate goal.

the

for the relationship by reason of the fact tbl.t it
or disrelationship."

39

In mare intelligible

e~reS8es

the ineompatib11it

.

tams, guilt is

81

expression tor

man's radical separation trcm God; but it is in the realization of his actual

-

separateness from God that man realizes the necessity of espou.ing a relationThe decisive expression
existential passion, theretore, eontinuall.y tarces the individual to choose decisively the inf1n1teJ t<r, on the

ship to God.

of

40 can find coZT8ap<xldence only

me hand, nan t s infinite passion

in the· Winit

and on the other hand, neither aesthetic ehoice (which. is pse~o-e~oiee, sinee

the aesthete does mt truly choose, but drifts) nor ethical choice (Which is
finite, since it deals only with the universal) can fulfU the requirements of
an infinite passion.

The resulting decision ot the individual, as Kurt Rein.

hardt, ane of Kierbgaardfs astute commentators, remarks helpfully, is "tor or
against the int1nite, an absolute either/or, all <r nothing; it is a choice

38

Kieri<egaard, Postscript, p. 472.

39

Ibid., 47.3.
40

-

Ibid., 181
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which male s or unmakes the individual, a choice in which he either truly 'be-

comes what he is' or utterly fails to realize his authentic existence.

'l'here-

tore, Kierkegaard concludes, 'Truth is subjectivity, I that is, the highest degree of personal self-realization."

41

Such, then, is the nature at the subjective thinker, the existing, finite,
ind1v1dual~

His task in life is to "become what he iaft_a Christian, an indi-

vidual "existing" in the :f'ul1est sense of the ward.

takes place with freedom, this indiv1<ilal must
his own initiative.

~e

Since

bec';)lI1.i.n~

always

himsel..t by a free act on

'l'his act is one in which he relates himself to Christian-

ity, and "Christianity," says IUerkegaard, Itis spirit} spirit is inwardness,

inwardness 18 subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and in its
maximum an inf'inite, peraonal, passionate interest in en,e's eternal haPPiness!il

The inWBE"dnes8 of subjectivity, therefore, is merely Kierkegaardts WIlT of describing intense religious feeling,.

Such religious feeling, or passion, is the

essence c:L man as nan; and therefore it 1s the property of everT. finite indiviBut Kierkegaard's intention is to actualiZe this religious fleling to

dual.

such a degree of intensity that it w:Ul impel the 1:rxii. vidual, in the faee of
all the contradictions rL reuen, to awropriate his relationship to himself
and to Gal, and to himself before God, in the "highest degree of se1t-realiaation"-in m act of free choice which is at the same time the act by Which he

exists as a responsible, Christian indi'ridual.

U
See Reinhardt, p.

42.

42nerkegaard, Postscript, p. 33.

THE NEm Jt>R FAITH-REPETITION
Why is it that existential. passion impels the individual to choose the in-

finite?

Basically, it is due to the need tor what Kierkegaard calls IfRepeti-

t1on," a renewal of selt, a re-birth of selt on a higher level of existence, a
re-integratian of an s' s whole 11fe, personality', and activity in the direction

.

of a newly-appropriated ideal.

43

It was no ted in Chapter Three of this thesis

that the young man in K1ericegaard' s book Re,petition sought for this in the aesthetie stage of ex1stenee, knowing that it was f!,ecessarT tor him but that he
could not attain it in a lite devoted to the immediaq of Sellse impressions and
artistic pleas'Ill"es.

Aesthetics e.annot bring the individual to the "highest

degree of selt-realization" of which he is capable .. sinee the aesthetic stage

18 a state of unrefieetive and uncommitted existence.
a

religious C:X)fm ept, and the question remains,

If!!'!l is

R~petitiQl

is therefore

it necessary?"

It is neeessar,y in Tieli' of mnts verlY situation in existenee.

"Existence, II

Kierkegaard Bays.. "18 a synthe8is of the infinite and th. finite, and t.he existing individual is both infinite and tinite."

44

of

This is amther way

or s83'-

ing that man :Nnds within his own finite COrJJCiOUSll8SS a relationship to an
infinite, eternal goal as his ultimate end.
Finite man, however, is not only a composite of :Nnitude and 1nf1nitYJ he
is also separate and consciously di.st1nct fran all other existing beings.

Mos$

43T. H. Croxall, Ul
. his Kierkegaard COJII'II&l'ltg, p. 126, offers an etymolo-

gical analysis of the Danish 'WtI" d lor "R.epetition, If linking the term with th4a
Christian notion of Itre-birth," the sense :1n which Kierkegaard uses it.

bhKierkegaard, Postscript, p. 3$0.
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of all. as noted above, he is separate and distinct from the Eternal, and this
precisely 1n virtue of his tinite existence.
maintained with true Lutheran gril'lll188S,

If

On the one hand, Kierkegaard

the existence of

a'1

existing being 1s

characterized as standing in opposition to the truth, .. 4$ and "to come into be-

46

ing is to becane a sinner" J

and therefore to be a man is to be apart from the

Eternal. ·On the other hand, the truth is prec1se:q his relat.:lonship to the 1';temal.

11an is theretore divided against hill8elt 8lld against God.

the need for repetition; and it i8 in this
man's bEdng his am task,

con~ext

Hence arise!J

that lierkegaard speaks ot

Each individ:ual nan must accept this personal., spir-

i tual dichotom,r a8 a starting point far that dialectical process of becoming
what he is-namely, a Christ1an.

He has need of a personal, spiritual "inte-

gration-repetition--of himaelf' in a relationship to

th~

Eternal, a rel.ationshi ~

which 1s 2.-ta_c....to
... constituted by his being a finite individual. but which must,
i t it 1s to have significance tor his eternal. happineaa, be appropriated anew.

The relationship of the finite individual to the Intinite is therefore
both necessary and tree.

It i8 neoessar.r because it is

-

man as an existing individual (hence the need

t (uM

tor repetition),

of

in the nature of
and. free because

it is a relationship which Illust be appropriated b7 the existing individual.
The full Meaning of man's rebirth th1'ough the act of faith will become clearer
when. the object of the relationship is explained in the following paragraphs.

4$

46
-

Ibid., 186.
Ibid., $17.
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THE OBJECT OF FAITH
The objeet ot man's truth-relationship has already been referred to in
general terms as man's absolute end, the Eternal, which, when subjectively appropriated, means tar him his om eternal happiness.

Kierkegaard speaks of

this highest end of man's existence as "the absolute telos" which "must be willed for its own sake,"

47

and in an absolute and unquaillied manner;

tor -to

w11l absolutely is to will the infinite, and to will a.n eternal happiness is

to will absolutell'."

48

Beyond this, the individual does mt wish to know any-

thing a.bout the absolute t.108 other than "that it exists."

49

That the relationship of the individual existing subject to himself cannot be defined wtthout reference to the eternal is a fact which is accepted by
Kierkegaard with .full realJ.zation ot the d1f ficulties :1nyolved.

It is easy to

see that the true reality of the individual can be found in interested sellactivity, or coming-into-existence.

But when it becoll8s clear that the passim

ate striving which canst! tutu authentic existential becCllling is no't directed
of

towards purely' temporary or secular goals (tor example, mere growth in person-

ality), but is directed towards etemity, Kiezkegaa.rd finds it necessary to
ref01"lllllate his principles in tel'Wl of a
that

".:!:!!.!

eternal h!epiness

relationship

47

~

-

Ibid.

namely, how is it possible

!!. decided ~ ll!!. throW ~
!! turthermore 2! .!!.2!!.! character

individual

s(ftething historical, which

Ibid., 353.
48
h9
Ibid •

2! ~

pro~.t

Ii,I

8)

!! !2 exclude
~

~

.lli cOEEos1tion ~

which

!?L virtue 2! lli

a.Mooe cannot

5rr--

historical .. ~ ~ therefore become ~!!l virtu. of !!!. absurditt'?

In other lOrds, Kierkegaard conceives of the object of the truth-relationship

of the individual as not merely' an absolute, eternal end, but as sonathing hietorica.l.

It was explained in Chcpter Three that by the "historicallt lierkegaare
i

means a contingent fac' ...ometh1ng which

COf1eB

into existence, and shares all

the uncert.ainty and contingency of tamporal existence.

The reaction of the in-

dividual to a historical fact, furthermore, is not one of knowledge, but
llef.

ot be-

The Significance of these two statements becomes apparent when Kierke-

gurd further specifies the object of Christian faith as being "the real it,.. of
the God-man in the sense of his existence."
the object of Christian faith.

51

That God became man is certainly

But according to the philosophical principles

outlined in Chapter Three, the!!!:! of this event, eVen if' it is taken for
granted, is not signi.f'icant. What is signi.t:1.eant

ftl!:

Kierkegaard ia the fund-

amental contingency of the event. Merely to know that Christ

_~

f

born is not
of

significant for salvationJ but the transformation of' om t s life through faith
in accordance with a living relationship to the Christ who was born is man's

jbest and greatest task-a task :involving the highest exercise of personal. in~erest.

'the difficulty involved in thus relating oneself to Christ rests upon

~he fact that the birth of Christ was a contingent event; and whether the indirld~l

attains a true spiritual rebirth or not depends upon the wq in which

the individual approaches the fact of the Incarnation.

I-Y

The ways in 'Wh1eh he

cane into contact with this event will next be discussed.

~.,

'TV

,I
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RELIGIOUSNESS A AND RELIGIOUSNESS B
The problem ot relating oneself to the fact of God's existence is, accord~g

.

to K1erkegaard, "pathetic-dialectic."

$2

It is, first at all, "pathetic,"

"hat is, it deals vi th the ex1atent.1al passion of the individual as it is dir~cted

to the "what" of the truth-relationship, to the thing which constitutes

~e individual's eternal happiness.
~t

deals with the "how*' of positing such a relationship.
The pathetic

~nerget1c

element, explains Kierkegaard, .consists in a more and mo re

and intense cultivation of inward passion, or religious feeling, in

~8 di.rection
~r

The problfJlll 18 also "dialectic, If that is,

or

the eternal; it is thus the existential. condition for the lat ...

exe.reise of the ex1atential dialectic of faith.

$3

The three "expressions"

p£ the existential pathos--the Initial Expression as the d,evelopment of the in- .
ti.vidual tovarda the appropriation of the absolute relatl O!lship to God through
~

lower stages of existence, the Essential Expression as the sutfering in-

olved in renou.ncing the world's attractions in the first D1O't"ement off the in~:inite chuble movement

or

faith, and the Decisive Expression of ex1at~tial

mthos a 8 guilt, man' s eonsciou mess that he is in a state of total guil. t and
~strangement

from God-these three expressions of existential pathos have been

!xplatned in connection with the existential thinker himself.
~lement

This "pathetic"

of the patbetic-dialect1e mov. . nt of becoming a Christian (Kierkegaard

alIa it "Religiousness A") can exist in paganism) for it is onl¥ a dialectic

t inward transformation. R9ligiousness.A is the religiOsity of immanence in

52

$3 -

Ibid.,

-

Ibid.

345.

:i
I.1

8S
which subjectivity, or inwardness, is accepted as the truth.

54

A. the rell-

giosi'GY of i.mmanence, it is indeed a dlalectic by wch the individual is inwardly transformed; but not because

at mything outside the individual. Kier-

kegaard sqs o:f Religiousness A t.ha.t "the individual does not. ba.e his relationship to the eternal upon his existence in time, but the individual's relation to the eternal, by the dia.lectic oJ: inward appropriation, determines him
in transform:i.:ng his existence in accOl'"dance with this relation and expresses

the relation by the transformation."

55

In other words, the man who is content

to exist in the state of Religiousness A does not base his eternal happiness
upon the Eternal

!!!. t~,

although his relationahip to the Eternal.

l:!

itself 1.

a determining factor in the trans/ormation of hi. exiatenee. This kind ot
religiosity brings a man, in his quest for eternal. happiness, to an attitude
of complete renunciation
and to an attitude

or

or

w:>rldl.y goods in an effort to attain that goal,

unqu.a1i.Ued rep_anoe for his total. gIlUt-but it i. not

•

Christian, because it lacks the necessar,r relationship to the temporal tact ot

..

the Incarnation.

I'
II
,I

True Christianity (Kierkegaard calls it Religiousness B) has, indeed, an

inner, devotional, subjective aide in common with the religion ot immanence.
but it also has an outer, transcendent, objective Side, concerned with a real ..
historical person-the Person of Jesus Christ, the God-Man.

The religion ot

immanence rests upon the supposition that truth is immanent in human subject-

56

ivity

and that the re-integration of the human subject can talce place through

54Ibid.,

5~

l8S.

5~' 5;8-509.
Ibid., 185.

eo
an inner effort or concentration of the personality.57
giousness B,

hO'iIlevt~r,

In the state of Reli-

the individual reaches the conc1u.sion that "Sl.l\)j,.?ct,ivity

is untruth, ,,58 in the se."lse that the more he

COfiC e."ltrates

inwardl.f the mar e he

becomes aware of his estrangellent frolll God .. and of his need for a revelation of
God in history.59

He must face the absurdity, the contradiction, that he is

then basing his etGrr...al .happi.'113sS upon san e temperal, contingent" eVent.
TH£ DIFFICuLTY l"C>Il FAITli--:i'HE PAHAlnX
o

Kierkegaard pcsed the pro blam in the

W'.)

ros . already q w ted: "Tha eternal

_
h_ap'.....-i'P,-.l._·
of ......
the ____
indiviwal __
is decided .......
in ..............
tiJrte thlUUi.J:l the relationshin
to some_ l1e_S_S __
Ii. ______
~.--.

--

- -- --

--

thing historical, . c:w_h_ic.;. fl_o is furtliel"rllOre of such a ch<io.racter as to i!lClude in

-

~

-

coqposltlon

~~

~

.£.£ ~ as.ance cannoL beccme
~ ~ virtue .2f: ~ absurditl_ft60

wnich

therefore bacone

Ez

.-..

virtue

""-

historical,

And, last his readers irll.agine that the absurdity facing tha seeker for

eternal happin&ss is only an appar6D.t contradiction, he says explicitly:
f

Suppose Christianity never intf'.nded to be understood; Suppose
that, in order to «lq)ress this and to prevent tmy'one from lfdsguidedly entering upon the objective way" it has declared itself to be the paradox. Suppose it wished. to have signi.1'icanc0
only for existing individuals, and essentially for existing
individuals in inwardness, in the :inwardness of faith; which
cannot be expressed nore definitely than in the proposition
that Christianity is the absurd, held fast in the passion ot
the infinite. Suppose it refuses to be understood, and that

57 Ibid., 509.

5BIbid ., 185.

Ibid., 49u·
60
59

~.,

31.6

"

i

'
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the l'TIAXimlllll of umerstanding which could can.e in question is
to understand that it cannot be nnderstood. Suppose it accentuates existence so decisively that the individual becomes
a sinner, Ciu'istianity a. paradox, existence t.he ::>eriod of
decision. 61
The problem which Kierkegaard here presents poses a triple contradiction:
The first of these contradictions constitutes the individual';8 breach "with the
understaniing and with thinking and with imanence. nb2

It is paradoxical, it

is absurd, it is cant. rary to reason, that a man should expect his eternal happiness to be presented to him in time through a. relationship to some other temporal reality.

6)

The individual exists; therefore he is contingent; and there-

fore he exists in time.
in time,

80

He comes :in time into a relat.1onship llw1th the eternal

that the rela'tionship is within time} and this

rea tionship

con-

fiiets equally with all thinking ."04 This is a problEm which does not ex:ist in
Religiousness AJ for in that sphere, the individual's relationship is to the
Eternal as Eternal, and not to the Eternal in time.
It is, secondly, a contradiction to inagine that eternal happiness is
based upon saneW.ng hi.storical, or temporal, at all.

65

.

f

'rhe subjectof0f truth

and of faith is Eternal in its very nature; the processes of truth and of faith
are temporal, as is the subject.

Ibid., SOS.
6)
Ibid.
6'
4rbid., 506.
6,-

61Ibid., 191-192.

62

-Ibid., 508.

Hence there is a gap between eternity and

88
time which must be explained or transcendEld before the subjective thinker can
hrtegrate them within him.self".
is

a1w~s

f·foreover, the "historical" of its very nature

contingent and temporal, necessar,y

and alw'ays fundamentally uncertain.

on~

with consequent necessity,

Religiou.sness A dee s not face

th~

contra.-

diction of basing its eternal happiness upon an uncertainty, although it does
indeed seek the Eternal in imm.anence; for it o:tJ.y urg$S the individual to trans
form his own inner existence in accordance with his

Eternity.

.2!

facto relationship with

Beligiollsness B, on the other hand, must base the individual's at-em-

al happiness upon a relationship to something historical. something outside
himself.

The contradiction here arises in view

or

the fact that the individual

is obligated to direct his supreme passion for the L:-.tfinite towards an his torical faet of which he can have only aflproximate knowledge,

66

and approximate

knowledge is clearly not coJllnE!nsurate with the infinite passion with which the
1ndi vidual must assert his relationship t,O the historical fact in question.

The third contradicticn inherent in man's relationship to the
Eternal
ie
•
f

I'I

frOM in the fact that this bJetorical event, namely, the appearancet of God in

time as a oontingent

beinrs,

is "not a simple historical fact, but is consti-

tuted by that which only against its nature can becone historical, hence by

virtue of the absurd."

67

It is an absurdity, for Kierkegaard, that God "should

ccme into being at a definite moment in tiMe as an individual. man,"

66

68

precisely

67

Ibid., ~O~, ~09.
Ibid ., ,12 ..

68
-

Ibid.

!I
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because condl'lg-into-existence is the exaot opposite of God t 8 being as Eternal.
Kierkegaard finds that the first two of these oontradictions, or paradoxes,

are, of themse1.ves, mt sufficient to repel
tensive inwardness·

69

the intellect with

It

sufficient in-

because the Eternal is not of itsel:t paradoxical, but

only becanlus so when viewed in its relationship to the incH. vidual.

70

Therefore,

these two contradictions are not sufficient to demand a full ex1stential-dialeetical mar.ent of the individual in the direction of God through the act of
faith; they are cnq sufficient to establish the. individual in the state ot Religiousness A.

There is needed an "absolute" paradoX) and "that God has ex...

isted in humm tom, has been born, grown up, and
dox sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox."

71

80

forth, is surel;y the para-

It is this absolute paradox

which is the condition tor positing the truth ...relations~ .. as it is the object
of that relationsh:i;p.

The absolute parada:l: is demanded. by the

ff

infinitY" ot

man's rellgiau.s passion "for the paradox is the source of the thinker's pusiol\

and the thiDlcer without paradox is like a lover withcut teeling,- a pUt17 mediocrity.

of

But the highest pitch ot passion is alwa;y"s to will its own downfall;

and so it 1s also the supreme passion ot the rea30n to seek a collis10n, 81though this collision 1'I1Ust in me wq or another prove its undoing.

The su-

preme paradox of all thought is the attenpt to d1.sccwer something that thought

cannot think.

'this passion is at bottom present in all th1nldng."

-

69Ibid ., 187.
70Ibid •

71
,

-

72

Ibid., 194

.

Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fra,eents, p. 29.

72

90
Paradox is, :indeed, present in all the thinking of the individual; for,
in thinking, he part:J.c1pates in lCDething transcending hiuelf.

itself m.ust be a paradox.

Thus, truth

A.nd so it is, if' truth is subjectiv1ty; for, on the

one hand, the Truth is Eternal, yet an the other hand it has an essential relationship to the e:x:isting, finite, individual.

Reason, when it seeks the

truth, is trying to diseorer sanething that thought cannot think-namely, something which rea1l1' exists.

Thus, reason actually seeks the paradox, the coni:r

diction, which is its downfall.

It finds an ordinary paradox in the "histor-

ieal"; it finds an absolute paradox in the "existence" of God through the Ineamation--a thing which cannot be proved by reason, sine. reasoning 1a conceptual in dlaraeter and alway'S ignores real existence.
co neepts,

savs Kierkegaard, "existence (bes not

CQ1le

While we dally' with

out" J

73

when

w. leave the

"proof," we leap immediately to existenee, eol'l'Jn1t ourselT.S to it, appropriate
it for ourselyes.

Thus, through faith, we establish a temporal rela.tionship t

the Eternal, and it is thus that the Eternal antiers time.
THE AC'l' OF FmH

The occasion upon which the relationship between the individual existing

man and Eternal Truth-irt-Ume is cm sUtutad is called bT Itierkegaard "The
Instant."

The Instant, though a moment in time, is a synthesis of time and

etenlitYJ am in The Instant, the believer become_ S\t>jectively cantem.poraneo
with Christ-tor, d,. to the nature of our knowledge of contingent existence,
according to Kierkegaard, we are not less contemporaneous v1th Christ than
were the Apostles.

73

-

Ibid., 33.

Only in The Instant, where time and eternity .at. does

Eternal Truth co._ into beiIl': for man in his temporal existence, as he responds
to it in the act of faith.74
finallY', the act of faith itself must be explained.

It is best explained

in the way that K1erkegaard himself presented it, as identical with existential

truth.

For nerkegaard.. the definitim of truth is, "An objective uncertainty

held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate iIWardness;1t

75

and,

a.s shown above, the truth-relationship of the individual to Christ is identical
with his faith-relatimship.

taa, in dealing

There are three elements to be considered, there-

with the act of taith: first, an "objective uneertaintJ" J se-

condl.Y' .. an "appropriation-process" J and th1rdJ,y, a "passionate inwardness."
The "objective uncertaintY', n as has been shown, is the fact of the Incar-

!nation. This
Ilect recoils.

f~ct

is the absolute

pa~dox,

the absurdity .trona which the intel-

Yet it is this tact wtJ.ch must be belieVed.

Bellet, however, is

an act adnirably 8U1ted, in Kierlcegaardts philosophy', to assert the reality of
this tact, since the .function of belief is precisely' to supply to: th, tailure
of the int ellect to understand an.y' process of becoming.

prooess of becoming is unique-even ahsurd--<bes not
~bject

~ture

~ute

That th1.II particular

c~e

the attitude of the

toward the Incarnation a8 the object of faithJ the absolute paradoxieal

of the Incarnation, however, does provide a w:>rtihy' object for the abso-

infinitY' of t 1'2 irrli vidual t 8 passion ate inwardne ss, that is, an intell8e

religious feeling.

7~ierkegaard

Dread, pp. 74-86.

75Kierkegaard,

discusses this point at length in his book,
Postscript, p. 182.

!!!! Concept 2!

The procHs b.r which the indiv1.du.al subject appropriates tbe paradox in
the moment of

8Uprer~e

rel1glcns teel1ng 1s the same proeMS by vh1ch Abrahut

reached tha religious stage of exlsterce, n.el.1, "the infinite double moveMent

ot faith." The first moveP\ll!lnt 1s the M0V'8rwnt

tI resignation; the S"«10

ment i8 t1:8 aot of tait h by whim t1» appropriation is accOMplished.

l'IlOV8-

Botb

tion, It he rtm(Ilnces, tirst, a dependence upon the temporal world and 1t8 at-

tachments,76 but the renunciation cannot be extemallzed except by . . erin, the
!'ltOnastic lite..

It this is im?08sible, the d••ire tor the world 18 accentuated,

and the inner tension alreaa, ex1etiqr, betwetm tai th and

~ea80n

is 1nereued.

A tension of this klnd is not unwelecme to the existential believer) tor it tor-

ee. hiPt at fJ'Iery instaat. to renew h1s abaolute re1atlorahip to Christ. And
lihUe he struggles to maintain this relationahip, ttres1gnaticn

vUl Uke 1ts

inspection early and late to lee how he JI"(lUterres the lotty 8Ole'llll'l1ty with
wh1d:l he tlrst acquired the absolute 4irection to tbe absolute telo,?-

In the !'iret act

or

the 1nfinlte dmble J'!tOIf'e.nt

alao renounce. his dependence upon human reasonJ

where th1.nking leaves oft."

or

17

faith, tbe individual

tor "faith begins precisely

t.

78

For fieric:egaard, as £f# Luther, faith 18 cont.._"'3
79
to reason, and not mere17 abav'e reuon. raith 18
4aa\b at rea&m.

7~bld..

362. 3116. 433.

Ibid., )67. See alao p. 3 6
76Kierkegaard.. Fear _d Trembl.1ng, p. 78.
"

79

' --
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h J . 1,I

s,lren K:ierkegaard, For §.!!!.-Exaa1nation, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford,

-'lQlll\
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After the first movemem of faith, resignation, the individual makes the
second moveMent, the moveMent of adheranee to the paradox.

Kierkegaard clearly

outline s this m.ovement in his PhUosophical Fragment s:
But har does the learner come to realize an understanding with
this Paradox? We do not ask that he understand the Paradox, but
only that this is the Paradox. How this takes place we have alreacly shaW'n. It c:>mes to pass when the Reason and the Paradox encounter one another happily in the r10ment; lIJhen the Reason sets
itselt aside and the Paradox bestows itself. The third entity in
which the union is realized (for it is not realized in the Reason,
sime it is set aside; nor in the Paradox, which bestows itselfhenee it is realized in san ething) is that happy: passion to which
we will now assign a iiime, although it is not the8e-a that so
much matters. We shall call this passions raith.
Sine. the paradox is a historical fact neriting belief, the individual's

adharanee to the paradox will have the qualit)" of belief, tundantentally, a tree
decision on the part of the subject, an act of the will CD!IIIWld.ed by' the
ings-and not m act of the int.llect commanded by the will.

81

f.~

Such a fre. de.

cision is a "qualitativ. leap,1I according to Kierkegaard, an act by vhich something becane 8, sine. all beeomi!'.g takes place thl'ough an act of

~e ..

choice.

80
Kierkegaard, PhUosophical. Fraents, p. 47.

81

Ibid., 50. It is important to note that on the same page he says that
his act is not an act of the intellect, Kierkegaard also sa;,ys that it is not an
ct of the will. The Question of the meaning which Kierkegaard attaches t.o the
erm "will" awaits further study. However, far the purposes of this thesis. it
eems valid t.o remark that. he is only d~ the name If act of the will" to
his act while the individual i8 yet n in error" 1 fOl' when he 1& "in error.. " man
annat ma.le anY' true act of the will in the direction of God, and God must b....
tow the coodi t.i.ons tor thia act. Thus Kierkegaard considers tal th ultimately
gift or God. See Kierkegaard.. Frapents, pp. 51-52. It has also been sugested that by "will" nerkegu:rd. means ttant'a "autollO!llous willll of the order of
thical law and obligation.. and thus of the order of easence and essential opertion. In his denial. or "will" in this s.nse, Kierkegurd is insisting upon
stential faith aa belonging to an order anterior to the "will" and the
intellect," in the same way that Pascal's iin;a:rtii or St. Augustine' 8 "memoria"
r "inquietudo" are anterior to sci.ntific knowledge.
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t is thus th...at the individual renews hi..'Ilself, by Te-creating himself, as it
mre, before God.

And when n.1an casts reason a.side and rejects objective exper-

. ence in order to join

hi~se1.f

to the absolute paradox of the Incarnation by an

inward act of appropria,tion which is a free decision, he is indeed a "new man."

is

V(}ry

faith.

existence is re..iIrtegrai.ed, and he exists iI1 a new relatio:l1ship of

His act of faith is a decisive, subjective act of his whole beil1i:, and

is therefore truly existential in character.
As a new man, having undergone the rebirth <?f h.i.JTtself, man remains finite.
He does mt esoape ti.1'!le and

l!l9

:'ge with the absol'.lte; and at the IJ(L"I1e time, the

etl,rnal beeof!\es immanent in him within his own existence through his new rela.'II

tionship to the eternal.

Man has begun to enjoy his eternal goal in time.

II

SUMMARY

The present chapter has been concerned with the problem of the passage of

the individual from the ethical to the religious sphere of existence.

The

problem itself was presented as Kierkegaard's prc1blem of "becomi:q.g a~ChriBtia.z!'1

"r6 must "become what we alread3" are," because. first, Christianity iiJ a matter
of personal responsibility 81d mt of group practice; secondly, because to k.."lOW
Christianity is not the same as to be a Christian.
The solution of Kierkegaardts problem is to be found. in his <bctrine of
the freedom.

ot belief. The basic concept of Kierkegaard's theory of belief was

seen to be that ot "subjectivity," the active relationship of' man to Christ
through a. personal appropria.tion of one's

!!!. facto

relationship to the Eternal,

and through an active, perse nal realization of the Christian ideal in one' s

own life.
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Furthermore, man I s subjectivity, his relationship to Christ, was seen to
be a truth-relationship which 1s identieal wi th the faith-relationship.

Man, the subjective thinker, was then discussed, and his essential characteristic-pasaion--was explained in its various "expressions," or manifestations,
culminating in the expression ot guUt, JIWl's realization of his estrangement
:fran God and from his om tl'lle selt.

.Man' s need for faith was then presented

as his need tor "repetition, n or regeneration .£'n)m that state
a state

ot vital intercOI!Dnunication

The object

ot faith,

or

total guilt to

with God in existence.

the Incamation

ot Christ, was then discussed. It

val

seen that Itierkegaard's explanation of the Incarnation ot Christ presents that
fact as an "historical" event, an event subject to all the uncertainty of contingent beings.

It is, theretom, absurd, contrad!etolY,to reason, and Para-

doxical, that man must base his eternal happiness upon a matter so unreasonableJ
but nevertheless, the Paradox is the determining factor tor that eternal hap-

piness.
Possible reactions to this "Absolute Paradox" were then explorea, and the
state of "Religiousness Aft was found to be a state of non-Christian commitment

to God, because, although it forces the individual to a renunciation ot worldlT
ends in tavar of the Eternal, it does mt demand Christian appropriation, Binee
it does not face the Paradox that Christ has really' "existed. 1I

The state

ot

"Religiousness B" alone can be tel"'1lled Christianity, because it seeks the paradox in spite of the necessary crucifixion of the intellect involved in accept-

ing such an "absurdity," and reorganizing one's whole existence in tavor of a
tact so intellectually uncertain.
Finally.. the act ot faith i tselt was analysed.. in its intini te double move-

I~
mente The first movement, an act

of infinite resignation, is the act by which

man renounces tnth the lI:)rld 81d the demands of the intellect.

The second move

ment, the act of appropriation itself, is the act of faith, by which a

JII8.fl

blindly, but treely, chooses to believe in spite of all contradiction.<J.

This

act has the effect of placing man unrsserTe<D.y in the religious stage of existence, adrift fl't)m intellectual moorings, but blindly and passionately reatfirming at each successive instant his absolute relationship to Christ.
cmd effect of the act of faith is to produce the man's own existence.

A seSince

aDJ' transit trom potentiality to actuality must lJe the resUlt of an act of free
choice, the act of tree choice which is the faith-act is thus the act by which
man exists in the fullest realization of his human potentialities.

Thus belief

is an act directed toward "existence," and, at the same time, an act affecting
"existence. "
lCierkegaard's own view of the situation of the true Christian is best given in his own words to conclude this chapter: "Without risk

t.be~

Faith is precisely the mntradietion betweEn the infinite passion
vidual t s :inwardness and the objective uncertainty".

is .no faith.
ot~he

indi-

If I am capable of grasping

God objectively. I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must
believe.

It I wish to preserve myself

jn

faith I must constantly be intent upon

polding fast the objective uneertainv, so as to remain out upon the deep. over
82
seventy thoUBal'li tathOMs ot water, still preserving my faith."

82
ICierkegaard, Postscript, p. 182.
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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
There are many worthwhile elements to be found in Itierkegaard' s doctrines
of belief l but much,

toOl

that is questionable.

ter is, after a synthetic review

0

The purpose of the present chap-

f the thesis in the light. at ICierkegaard1 s

sources tor his doctrine at beliet, to present. in a positive way his contributiona to the stud,y of philosopq in the elaboration of the notion d

belief and

in the sphere of Christian action, after 'Which a few negative criticisms will

be att81lpted, part.icularly the questionable Kierkegaardian doctrines involving
his denial. at the validity of reason in matters of faith, and his denial of the

validii¥ of objective truth and objective certitude.

SUMMARY

.

The primary object of this theais has been t.o present and eacplain narkagaarcl'a definition of faith: "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness."

The explanation of this

definition has yielded the following particularizations.
The core of Kierkegaard's treatment of bel1et, as outlined in this thesis,
was found in his problem of "becoming a Christian," and in his solution of the

problem by his dtIlial of the validitT of objective knowledge and his defense of
the subjectivity of truth, and therefore the subjectivity of faith.
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In a wider

frame

or

reterence, through his call1ict with Hegelian Determinism on the one

hand, and with Romantic Aestheticism on the other, he gathered the materials
with which he was to solve his problen.

FroM his conflict with HegelianiSM were

developed the concepts which Ronanticism suggested to h:1.m-his notions ot exis.
tence, of human contingency cd human freedom.

frail his conflict with Romanti-

cism was developed the existential dialectic which his studies of Hegel suggested to him.
When viewed in the light

or

the sources of his cbctrine ot belief, the

doctrine itself becomes mere intelligible.

It was proposed in the thesis that,

inn. uenced on the one side by LutheraniSM, which substituted the will or the

eJlX)tions, or both, for the function at the intellect

~

dealing with religious

belief, and influenced on the other side, through the wri.tings of Kant, by Empiricism, 1ilich substituted acts of beliet fer true and scientific judgments in
dealing with human knowledge, Kierkegaard came to his great conclusion that

of

Indeed, most of his important doctrines, when understood in the light at
the _-fold source :in Luther cd Kant of his notion of belief, become remarkably

cl~.

His revolt against Hegelian Deteminism in the religious sphere

seems nothing more than a re-assertion of Lutheran anti-int ellectualiSlll, a restatement of the opposition between the difficulties of speculative or rational
knoWLedge and the need for a subjective assuramse of salvation--wbich both Luther and Kierlcegaard experienced strongly in their lives.

Again, Kierkegaard'.

concept of guilt, the consciousness of need, tN! painful realibtion of human

sinfulness, echoes the Lutheran teaching roncemini the orig1.n of religious
fa! th in the depravity- of man' s nature.
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Kierkegaard' 8 description of revealed mysteries-especially the Incarnation of Christ--u paradoxical and absurd seems merely to reflect the theological skepticism of Luther and the philosophical. skepticism of Loeke, Hume, and
Kant; while his response to the :incomprehensible, the leap or faith, reflect.
the Lutheran non-rational explanation of bellef as an appropriation of salva-

tlon on the. part of the believer.

In so far as the lea.p wolves choice, or

decision, on the part of the subject, it is linked vi th l'Oluntari 21m and empiricism; in so far as it reflects a passionate inwardness, an exhil&l'ating sense
of risk :induced. by the possibility of choice in the face of objective uncertainty, it shows a Cl. oee affinity 1d th the emtionaliS1ll which is a major factor in the Lutheran cbctrine of assured salvation.
gaard upon the emotional factor

80 dependent was Kiarks-

m religious belief that the only di..scemible

motive for the act ot taith in his writings aeeu to be a teeling of tension
between the damams of faith and the testimony of reason, a feeling that now,
in an f'inatant,tt the choice for God lIlUSt be made.

K1erkegaard I s own de.tJ.nit1on of f&1th as

Ran

objective uncertai\}ty held

fast in an at:Propriation-process ot the Jl:)st passionate inwardness,"

5UlIIS

up

his own doctrine, that of his Lutheran rore-fathers, and that of his philosophical companions.

In his detinition of faith, the "inwardness" of the act of

taith stands torth as a skeptical protest against all objective knowledge) the
Happropriaticl'l-proeesa" is the voluntaristic substitution for this knowledge)
"passion," as the sustaining torce of the decision of taith, is the emotionalisti.c substitution fat' reasonable oertitude in the act of taith.
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EVALUATION

1t1erkegaard's doctrines are intelligible, not

o~

in the llght of his

sources, but alao in the light of the story of philosoplV as a whole.

His con-

tribution to the historical elaboration of the notion of belief has not been
tirelJr original; but it has been a pOllerfUl voice railed in agreement with the
wark of rhllosophers of all times.

The foundation of hil doctrine of belief, the thesis that troth is subjectivitq, has not been without precedent in the history of thought • Assuredly,
the comon-SEIlse n.wof tru.th (and the attitude or ear17 Greek philo8ophers
points wt this fact) is that truth 18 aimpl,y "wha.t

is,"

that is, fundamentally,

an object-real or conceptual--of thcught, reflection, or speculation.

But by

the time of Plato t S more 8aphisti.cated treatment of truth, the v1ew was being
posed that,

altho~

truth is earls:i.derecl

III

object of contemplation whose

tabllit.y and un1ver8ality senea a8 a norm far the changing and particular
x.i.stJ.nc objects of experience, yet truth-or the highest truth, .The ~Good-

erves its mast important function as a basis ft:1l' action.
Ar1atotle, who treated "speculative" truth as d1sti.nct £rom "practical"
ruth, thereby gave support to the notion "that truth is related to an existing
ject as a basis fer decision and action.
After Aristotle, it was cb1efl,y the Skeptics who called attention to the
bjectivitq

or

truth ltben they "withheld assent R bom aU propositions.

In

ing so, they unwittingly proved that the act of assent i. really distinct
om perception or from (xmtemplation. Thil, of i tsel1' 1IOU.ld have been of lite value, had they not at the same t i . shown, again unwittingly'. tllat the act
assent i tselt involves the will and signifies freedom.

They gave, in WI
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manner, impetus to the notion of subjectivity as truth by linking kncwledge
with freeclom of the will, zd thus with realitcY, and thus, too" with action.

As the same time .. in bringing knowledge intD closer union with volition, they
laid the groundwork tor future studies of tlE act of assent itself.

Thus the coz&ribution

ot the Skeptics to

the notion of truth as subject:i.-

vity is mereJ¥ implied from their general position.

otb.cr hand, &ltbrugh his

writi~s

st. Augustine, on the

destroyed the skeptical positi.on, gave a pos-

itive impetus to the notion tha.t truth is subjectivity when he fronded know-

ledge and certitude upon an initial. state of doubt.

He did not, like Kierke-

ga.a.rd and tie modern Elti.stentialists, t1".1 to reach certitude through. despair
of d:>ubtJ he rather chose a state of. cbubt as a starting-point for certitude

because in spite of its negation of knowledge and of cEl!t"titude, dwbt still
contains within itself sane cere of knowledge.

Thus, subjectivity, tha.t ten-

dency to 8eek the criteria tar truth within the individual's inner conscious-

ness, gained

&SCendIillCY

in the wal"ld

ot thoo'ght.
of

If the influence of St. Augustine had remained as strong in the modern

world as it had been in the ancient world, present-day philosophers would probably not be faced with the problelll8 involved in accepting subjectivity as

truth, since the resurgence of Aristotelian intellectual.ism a.t'ter the time ot
Augustine tended to break the preoccupation of thinkers with states- of inner

conscioJ.sness.

Subjectivity is baaie to the question ot belief, and after the

time of Augustine, it was to be discussed in the context of juigm.ent and beliet.

The problems arose, it seems, £ rom later misinterpretations of the

cb c trine ot Aquinas.
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st. Thomas, in his massive synthesis of thought, incorporated an Aristoitelian theory of jud&!!';E!lt (which is concerned lnth true and certain judgments
~llcited by the intellect, moved by its proper object) and an Augustinian the-

pry of belief (which deals psychologically with the act of faith, Lfl which the
Pbject is not directly or fully apprehended by the intellect, and in which the
~telleet must be in1.'l.ueneed to act

bT the will

and the affective powers).

The treatment of Scholastic philosophers, from the time of Scotus until the
~nd of the seventeenth eentuX7, of the doctrines of St. Thomas led

to the ala...

poration of two separate theories--one a theory of judgment, the other a theor,r
~f belief.

The theory of judgment was concemed with true and evident judgments

lmly, md no special problem i8 encountered in the do ctrines of these philo sohers; for their analysis of the act of judgment was undertaken eol.,ly in an atempt to explain how and why truth could be formally attained in the intellect
lone.

1

In their analysis ot judgments of belief, however, they note?- ~t the ap-.
~ehen8ion of divine mysteries <be s

rot d1sclose to the human mind

ic evidence as to cause spootaneous assent.

au~h intrin-

Consequently, they recognized in

Ibe act ot faith an assertiveness attributable to the infiuence of the will and

~anci8 Martin Tyrrell, The Role of Assent in JUdsentf A Thomistic Stu~ ~ (Washington, D. e., 1948). W.---r2-7J.' !fhts pUbliShe doctoral diSBertaion has been of great assistance in the elucidation of the nature of belief.
Wurthermore, trds work, together with an unpublished manuscript, "The Kierllegaardian 'l'hesis of the Subjectivity of Truth" by Robert F. Harvanek, S. J.,
J as served as an tAltline for the his torlcal cO:1ID1ents on the notion of subjec1 ivity in the presmt cha.pter. The latter work has also been helpful in the
E valuation of K1erkegaard IS cb ctrines.
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the affective powers-an element distinct fro 1'1 percept1:m or from apprehension...
and a certJ. "tude not. depende...1'lt upon the clarity of the ev1dl"'nee presented.

2

This recognition is not surprisi.'1£" in view of the fact tha t th9 difference betwee.'1 belief Zl..'1d opinion is not a difference in knowled,ee, but rather a
dif'ference in certitude.
CallS ed

lief.

The certitude w:lich follows the judgment of belief is

by the act of assent, which is the forJ'!liI elanent

ot the essence of be-

.3
In the judgment of belief, the act of appr ,,:heneion msy be clearly distin.

guished from the act of assent.

This distinction between apprehension" the ma.-

terial elemEn t of judgment, and assent, the formal element, seems to hold true
of all judgments.

The 4lprehensive element of judgment is conoeptual, but con-

cepts, whether they have the non-complex character of simple apprehension or

whether they attain the complexitq of a synthesis of

co~epts,

are onl1 repre-

se.ntations of the essences of things, and merely c»nnote-but do not assert~al

existence.

Itherefore

C8lllX)t

Existence, on the other hand, cannot be
be the object of an act of apprehension.

~e object of the

concept~~ed,

and

'Ex1stence"must be

act of assent.

Apprehension, then, the material element of the

esse~e

of judgment, cor-

responds to the essence of the object of judgment; while assent, the formal
~ement, correspoms to the existence of that object.

2

Tyrrell, pp. 72,

3
Ibid., 159, 164.

93, 153.

The act at assent itself,
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considered in itself and in its relation to real existence. seems to possess
the tollowing quali ties I tirst, assent is

active operatioo ot the intellect.

al

It is mt an :intuition or an apprehension, but a conmitment on the part or the
assenting subject, intluenced less by' intellectual apprehension ot the objective eYiticee than by the motives of credibility surrounding the evidence.
Secondly, the act or assent theretore l..,lies SQ1I.e term ot clecislon on the part

at the subject, _

points to the activity t1 the will and the affective powers.

This is moat clearly evident in judgments ot beliet. Third13, the act of aasent is cognitive in the sense that it is
tultills the reqI1rements

ot

or

Cl

act ot the intellect; but it also

aubj activity, in tha t 1 t provide. an enc!:C!!!nt

the assenting subject with real existence.

4

The Thomi.tic philosopher lD8\Y' therefore regard truth as subjectivity in

this qualitied sense withwt aband.cning the Thomistic posl tion on the primacy

or the in tell act

in man' s nature.

This same notian

or

the subjectivity

or

truth 1s supported -bT -ehinkers out.
of

side the Thomistic school, eTtl1 those whose general positions are widely divergent in other respects.
Wh1le the Bnpirical schools were losing contact with reality in their sup-

port ot subjectivity, subjectivity received important clarification trom the
resurrected schools ot Realism.
in doctrines

Realism bas been ftI-asserteci in modem times

ot "intentionality" bT the late nineteenth centnJ.Y schools ot psy-

chology, which liberated truth trOJll the exclusive control

or

the will, and at-

teIJiIted to bring it once more into the province ot the intellect.

4

-Ibid., IS5, 167.
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Franz Brentano is a typical exanple of this modern trend toward realism.

ie expressed. the newer

VleWS

on human knowledge in a psyehologieal centext, and

IlOst profoundly intluenced the more modem theories of judgtl'lltnt and belief.
In his study of judgment, Brentano maintained that judgment (bes not eon-

nst merely in a composition of ooncepts, as the Associationists like Hume and
the Empiricists like Locke had contended.

Brentano atfi1'llled, on the contrary,

ithat cauposition nterely' precedes acmu judgJnent, and is oilly part of the propess of the representation of reality.

The act of j1¥1gment is in itself unique,

an operation d1tfer1ng wholly' frail representation, 1ihlcb at1'1nu or denies the
!Content of the representation far reall ty.

Further, the content represents the

pbjective structure of realitYJ the judglltent accepts or rejects their correspondence.

5

Attempts to explain the character of this act of judgment ln the realm of
~l1ef

b7 philosophers after Brent&no has resulted in the typical present-day

attitude

or

philosophy toward belief, 1Ih1ch will here be briefly: reT).ewed.

Pursuing a eommon conviction that judgment is "an attltude of mlnd towards
suggested fact, ,,6 distinguished from "thinking-about" or simple awareness of
the suggestion, ("inasmuch u in the act of judgment there goes with the pre-

5See Peter Hoenen, S.J., Reality 8ld JUdf:!nt According to St. ThOm.U~
trans. Henry F. Tlblier, S. J. (Chicago, 195~7pp. 52::62. J!r. 'ROeneis
terpretat10n of Hrentano has 'been 1'ol1CJn1d here. See also Alexander Ma1r,
"Bellef," EneiClopaedia 2! Relis1;on !!!.2 Ethics, ed. James Hastings (New York,

1910), II,
6

lis •

Ma:1r, p.

459.

lOS
sented suggestion acceptance

at"

rejection on the part cL the subject," 1) Bald-

S

win, for example, concluded that "bellef is tne subjective sid. ot judgment."

That is, as tar as the act of judgment is concerned, it may be identified with
the act

or beliet; for

in that act, "the subject orientates himsolt towards

reallty,n 9 but realiv does not press itselt upon the subject.
that Realism. has cm tributed

1:1:>

It 1iOuld seem

the mcdern vUw onl¥ the coo.v.i.ction that exis-

tence is involved in judgment and beliet, tor the typical present-da.Y M.ttitude

still retains the old Empirical 8USpicion that beliet is indeed a subjective
reaction to :reality, but that its intellectual JIlOorings are weak.
mexlerll minds, "beliet is antecedent

to knowledge; If

10

Indeed, in

bit modem thinkers are

follON'ing in the footsteps ot St. AUgllstine" whose taith sought understanding,
with le8s assuranc e ot success than Auptine enjoyed.
In spite at the limitations lilidl modern realism places upon the function

ot the intellect in the act of beliet, however, realism. still acknowledges the
pre.Slce ot the cognitive fac1x>r in belief, and do es not give OV'er the appre~

hension of malitv entirely to the

..a..11,

and admits at least that cognition
11
serves a.s the "immediate point of reference"
for the act of belief. StUl,

it is the conative taetor--the will--which is given the primacy" as the I'IlOst

-

7Ibid.
8

10Ibid., 460.
11
Ibid.
9
Ibid.

Ibid.

1
'i,
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important determinant of belief; and in this context, we "orientate oursel"es

this wll3' and that according to need, bY' means of the paver of attention, which
mvolves selection, self-determination.

In brief ••• 'we will to believe, .J2

as William James announced.
The extent of agreement with respect to the basic elements proper to the
concept of belief may be briefly indicated bY' reference to standard author! ...
ties.

13

I
I

St. Thomas distinguishes four senses in which the term "belief" may

1:
'I

I

be used, each of which is regularly employ-ed to modern phi1osophers.

In its

widest sense, beliet Rcomprehems every assent ot the human mind, whether it be
given in virtue ot intrinsic or extrinsic ev1dence. R14 This usage,
bY' St. Thanas,

15

is confirmed by Harent,

16

am

by' Alexander Mair,

cribes it to J. S. M1ll in bis attack upon Hamilton.
defmed as "strong opinion" b7 St. Thomas.

12

18

17

~'F1Q1e~
who as-

Seoordly, beliet is also

This use ot the term is described

13-

Ibid. , 462.

S. Hard, S. J., "CroYal1ce," ~, ed. A. Vacant (Paris, 1903), III,
2364-2396. Mair, pp. 169-465. A. Lalande, Vocabu1aire techni~ue et critique
2!. !!:. PhUosop!p.e, 5th ed. (Paris, 1947), pp. 189-191. TiiTel I p7"91.

14ryrrell, p. 91.
15
St. ThOMas Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, Parma ed., VIII,

247.
16

---

Harent, col. 2364.

17Mair, p. 459.
18

230.

St. Thomas Aquinas,

~

Veritate, 2. 14, a. 2, c., Parma

ed., IX, 229-
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by both Harent and Lalande19 as current in modern times.

Thirdly, beliet, con-

sidered in a restricted sense" is customarily referred to as "faith," and "is
20
primarily intended by st. Thomas."
In this sense, belief is defined as "the

firm assent of the intellect which is given under the influence of the will on
21
the basis ot extrinsic evidence."
Harent adds here that we are indebted to
Bossuet tor the observation that this type of belief m;q be either "human· or
"divine" faith, depeming upon the origin of the testimony.

22

Fourthly, and :nI)st apt for the present purpose of this thesis, is the use

ot the word "belleflt to irrlicate "a sure assent which is placed under volition
intluence because the object i5 not so distinctly perceived as to compel assent
of itself."

23 Harent indicates this usage most clearly, asserting that it 1s

remarkable how philosophers of the most heterogeneous sC,hools agree in placing
24
belief sanewhere between knowledge and opinion.
In thi s final sense of the
term "beliet,· the "bellet of kriOwledge" (that is, beli.t which carries with i
a tear that the opposite may be true), is characterized by philQsopaers a.ncien

and modern as depending upon a less distinct perception of the objedt, and requiring the innuence of the will.

The role of tile af'fective faculties in be-

lief is precisely to supply'--in the production of certitude-.for the insufficiency ot the intellectual light which should proceed from the object.

Laland

19Harent"

4 Lalande, p. 190.
co 1. 236.
2OTyrrell, p. 91.
215•• st. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q.2, a. 1, e., Parma ed., III, 10
22

Harent" col. 2364.

-

-

23

Tyrrell, p. 91. See St. Thomas Aquinas,

ed., III, 10, am Lalande, p. 190.

!.!., II-II,

q. 2, a. 1, Parma

24

Harent, col. 2)64.
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describes this popular use of tbe term "belief" :in modern times to the :Ln.nuence of Kant; and Alexander Mair discusses the problem of belief almost entirel1
in th is coo. text.

What pertinent conclusions can be drawn hom this discussion?

It would

seem tha t the problem of subjectivity arises :in the sphere of belief, and finis
iits soluticn ir. the

jud~nt

formal elanent of belief.

of belief' ald in tbe act of assent which is the

It is apparent that, generally speaking, all philo-

sophers agl"M that b.elief lies somewhere between la¥.>wledge and opinion.

It 1s

apparent, too, that belief is endowed with a certitude which opinion can never
possess, and that, on the other hand, it is not to be confused with apprehension.

In calsecpence of' this, belief' must be determined by aome other ele-

ments of' human nature, the w11l.

In the determination of belief, scholastic

philosophers will insist. upon a sufficiency of rat.ional motives fer asunt
(extrinsic objective evidence in the case of supernatural faith, both extrinsic and intrinsic evidence in the case of natural belief), and 1t'11l maintain

•

that the act of belief must be elicited by' the intellect.

Others w:iJ.l empha-

size personal need as a motive for bellef, or stress environment and education
as influences in the act of belief, and look upon the lhole personality or the
will as the primary subject of the act.

All will agree that beUef represents

a personal attitude toward reali V, because beliefs are accepted by man in a
personal decision-for" in belief the evidence of known truth does not demand
the assent of the intellect-in an act which is unique, not an intuition or an
appreh..mlion, but· a:n act which expresses the definite attitude of the person-

ality tCMardS experience, and which is characterized by a personal endoraement
of reality.

This altogether unique act of' assent" which is the essence of the

judgment of belief, has been shown to be considered by philosophers in the
terms stated aboveJ but basicall¥, there are only two positions: either the act
IOf assent is an act of the intellect, cOl'llll1anded by the will and. influenced b)"
the other affective faculties, or it
the other affective faculties.

~s

an act of the will alone, infiuenced by

The latter view is that of the Voluntarists,

and it is also Kierkegaaro's view.

His terminology differs; his concept of the

act of belief differs slightly, in that his act of belief is identical with the
act of true existence; but all the characteristl,c elements of belief are present in his expana:tion of subjectivity, especially the element of personal..

tree decision and the 1nvolyement of the total personality in that deei.Jion.
Kierkegurc:i's contribution to the elaboration of the concept of belief has
not, therefore, been entirely original.

h~e

lli.s doctrines

had their chief' ef-

fect through their timeliness in re-activ6.t!ng Protestant religious fervor.
His contribution to the sphere of ChrisUan living has been of the same charac-

ter.

His contention that knowledge is not virtue has long been .conmon coin in

the realm o£ religious activ.L V.

That belief. are perhaps the most effective and important foundations of
activity is univex'sa.1lT admitted by all writers--Protestant and Catholic alike
--both on the natural and on the supernatural level.

It is usumed that our

activities are based upon our certitudes of belief as well as upon our certitudes of knowledge; but explicit studies of t.he character of belief as related

to activity are rather infreque11ti.
That there Us a differenco between "speculativeU and "practical" assent

canDOt be denied.

Preachers of all faiths

invei~

against a sterUe acceptance

of creeds without the translation of creed into action.
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It is to Cardinal Newman that we a.re indebted for a detailed explanation
of this distinction betwee.11 speculative and pra.ctical assent.
notional# or speculative, assent and

real~

or

practical~

Notional assent is concerned with abstract propositions.

His diiscussion

0

assent is well known.
It is merely an intel

lectual acceptance of truth, and need have no bearing upon life and conduct.

,I
I

Real assent, on the other hand, is not merely intellectual; it has for its object "not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful,
admirable, heroic; objects wb.ich kirxlle devotion, rouse the passions and attach
the aff'ectionsJ and thus it leads the WC\Y to actions of every kind# to the es...
tablishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus .gain in.
timate1y connected with what is individua.l and personal."

25

In s...hort# it is

the total personality, greatly intluenced by affective fa,(rt;ors, which is the
true subject of assent.

Perhap s Newman best aumrned up his idea of rea.l assent

when he wrote, "Many a man will llve and die upon a dogma, no man will be a
tyr for a conclusion."

l'IJ.I.r-

26

.

A similar attitude of mind, not developed into a philosophical doetrine,
is suggested by the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola.

27

This at-

titude mq be br1efiy :mdicated as an example of the use of practical assent.
The exereitant is asked by St. Ignatius to consider basic religious principles
and their general application to life and conduct.

25
26

John Henry Newman, Grammar

-

27
4th ed.

£! Assent

Wh«1 assent is achieved

(London, 1892), pp. 90-91.

Ibid., 93.

St. Ignatius of Loyola, The Seiritual Exercises# trans. John S. MoO"is,
(Westminster, Md., 1943).'

I~:
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here (and only speculative assent is demanded.), the exercitant is then led to
bring to bear all his faculties of iw.agination, and all the personal motives ot
repen.t811ce and gratitude to an affect..ive state which culminates in the Election
--a moment

ot decision-based upon his speculative convictions, but demanding a

complete reorientation of thought and activity, bolstered by all the powers
will and imagination.

The object ot the real assent is Sll.rely no different from

that of the notimal assent which preceded it,; for the subject
than he did before.
practical.

ot

kl'lOWS 00

more

But his assent is mw rot JJl!!rely intellectual; it is alao

It involves a decision, a personal conrnitment to a way of life.

This is the aspect ot belief which is emphasized. by Kierlcegaard, and by
other authors of modem times.

"Belief," they inSist, "expresses the definite

attitude of the personality towards its experience."
whole, mally-sided self."

28

~e

believe with the

29

This is the character of' Kierkegaard's act of faith.

It is a personal de-

cli.catlcn to Truth, in an act which is really the act ot existence, the act by

.

which one "becomes" 'What he treely chooses to be, a Christian in the fullest
sense

ot

the word.

CRITICISM

But to find. echoes ot Kierkegaard's own ideas in the

COnlllon

traditions of

tbOl1eht and of Christian activity is not the same as recomnending lierkee:aard'.
cbctrines withmt qualification. While there is much good in IC1erkegaard l s
writings-for eXIUIPle. his devastating cri. tique of the "idea-theory"

or

truth,

his emphasis upon the role of the existing i1'¥:i1:v1dual in the problem of know-

28

29Mair, p. 462.
Ibid.
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ledge and being, his exploration of the cha.racter of etpico-religious truth in

terms of subjectivity, r.is analysis of the nature of tersonal conversion and
personal comm.itment to being and to Gocl--there is mt'lCh also that. destroys the

value :i' his fi:rlshed work.

His denial of' the validity of human reaSal in the

sphere of faith, his denhl of the validity of objective truth, and his skf'ptical resolution of objective uncertainty by an act of the l-Till are fundamental
errors.
The first of the Kierkegaardian roetrines :which vitiate his contribution

to the elaboration of the notion of belief is his denial of the value of nason
for faith.

While he was justified in proclaiming the incompatibility o! re-

ligious tl"'J.th and the absolutist. reascn bequeathed to his cwn time by Hegel, a

and althrugh his c::mpla,1nt that doctrinal knowledge lar [Jely fails to arouse a
response in the practical order was lef;i ti.'!J&te~ madeJ still he erred basically by neglectill! to note that theology can beJ and is, both speculative and

practical.

It is true that theology is conc::erned primarily wit,tl mants

knowledg~

of God; but theolou is also concerned wi th directing human actions of toward God,
thereby fulfilling perfectly the demands of true wisdom-that virtue which
judges and orders all things taurd mants f1nal erd.

Once it becaftes clear

that thoology is both speculative and I%'actical, one 'fIfI!IY pursue theological
speculation withwt implying tlult su:il speculatim is due to a weakness of beIj.ei on the one hand, or that there is a
natural &Bsent

am

c~rom1se

1:0 be nade between super-

man's human faith.

St. Augustine •• faith sought uncierstanding in order that faith might be
strengthened, not in arder that understanding might abolish faith in this 1i.te.
n.rkegaarci's faith f'lees understanding, embracing religiQts Bl1'sterie8 in all
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their incomprehensibility.

IC1erkegaard failed to realize that not all revealed

truths are unknowable)

relig1.00.s truths are penetrable by human reason,

lOme

but have also been revealed because of their importance for our salvation.

H1a

re.f'usal to consider these truths intellectuaJ.l¥ is merely the reaction of an
anti-intellectual Lutheran Minister to revelation, and doe s not honor the facts
of the situation as they are presented to the intellect.
Secondly, a ,more basic error on K1erkegaarc1's part is f(11nd in his denial
of the validity of objective truth.

The object. <:L our knowledge may, of course

be ccnsidered "uncertain" when we are dealing with pereeption.

In all cases 1rI

which the intellect is not bound to assent, because of a lack of intellectual
clarity of t.he object presented the mind can be drawn, through distraction,
through further questioning, or through unwillingness to face the issue, to
turn aside frolll the objective evidence presented.
only as long as assent is wi thhel.d.

Such evidence is "uncertain"

The uncertainty thereto re lies in the subi

ject) it is not true to s81' that the evidence is of itself

unc~11l

in all

cases. To speak <:L ·objective uncertainty"" in the realm of faith i1l to underMine entirely the signit1cance of the content of faith.
Even i t it were to be conceded that the "uncertaintY" of objective evi-

dence, as present in some cases, is sufficient justification for generalizing
that fact into an all-inclusive doctrine, lCierkegaard' s presentation of belief
would still flounder in its most .f'undamCltal aspect : namely, his resolution of
objective uncertainty by an act of 'til e vi 11. SUch a position completely sevU'!
the connection of the intellect with certitude, and !lUSt end in intellectual
skepticism.

Kierkegaard is correct in maintaining that the contact of the sub

ject ot thought with its object,

existi~

not as object but as subject, is un-

I
I

attainable in the :ideal order; for it is true that judgment is necessary to
e.tfect an ensaBement of the subject with its object as an existing subject.
It is not, bowver, true to say that the intellect itself can in no way a.pprehend existence, and that therefore decision m.ust substitute for intellectual

! I

judgment.
One argument to refute Kierkegaard when he sqs that intellectual. uneer

ty can be resolved into certitude by an act

or

the will is loond in the fact

that such a proposition involves a vicious circle.

The uneC'ta1nty ot intel-

lectual evidence cannot become certa1n through an act ot the will i f it is asaumed

! priori that the will is the tacul V which makes the uncertain a cer-

tainty through i tE decision, or, on the other hand, if it is assumed that Iier-

kegaard's propositi<n is rot ! priori, but is given in
If' the proposition is assumed
On

r~ity.

! priori, it mq be as gratuitously' denied.

the other hand, the proposition is def1ni1iely coosidered by Kierkegaard as

actually given :in reality.

He accepts with out question the fact. thlAt it is

realJ.T true that the will is the ult1mat e faculty in the resolution 't,f inteUec
tual uncertainty.

If Kierkegaard's proposition is accepted at its face value,

then, that proposition itself must be certified by an act at the will; it cannot be

aec.~ed

as true,

at:

ality, but onlJ' in decision.

as given in reality-for truth is not frond in reThus, Kierkegaard irJt roduces a vicious circle

into his reasoning, and invalidates his fumamental principles.

Cmsequently',
1.1

K1erkegul'C:i's voluntaristic theoI7 merely perpetuates a gratuitous skepticism,
and cc:n tributes nothing to the solution of the real problem of belief.
ThirdlY', suppose, on the other hand, th& Kierkegaard is willing to accept
this criticisn, but msYers that the uncertainties of the presented object are

I

llS

pot resolved at all and that the subject proceeds with the existential leap,
embracing passionately all the contradictions thrcngh the decision of faith, and.
therea.!'ter lives bravely for God in spite of the contradictions presented to his

reason.
The answer to this type of skepticism is t'WO-fold: first, Kierkegaardts
voluntarism· is UIlH'arrantedJ secondly, it is dangerous.
Kierkegaard's voluntarism is unwarranted, since, when skepticism withholds
assent because of the presumed uncertainty of the evidence, it calls attention
only to the fact that assent is under the control of the will, not that assent
is the act of the will alone.
will

am the

Skepticism ignores the inter-causality of the

intellect (which is due to their reflectivity as spiritual powers) J

and fails to real1ze that whether assent is f,:iven or not will depend, not wholly
upon the will and the feelings, but, in large measure, upon the quality of the
apprehension of the erldunce, -.nd. upon the direction of the act of assent by
the specification of the intellect.
Secondly, Kierkegaard' s skepticism and voluntarism. are dangerous, since

theu deprive man of roth

goal and guide in his acts of assent.

Iierkegaard can-

not escape the aimlessness of irrational commitment to s:>me unapprehended
"truth· lII&rely by" asserting that his interest is .focussed not upon the "what"

or

Christianity, which he takes for granted as

the "how" of man's relationship to it.

kmw intellectua.l.l.3, but upon

He is so interested in mants subjective

relationship to fltruthV through the blind activity of the will and the feelings.
that he is will.ing that man be related to something which is not in itself true
as long as man posits the relationship with the required intensity of feel1nglJJ
301'1
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This is anti-intellectualism in its highest degree, and cannot but undo whatever good Kierkegaard has proci.lced by his thesis that fltruth is subjectiv1ty"."
CONCLUSION

The most fitting conclusion for this thesis is not a negative one, however
and the judgment that Kierkegaard's basic position is anti-intellectual cannot

serve as a sweeping negation of his whole philosophy.

He has presented m.uch

valuable evidence for his position, which deserves honest attention.
provided new insights in-oo the psychologieal

lif~

He has

of man; and ttBse likewise

our,ht to be tested for validity before judgment is made.

Kierkegaardts great

contribltion is that he has enriched the philosophical lexicon with significant
elaboratims, and has revived md re-presented important but half-forgotten
truths.

In particular, his great concepts of "existence,."

or

and of "freedom," which served as the bas1s for the whole body

"contingenq, U

ot his thought

and that of the Existentialist movement of which he is the acknowledged founder, are of considerable int>ortance for philo80pQY alXi tor life •.
of

Kie:ricegaard md the Existentialists have been accused of dressirig up old
ideas in dramatic and mysterious language and of presenting these disguised
coDlllonplaces as origiral creatims.

The accusation is not entirely fair.

It

may be true to say that these philosophers are enunciating commonplaces in the
sense that they are advancing proposi tiona which tell us, in solemn and frecpently obscure language, what we already know--for example, that we are finite
contingmt, unstable, and rree--but their dramatic treatment of these truths
is justified in view or their desire to

Ii ttract

our attention, by' means of

tragically tortuous verbal dis play, to significant truths which are indeed

1tnown by all, but are, in tact, often ignored.

I.
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It would. seen that their ooncern is well founded; for both in philosophy
and in life, human finitude and instability md dependence are generally not
treated with anguished and passionate interest.

Perhaps they sho\1ld not be so

treated; perhaps a (letached view of philosophical problems is the surest means
of achieving an unclouded vision of the truth.

Kierkegaard did not think so;

and pertups his mt1.on of passionate int:.erest in hUMn existence, human con-

tingeneyand human freeoom is a laudible
blem.

am

le~timate

approach to tM pro-

For example, it is elear from the foregoing pages of this thesis that

Kierkegaard's concern with these mt1.ons (a.lthough his ooncem had been characteristie of his thought from thE; start) developed si.gni.ficantly dlr.i.ng his
attack upon the Detena1n:i.sm of Hegel.

He objected that Hegel had ignored the

true mUons of man's cpntingency and freedom because he had ignored the preeminent irrportance of the existing individual, zmd that Hegel had replaced the
re~ity

of the contingent world with the notion of m inexorably-evolving idea

Students of Kierkegaard remind us that In hi s attack upon phUosopir¥ as a
mole, he was attacking only this Hegelian brand of absolutist thou"ght; for
that was the only system "With which he was well acquainted.
But is not the same kind of over-simplification and over-abstraction the
curse of all systematie systems-even those systems of nrxl crate realism which
protess to fW their problems rooted in reali1\1 am their solutions applicable to reality?

Systems of thollght tend to beeane doctrinal; and succeeding
I

I

gEnerations of phUosophers find it more and more dift1cult to proceed induc-

tively when facing peremial problems.

Original problems, once solved, becOl8

simpli.fied and tailored for use as stereotyped "examples" to be used as pedagogical illustrations in classrooms, where the doctrine is transmitted to

I'
!
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students to begin the history of philosophy anew by struggling with problems
which have already been solved in the history

or

philosophy, still the doctrine

itself tends to become more and more abstract and theoretical as the origina.l
problem tends less a.nd less to be a real problem.

As more and more illustrativ

"texts" are consulted, philosophy tends more and more to become a project of
thought rather than a search tor real causes of reality and of really existing
beings, or the appl1eation of real principles to real problems.
A corrective muat be applied from time to time, calling attention once

again to real existence as the origin. and touchstone of philosophy, to man's
contingency as the radical source of his instability and ronfusion, to man's
freedaft as the subjective source of his salvation from instability and confusion.

In short, we must be reminded from time to time, as IC.ierkegaard reminded

the thinkers of his day, that we need philosophies
about We.

S!!

life, not philosophies

JCierkegaard. and his intellectual heirs have applied this correctivt

to philosophy in modern times, and we are indebted to t.hem for

a~tempting

to

revive in the mims of philosophers, and even of casual readers, an interest in
the human situation.
Not only in philosophy 1s the lack ot interest in human existence and human individuality and hlllUll treedom apparent.

The same lack of attention to

"authentic" ex1stEllce and indivicha11ty is found in society generally.

Our

twentieth century has witnessed a great revival of the "herd mentality" against
which Kierlcegaard raged in the nineteenth centurn and man's loss of individual...
ity is apparent in many spheres of human activity.
Politieally, totalitarianisms of various kinds bave waxed and waned, each
taking its toll. of hU1lll&D. individuality, .treed.om, and dignity.

NaZism, Fascism,

III
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Communism, Socialism and the Welfare State have all, each in its own way, eontributed to the formation of featllreless "masses," and the strong individual 1'8&
today beeome a rarity, to be a.dm1.red but not imitated.

Even :in free democracies, such as our own country, responsible individualism has beeoma a qualltu to be avoided.

"Public Opinion, tt an attenpt to ereate

a universal" will thl'O.1 goh r!'l>dern man' s desire for eooformity at any cost, is

only a minor manifestation of the

a> cial

and intellectual leveling process

whil')'

is now at work.
Socially, modern man's perfection has come to consist in his conformity in
all things with his fellows in every activity of life; and even the "newsworthy'"

exceptions, the heroes and heroines of the root1on pictures, seem identical with

one another, m.d irxUvidualized only in their possessing more cr less of the
same thinr:.

Hodem man is now de.fimd in terms of his .fUnctions in society--biolog1eal,
economic, or social.

Do we not speak of our friends and

acqllain~ane.,

in terms

of the services which they rE>..nder to society, 1ilen we describe them 1b others?
A.t one time, not so long ago, a man could be identified by ascertaining froll

what neighborhood or parish he came} he acquired his characteristic features at

least from the small group of people with ltlom. he asoociated.

Today, a man is

individualised only according to his social, economic, or biologieal function
as a I!W'}mber of a faceless group.

What corrective can be applied to recall to modern man the eircumstances

of his human existence?

Twentieth-een1nry man must learn anew the lessons of

individual Sld social responsibility through intelligent use

treasure of tree self-detendnation.

or

his precarious

He must do this in order to counteract
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the sense of his contingmcy and insecurity, a lesson which he has learned onl¥
too well.
Will Kierkegaard prove to be the savinr corrective fer the over-abstractio
of philosophy, and for man's preoccupation mth his intnediate social needs?
EmergEncy correctives, like the old-time leech and the puree, are apt to be
drastic

and extreme.

For this reason, Kierkegaard's unqualified existential-

ism may be looked upon by some as the only answer; but Kierkegaard has been d
just over one hundred years, and perhaps i t is. time for a Jlk)re modified approach, in which a solution tor the problem of hUJ'll\n existence, of human contingmcy, tI'ld hUlllUl freedom can be found throud'l a moderate realism which takes
advantage of the invaluable insights of Kierkegaard' s original protest, wi thout ooll'lllitt.1ng itself to his intellectual despair.

'roo

problem. cmfront:1ng such a mocerate realism is wide and conplex.

We

are deaUng with ext.remes: Essentialism versus existentialism; the view of man'
perfection and happiness as contemplation versus the view of ma,nts .perfection
&s effected throurh sane ld.nd of action; the primacy of the i,1te1lebt versus
the primacy of the will.

These problems, of conrse, are too wide and too

COM-

plex for treatment in this thesis; but a feH' remarks concerning Kie:rkegaardts
basic concepts d

existEllce, contingency, ani freedom, can be valuable in the

application of correctives to modern philosophy and modern society.
Professor Etienne

Gilson~

a brilliant philosopher and historian of philo-

sophy, has made it the object of his book, Being

!!!! ~

Philosophers, to

point out that in the age-old vacillation of philosophers between the extremes
of essentialism and existentialism, the adherants of neither extreme can be
success.tUl for long, since neither extreme is a eonplete answer for the problem
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of philosopbT, the problem of being.

Thollistic philosoplV", on the other hand,

as the moderate tulcruJll between the two, alwqs aa:l.nta.1ns an easy balance between essentialism and existentialism.

For the Thomistic phUosopher, created.

being 1s neither essence nor existence, blt a synthesis or a>m.posite of essence
existence, transcendentall.7 related to each other as act
-incomplete
in itself, and needing the other for cOllpletion.
and

and potencyI each

It is in this CDntext that Kierkegaard's eontribution of the notion ot existence, though in itself greatly exaggerated, and requiring the application ot
a corrective, provides an unbelJ.evably rich elaboration ot the notion of existence.

His contribution serves, first ot all, as a permanent and necessa17 re-

minder ot the claims ot real existence upon the phUosopher.

Secondl3, his

description ot the human situation in existence, with all ot its uncertainty,
its anguish and insecuri1\r, its contradictions and its dSftanc:ls, points dramatically and tragically to the rad1eal instability ot human existence which is
GIlly implied in a detached and disinterested anall'sis ot the es!Senttal compos1tlon at the heart of the nature ot an.
The o>ntribltion ot X1el'kegaard' 8 concepts ot contingency and treedom. to
the platform. of lIIOderate realism. cannot be

80

readily usessedJ no reputable

spokesman has yet indicated 1il at Tbomistic pbilosophT bas to learn troa ICierkegaard's analysis of buman cont.ingenq cd treedom.

However, it seas to be

correct to sIlT that tbe Thomistic philosopher has, on the whole, made better
use of the notion ot contingency thm K1erkegaard; tor the latter has been uno

willing to malee the rational inference fl"Om effect

to

C8Il8e

1D ci.emonatrating

the existence of God, and has preterred gratuitously' to alntain that intellectual certitude i8 1lIposs1ble, that JI1'Stery i8 preferable to d.emonstration.
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K1erkegaardl s notion of f'loeedom md free choice, however, can be of serv_
to the Thomistic philosopher in the DXXiern world; for he calls attention to the

neeessi4;,. of choice, and to the responsibility of the individual for his choice
He has stated and. analysed the corditions for authentic choice.

He has point-

ed out in vivid terms what we Mean lben we SIl3', "We make ourselves what we areby'

our choice, and what we mean when we speak of oo.r "true" selves.

The tirst

should signify' that our choices are the determinants of our character, and the
resultant character is the determinant of

.tutur~

choice, the latter should

mean that we recognize in ourselves possibilities for progress and development
which call for energetic and resolute action on our part.

lOlfers, Bartre, Camus,

am

Kierkegaard' s fol-

Heidegger .. have igncred the object of choice which

he so carefull3' described, and to which he demanded unconditional commitment.
It is the ruty of the Christian philosopher to insist again upon Kierkegaard's
fundamental postUlate: It is God alene 'Wbo is the goal of our choice and our

dedication, the only s:rurce of human personal reintegraticn, the. onlY' completely

'WOrthY' ideal.

"

In general, it may be said that Kierkegaard can lUke a significant contribltion to Thomisti c philosophy by providing a new perspective and a new insight into facts of which ve are already aware.

He directs our attention again

to limits which mB3' be only lIIlrginal in our philosophical considerations or in
our daily living.

But he focusses our attention dramaticallT upon human fini-

tude, human l.1JII1tation, and human potentiality, ald thus he can be of service
in the ccnstlUction of a Christian philosophy" of relig:lonJ for he also insists
upon coosider:ing man, not as a member of tl"a crowd, absorbed in social, biological, or economic functions,

w t rather as an individual existing subject, who
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discovers hiuelt in existence as a pUgrim on the

W&;f

to God, striving after

the realizaticn of his ideals in God through his tendency bard God by means

of a free dedication to God in a relationship which at once constitutes his

highest duty and his greatest happinsS8.
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